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Consuelo Preti

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RUSSELL AND THE WOMEN

CONSUELO PRETI
Philosophy / The College of New Jersey
Ewing, NJ 08628, USA
PRETI@TCNJ.EDU

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This collection of essays is the fruit of a 2021 workshop at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University on Russell's relationships to women—his personal relationships, as well as his relationships to professional women in philosophy. The idea, as explained by the editors, was to re-examine what Russell's "values, behavior, and feminism" tell us about "his life, thought, and influence" (p. 6). The aims of these essays are (1) to examine some of Russell's romantic relationships in the light of his own ethical and political views about marriage, sex, and family; (2) to "recover and re-examine" the contributions of neglected women philosophers like Alice Ambrose, L. Susan Stebbing, E. E. Constance Jones, Margaret MacDonald, and Dorothy Wrinch (via their relations to Russell); and (3) to make "a more nuanced appraisal" of Russell's legacy by way of these considerations.

Three essays in the volume (Koç Maclean, Connell, Forbes) look to establish a verdict of moral accountability with respect to Russell's personal relationships by applying his own theoretical commitments, or under more general theoretical criteria. Koç Maclean, in the opening essay, argues that Russell was morally culpable in his behaviour with respect to Helen Dudley and Vivien Eliot, in that Russell benefited from a socio-political power imbalance with respect to both women. Russell is held to have objectified these women in that he treated them fungibly and instrumentally, denying their subjectivity and autonomy (p. 15). This objectification was made possible by the lack of "respect and regard", which mainly included a disregard of the need for their consent to being objectified,

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which Koç Maclean argues should have been subject to restraint on Russell's part, as the more powerful party in these relations.

However, it is not made entirely clear how a sexual objectification could take place *with* the consent of the allegedly objectified party, since one's consent to being objectified seems to take place within a context of respect of one's subjectivity and autonomy (if it's genuine consent). Koç Maclean argues that Russell is at fault because he didn't respect the women enough to ask for their consent to be objectified. This is deeply puzzling since, as she acknowledges, he *couldn't* have asked them for their consent in any genuine way, because he had all the socio-political power.

One issue highlighted here is the implicit claim that we are morally required to bow out of emotional/sexual/personal relationships if the other party is in the subordinate intellectual/social/political position. Consider, for instance, that Russell might well have been intellectually, socially, and politically superior to nearly anyone he met in the context of nineteenth and twentieth-century Western social structures. Would that really require him to forgo a personal life, on the ground that he would be, in (nearly) every case, in effect taking advantage of a power imbalance? Moreover, women during this period were in general fixed in a subordinate societal position, period. Would Russell have had to take a moral/political stand against any personal life until this were rectified? He'd still be waiting, it must be said. Finally, there seems to be a peculiar set of ideological criteria driving Koç Maclean's argument on the moral dimensions of Russell's personal relations. We can agree that *women* occupied a subordinate role in society but might want to resist the implication that this somehow erases any one woman's *individual* autonomy.

This worry arises for Loner's essay on Alice Ambrose, an American student of Wittgenstein's, who went on to a career in philosophy at Smith College. In his zeal to condemn Ambrose as a casualty of a host of intersectional political and social vectors, Loner silences Ambrose herself, despite a detailed examination of her work, her correspondence, and her interactions with Wittgenstein and Russell in the debate on the foundations of mathematics in the 1930s, and her later career. Loner contends that "what happened to Ambrose was the result of patterns of thought and marginalization situated within the contingencies of knowledge, disciplinarity, and power in the University of Cambridge's interwar culture, itself the result of the late imperial British order" (p. 117). But what did "happen" to Ambrose? Loner maintains that she "had to adopt the language of the mythos she was meant to be supporting" (p. 119): namely, to impress upon the community the importance of Wittgenstein, her teacher. As Loner tells it, Ambrose was permitted to become a student at Cambridge in 1932 mainly to serve as exegete to the fancy smart white men running the show, and ever after was trapped in that role.

Alice Ambrose herself—her choices, her own subsequent career, her work and her own account of her life (in letters, and in her memoir of studying with Wittgenstein)—is reduced to a cautionary example of socio-political oppression working through philosophical historiography, formulated in Loner's essay in lively ideological terms. But why wasn't Ambrose centered in her own story? For instance, Wittgenstein chose her, and only one other student, to collect the dictation of his thoughts that ultimately became the Brown Book. She stood up to Wittgenstein when he took exception to her publishing work she intended as part of her PHD thesis because he thought it misrepresented his views. She was single-minded and ultimately successful in her desire to complete her degree and qualify for a job in philosophy, and her career has had far more notice than her husband's, the philosopher Morris Lazerowitz, whom it is safe to say nobody reads. What about the support she received from even Wittgenstein himself when he—unusually for him—took steps to encourage the administration to bend some rules to enable her to get her degree, and the support she received from the administrators at Trinity when Wittgenstein resigned as her supervisor, and the encouragement she received from Moore, as editor of *Mind*, to publish the work she wanted to publish? And what of any sense of her uniquely difficult teacher, Wittgenstein himself, who fell out with nearly everyone he knew at one point or another? Instead, Loner doggedly mansplains not only her career but her reticence on her own alleged silencing/marginalizing/capture as an inevitable complicity in her own subordination, citing, among other things, her later recollections of her time as Wittgenstein's student (even when she was President of the American Philosophical Association in the 1970s). This is hardly fair to Ambrose, however, or even the historical reality of the dominance of Wittgenstein adulation in this period. Has Ambrose received all the credit she deserves for her work in philosophy? No, as some of the essays in this volume argue (see below). But this essay (ironically, not to say typically) fails to give Ambrose her own voice about her role in the history of philosophy.

Connell's and Forbes's essays take on Russell's commitment to feminism, arguing that we can generally understand Russell's feminist commitments by considering principles set out in *Marriage and Morals* (1929), although both agree that the book is not an entirely consistent and well-formulated work of philosophical ethics. Connell notes that there are significant theoretical tensions in *Marriage and Morals*: the emphasis on sexual freedom and its consequences for parenthood (male parenthood, anyway: the role of legitimacy in a patrilineal context); the connection between sexual freedom, love, and marriage; and the well-being of women as opposed to the well-being of society.[1] In these areas (at least), the authors agree that Russell qualifies at best as a middling feminist, whose concern with women is mostly indirect—his focus being less specifically

[1] See also, in this journal, HEATHORN, "'Improperganda'" (2023).

on the well-being of women than on the well-being of human society. Connell argues that the tensions in *Marriage and Morals* were the result of Russell's own "aristocratic" values (and some gendered distortions on the male sexual instinct) which made an appearance when his wife, Dora, after producing two children with Russell, went on to have two more children with another man (while still married to Russell). What Connell calls "the new morality" and its ideals for sex and marriage could not ultimately withstand Russell's repugnance at claiming Dora's children as his own. Connell does note that Russell claims that in a society with complete equality for women the social impositions required by the notion of legitimacy can be eliminated, and that the role of marriage might come under fire as well.

Dora herself separated sex and love from marriage and childbearing in her own work. And as their marriage dissolved, cratering their family life, their school, and the well-being of their children, Dora repeatedly expressed to Russell how much their work and life together meant to her, and how her sexual relations with others—and her other children—were irrelevant to her truth. This, however, did not have the effect she may have meant it to, as the marriage grew steadily more unstable. Russell was clear enough in *Marriage and Morals* that legitimacy of children and the well-being of fathers is challenging to balance with a proper view of sexual freedom, love, and marriage, and he leaves the imbalance unresolved. Russell's primary motivation in marrying Dora was to have children (or so he said), and he described the early years of his family life as blissful. It is indeed possible that the kind of patriarchal family life that made Russell happy was at odds with a proper feminism—but his and Dora's relationship might well be explained by something other than a negative assessment of Russell's feminist commitments. After all, in his indifference to the demands of ordinary domestic life he seems to have met his match in Dora. The trouble is that it's not clear that pressing for a consistency to principles in the fraught human areas of sex and relationships could ever work for anyone. Would any of us pass the test of being entirely true and consistent to our moral/feminist/rational principles?[2] Is the bar meant to be that much higher for Russell? We might wonder if that doesn't beg a question or two, if so.

Forbes addresses the nature of Russell's feminism with more gradation, and queries Russell's engagement with key feminist ideas of his day. She compares his views on sex, women's suffrage, and marriage relatively favourably with those of Victoria Woodhull and Emma Goldman, whose views she discusses in detail. Forbes, like Connell, emphasizes that Russell's stand on sexual freedom did attempt to balance this obvious good with a conception of marriage that kept the interest of children at the forefront. On suffrage, Russell's position was that

[2] See DE BEAUVOIR, *L'Invitée* (1943), for a searing account of failing to pass the consistency test.

equality is a key characteristic of a well-functioning society, which must include full political and social participation for *all*. As for marriage, Forbes points out that Russell's discussion of marriage in *Marriage and Morals* shifts between two senses of the term: both as a relation between people and a legal institution, with the distinguishing feature being the advent of children. At its best, marriage will include equality, freedom/non-monogamy for the involved parties, complete mental and physical intimacy, and coincidence in core values (p. 101)—which, as long as there are no children, should be independent from societal interference. Forbes, like Connell, here notes a tension in Russell's view of marriage and a commitment to feminist principles (or at least to some kind of equality): that the feature of marriage that confers the legitimacy of children may hamper full realization of *women's* sexual freedom. The upside, from Russell's point of view, is that confidence in paternity allows men to feel the full benefits of a mental and physical union, rather than just a sexual one. Forbes rightly points out that *this* is not women's problem to solve, and that full recognition of women's sexual freedom—and their freedom in general—would involve an evolution of a host of attitudes concerning paternity/legitimacy, among other things.

The next set of essays (Chapman, Kissel, Janssen-Lauret, Senechal, and Elkind) concentrates on the "recovery and re-examination" of the work of neglected women philosophers, in particular Ambrose, Stebbing, Jones, MacDonald, and Wrinch, in the context of their professional relations to Russell. Chapman's essay addresses the work of Ambrose and MacDonald on ordinary language, particularly in their challenges to Russell's views. Chapman begins with Ambrose's publication of her views on finitism which led to the rupture with Wittgenstein, who (as discussed in Loner, above) took exception to what he thought were misrepresentations of his own views. As Chapman recounts, when Russell himself decided to take on issues adjacent to these views, it was Ambrose's articles that "prompted a direct response", which could, on its face, bode well for an account of the way the work of a young woman philosopher in the 1930s at Cambridge was treated. Chapman, however, describes Russell's response as "high-handed", with "expressions of incomprehension", and "caustic comments" (p. 173), and goes on to claim that Russell "does not seem to have been inclined to modify his usual confrontational approach to philosophical debate when addressing a philosopher of such a different social and institutional status from his own" (*ibid.*), although she does say that Russell was similarly ferocious to others in philosophical discussion (*ibid.*). Of course, we could object that a more temperate response from Russell would have been patronizing or demeaning, undermining the professional role that Ambrose was determined to claim for herself. And it is not clear whether Chapman might be implying that Russell's "ferocity", was directed to Wittgenstein *via* Ambrose (since Wittgenstein had not published his views at this time), which would have been an interesting point to pursue.

Ambrose's engagement with ordinary language was taken up some years later, when she was commissioned, as one of seventeen "leading names in the field", to write a chapter for an anthology on analysis (p. 174). Ambrose argued that objections to natural language in philosophical analysis were "pseudo-complaints", in that the objections do not respect the distinctions between formal and natural languages. Ambrose could not have anticipated that the Chomskyan revolution would put paid to her view that "natural languages do not contain structural rules which determine which are and which are not legitimate and significant sequences of symbols", leveraging her argument instead against the then-prevalent options for addressing the pitfalls of natural language for the formulation of analysis (Carnapian explication, say, or Moorean analysis). These, according to Ambrose, are in effect arbitrary decisions about language use for a philosophical purpose. As to whether language is an obstacle to philosophical progress in analyzing concepts; or whether a philosophical theory is to be adjudicated for its linguistic correctness; or whether philosophical/analytical practice is that of revising language, all are decisions about the special uses of language, Ambrose argued, which few philosophers were willing to admit (or perhaps be aware of).

This, Chapman claims, bears comparison to Austin; and Chapman makes a similar claim for the work of MacDonald in the late 1930s. In her early work, MacDonald—engaging also with Russell's criticism of ordinary language in philosophical endeavours—also claimed that philosophers must not dismiss the way that philosophical problems can be solved through an understanding of how language is used and misused (p. 180). Chapman aligns this to Austin's position on declarative propositions, a category to which both MacDonald and Austin argued that certain kinds of statements did not belong. Chapman does not contend that MacDonald full-on anticipated Austin's speech act theory, but claims that MacDonald did, like Austin, emphasize the "'practical effects' . . . of the use of a particular type of statement" (p. 182), in her arguments that "some uses of language perform actions rather than make statements of fact" (p. 183). As a result, Chapman concludes that the history of philosophy benefits from the recovery of MacDonald's (and Ambrose's) contributions, in that how "she arrived at similar ideas to him [Austin]" shows "alternative directions which speech act theory might have taken" (p. 186).

Chapman's essay ends on the slightly sour note that Russell was not terribly generous, if not downright sexist, when it came to engaging with or giving credit to women philosophers ("there is no evidence that he engaged with MacDonald" [p. 183]). But the historical case—to say nothing of the potentially sexist case—would have to be drawn in more detail, especially given Chapman's concluding assertion that "MacDonald's discussion of performatory language provoked little response from her philosophical contemporaries and, it seems, no praise" (p. 184). Ultimately, the condemnation of Russell in Chapman's essay is somewhat tenuous.

It is even more tenuous in Kissel's, who discusses Stebbing's contributions to the dispute (between Russell and Bradley) concerning external and internal relations. Kissel's essay carefully delineates what she calls Stebbing's middle ground proposal concerning relations—Stebbing's defence of what she called "interpenetrating" relations. Kissel formulates this on Stebbing's behalf as the doctrine of I/E relations, while at the same time conceding that Stebbing may not have had an entirely coherent formulation of this position. Kissel highlights Stebbing's claim that relations should not be formulated as terms *and* relations but rather terms *in* relations—that relations are continuous with their terms. But Stebbing herself, according to Kissel, did not make it clear how "interpenetrating" was to be used (was it merely a replacement for "internal"? [p. 196]). The doctrine of I/E relations is that sometimes a change in quality follows from a change in relation, and sometimes it doesn't, something that must be decided empirically in every case. Stebbing, however, does not say how (p. 198), and Kissel proposes Stebbing's formulation of "directional analysis" to fill in the gaps. Directional analysis is "seeking to uncover precise truthmakers for any proposition" (p. 199). Thus reconstructed, Kissel claims that Stebbing's doctrine of I/E relations "is an interesting and novel move in the dialectic of Russell and Bradley", and concludes that it is "rather a mystery as to why Russell and Bradley never cited Stebbing on this topic." Kissel's diagnosis of this mystery, however, is itself mysterious: "something to do with Stebbing's gender [*sic*]" and "something to do with the fact that she was Moore's student, so Russell and Bradley may not have felt that they were able to engage directly with her work [*sic*]" (p. 201). The gender allegation, though, could have used more historical depth. (Was Russell engaging with this topic at the time with anyone, for instance?) The other allegation similarly makes little sense without further detail—what difference would being a student, even Moore's student, make? As Chapman's essay (above), points out, Russell did engage directly with Ambrose, who was Wittgenstein's student, so it's not clear what Kissel is getting at here.

Janssen-Lauret's essay concerns two women philosophers: Stebbing and E. E. Constance Jones, a philosopher who is even less familiar in the history of analytic philosophy than Ambrose, Stebbing, MacDonald or Wrinch. Jones was the Mistress of Girton College (a woman's college at Cambridge) in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a protégé of Sidgwick's, widely published in the journals, and a participant, insofar as this was possible, in the philosophical *milieu* at Cambridge. Janssen-Lauret makes the important point that the role of women in the early modern period was more effortlessly dismissed in its history, as women then rarely had any official role in what counted as "academic" contexts (p. 208). The same cannot be said for Jones, which raises the issue of why her work has been ignored in the history of analytic philosophy, especially if, as Janssen-Lauret claims, "her philosophy of logic played more of a role in shaping analytic philosophy than is commonly recognized" (p. 209).

To defend this, Janssen-Lauret asserts that "Moore and Russell would have encountered anti-psychologism about logic, as well as the view that logic is a science of propositions, and the sense-reference distinction, from the 1890s onwards, in . . . the works of . . . Constance Jones" (p. 210). But "would have encountered" is too speculative. Recent histories of analytic philosophy give accounts of the anti-psychologism that spurred Moore to his new approach.[3] That logic is a science of "propositions" depends on what we mean by "proposition"—Aristotle's logic featured categorical propositions, after all. And there are several discussions in the literature that take on the issue of Jones's "A New Law of Thought", the claim that it anticipated Frege's sense-reference distinction, and the allegation that Russell was too churlish, or sexist, to acknowledge it.[4]

Janssen-Lauret claims in her essay that "Jourdain . . . pleaded with Russell in a 1909 letter, now lost, to cite Jones [*Elements of Logic*] (1890), and not Frege ["Über Sinn und Bedeutung"] (1892), as the originator of the sense-reference distinction" (p. 210). But how do we know what Jourdain asked? The letter is lost. All we have is Russell's response, in which he notes, with respect to Jourdain's suggestion that Jones's "distinction of signification and denotation must be much the same as Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung," that "*some* such distinction is a commonplace of logic" (p. 210).[5] This could use some further investigation. Was it a commonplace? How?

Janssen-Lauret does note that "Jones's distinction is not merely the extension-intension distinction" (p. 214), which was indeed a commonplace of logic at this time, as was a distinction between connotation and denotation. Jones's view is that subject-predicate propositions "express identity of denotation with diversity of significations" (p. 214), although Janssen-Lauret explains that Jones's model of logical form was "in some respects superseded by Frege's polyadic logic"—a bit of an understatement, perhaps. Jones's conception of logical form was derived from Lotze and Janssen-Lauret does not explain in much detail how this take on logical form, or the distinction Jones employed in its defence, "advanced" the logic of Jones's contemporaries, or, indeed, how it maps onto Frege's.[6] Janssen-Lauret asserts that Jones's view "made a clear and noticeable advance on her contemporaries" (p. 214). But how, exactly? Among the "logicians" Janssen-Lauret cites are Bradley and Bosanquet (pp. 216–17)—idealist philosophers for whom "logic" meant something like a unifying act of judgment.

[3] NASIM, "Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers" (2008); PRETI, "On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content" (2008); VAN DER SCHAAR, *G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (2013).

[4] GREEN, "On E. E. Constance Jones's Account of Categorical Propositions and Her Defence of Frege" (2023); OSTERTAG, "E. E. Constance Jones on Identity and Predication" (2023).

[5] See also GRATTAN-GUINNESS, *Dear Russell, Dear Jourdain* (1977), p. 119.

[6] See GREEN.

This raises questions about the shift from nineteenth-century logic to twentieth-century logic and the way in which Fregean, Russellian, and Moorean innovations advanced our understanding of expressions like "predication", "judgment", "proposition", "identity", and "logical names" (to name a few). This shift would need spelling out, to properly situate Jones both conceptually and historically.

Frege's account begins with a puzzle about identity statements between grammatically proper names ("Hesperus"; "Phosphorus"). Jones, on the other hand, seems to stick to the traditional nineteenth-century formulation of identities between general, not proper names. Jones was also mainly addressing Lotze's worries about identity, and the formulation of "identity in diversity" sails very close to the traditional idealist wind. Frege's account goes on to expand the logical category of *name* to sentences (Jones's does not) and runs aground in opaque contexts like *believes that p* and *is necessary that p*, which he tries to solve by shifting the sense and reference of expressions in those contexts. Jones has no account of this. As for Janssen-Lauret's claim that Jones anticipated Frege's anti-psychologism in logic, we know that Russell, in correspondence (1902–04), found Frege's account of *Sinn*, not to mention the nature of a proposition ("thought") too psychologistic. It was Moore's anti-psychologism that influenced Russell, and Moore had not read Frege, let alone Jones, in the crucial period 1897–99. And finally, of course, Frege was not working from an account of the logical form of categorical propositions. Frege's sense-reference distinction is not *itself* a simple intension/extension distinction, and the theoretical contexts in which Frege's and Jones's distinctions are made have little in common. In all, Janssen-Lauret's case for Jones anticipating Frege is weak, as it is on the charge that Russell was remiss in not crediting her.

Janssen-Lauret turns her attention to an exchange between Russell and Jones (1910–11), with a focus on their discussion of complete/incomplete symbols, captured in Russell's theory of descriptions, and the import of this for the question of negative existentials, identity statements ("Scott is the author of Waverley"), meaning and denotation, and other issues now familiar to philosophers of logic. Jones, for instance, asserted that definite descriptions are directly denoting (which Russell denied), and that what they denote is a property, and Janssen-Lauret does what she can to clarify the dispute. What doesn't help is that there was at this time a certain amount of ambiguity in the semantics of words like "meant" (p. 224) in the discussion. It might have been helpful to distinguish the different venues in which the "exchange" took place in order to examine it more fully: in December 1910, Jones delivered a paper to the Moral Sciences Club called "Categorical Propositions and the Law of Identity"; Russell delivered a paper there in March, 1911, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", later published in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1910–11). Jones published a version of her 1910 MS paper in *Mind* (1911) and published what she called "A New Law of Thought" in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian*

Society (1910–11). Janssen-Lauret does not explain or even note if any changes of thought occurred throughout these papers, which might have been relevant. It's quite possible that Russell and Jones were talking at cross-purposes, neither one of them fully appreciating the technical differences of the expressions each was using. In any case, that the exchange(s) took place at all is at least one way to show that Russell did, in fact, acknowledge something of Jones's work as being worthy of reply, and in a professional setting.

Janssen-Lauret also includes a section on Stebbing on analysis and incomplete symbols in her essay, to argue that we can trace the influence of Jones in some of Stebbing's responses to Russell and to Moore (p. 226), in part to "recover" Stebbing's work from its uncritical (and dismissive) label of "student of Moore's" (fair enough, as Stebbing deserves better credit than that). But as in the discussion of Jones's anticipation of Frege, Janssen-Lauret does not give enough evidence of how exactly Stebbing might have adapted Jones's views to her own developing thought. Stebbing studied logic with W. E. Johnson, not Jones (p. 227), and Johnson was well-versed in the logic of *Principia*, unlike Jones, who had a very tenuous grasp of it. Stebbing, moreover, completed her studies at the University of London, not Cambridge, and her career flourished at Bedford College, where she was appointed in 1920 and became the first woman to hold a professorship in philosophy in the UK, in 1933. Janssen-Lauret makes an initial claim that Stebbing's own approaches to incomplete-symbol analysis and immediate acquaintance with sense data bear similarity to those of Jones, but supplies little evidence for this. It is equally plausible that Stebbing was quite innovative herself. She had plenty of opportunities to refer to or cite Jones in her own work—but she didn't (this could have been investigated). However, increased attention to Stebbing's work on the philosophy of physics, perceptions, and analysis is welcome, in the project of recovering overlooked voices in the history of philosophy.

The next two papers in this volume concern Dorothy Wrinch, a student of Russell's and a woman of whom it seems Russell was entirely approving. Senechal's essay, a précis of her virtuoso book on Wrinch,[7] is a useful introduction to the polymathic Wrinch, who began as a student of mathematics at Cambridge in 1916–17 and went on to a career as a biochemist at Smith College in 1943 (by way of positions at UCL, Oxford, and Johns Hopkins). Russell and Wrinch became and remained friends to the end of his life (p. 241), which cannot be said for that many people in Russell's life. Elkind's essay seeks to redress an imbalance in the history of the work of Russell and Wrinch—much has been said about the influence of Russell on Wrinch, but less on the influence of Wrinch on Russell (p. 260). Elkind focuses on four areas of their intellectual engagement: parenting, memory, judgment, and mathematical logic, in part to

[7] *I Died for Beauty: Dorothy Wrinch and the Cultures of Science* (2012).

assess Russell's feminist commitments, but also in part to examine a curious inconsistency in Russell's engagement with Wrinch's work.

Russell and Wrinch collaborated for fifteen years after she attended his class on *Principia* in 1916 (p. 261). Russell promoted Wrinch's *The Retreat from Parenthood* (1930, published under a pseudonym), and cites it in one of his own books (p. 262). But Elkind notes that Russell did not just consider Wrinch's work on parenting and related social issues worth engaging; he also took her seriously on work in the philosophy of mind, namely memory (p. 266). The issue turns on whether memory is a form of belief (in past existence), and whether the logical form of a belief statement distinguishes between the act of belief and its object. Elkind compellingly assesses the ways in which Wrinch and Russell will have exchanged thoughts on the issue, the changes in view in Russell's draft materials as he worked on *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), his citations of Wrinch's 1920 article, "On the Nature of Memory", and his generous acknowledgement to her (p. 277). So far, so good—from the evidence that Elkind considers, it looks like Russell was willing to and successful at collaborating with and co-influencing women in philosophy (at least one woman). The fly in the ointment, however, is Russell's neglect of Wrinch's work on judgment and mathematical logic. But as Elkind notes, by the time Wrinch published her account of the multiple relation theory of judgment in 1919, Russell had abandoned it, so, all things being equal, might not have been bothered to return to her defence of it.

Elkind gives a somewhat different interpretation of Russell's neglect of Wrinch's work in mathematical logic. Four of her papers (published between 1920 and 1929) formulated new theorems in the notation and style of *Principia Mathematica* (p. 282), published in the second edition in 1925. The new edition included a summary of contributions that had emerged since *Principia*'s first edition (1910–13); the list was Frank Ramsey's, who sent it to Russell, and both made edits to it (p. 283). Wrinch was not on that list, although according to Elkind, we might excuse this if the list was meant to highlight contributions on the foundations of mathematics, on which Wrinch did not write (p. 284).

Her omission is nevertheless perplexing, however, in that Wrinch did write on topics that Russell did include as worth noting in the post-*Principia* literature—like Tarski's on the axiom of choice (p. 284), which appeared in 1924. Wrinch had published on this in 1923—so why did Russell fail to cite Wrinch here? It is possible that Russell didn't think her work was successful (p. 286) at establishing its conclusions (*cf.* her formulation of mediate cardinals), but Russell didn't stint at citing others whose work he didn't agree with, or which conflicted with his. It's also possible that, as in the case of the multiple relation theory of judgment, he had theoretically moved on (p. 287). Elkind rejects this, however, taking it that if Russell could cite Tarski there was no reason not to cite Wrinch.

Elkind's inventive diagnosis of this neglect is this: Russell was making a practical decision not to highlight Wrinch's work in mathematical logic because

she was struggling to find a job. "Boosting" her as a mathematical logician in a "Who to Watch" 2nd ed. *Principia* list would scuttle her chances in *other* fields, so Russell prudently didn't mention it at all (p. 288). It is true that Wrinch had a bumpy early career (although she collected many "first woman to" degrees and jobs); it is also true that her mentors found her diverse interests frustrating. In the case of one—the prestigious Rhodes fellowship—her application had to be sponsored by her mentors (Hardy and Love). They were not pleased when she complicated their recommendations for her already slim chances of getting it (because mathing while female) by applying again to the same fellowship—as a social scientist.[8]

Elkind thus denies any charge of sexism against Russell, as inconsistent with the pattern of respect and regard that Russell showed Wrinch and her work. Rather, he claims, it is consistent with Russell's concern for Wrinch and her prospects that he left her off the list. This is a reach. Perhaps Ramsey had final edit of the list and didn't think much of her work—maybe he was the sexist here. Perhaps it was an oversight. Perhaps there was nothing sufficiently original about her contributions, or sufficiently expansive. And, ultimately, perhaps, a reflexive sexism was at work: Russell may well have thought she was a good mathematician . . . for *a woman*. And it may not have been enough.

In the last essay in this collection Michael Stevenson examines the influence of Russell's third wife, known as Peter, seeking to redress the brief, and usually dismissively negative, assessment of her role in Russell's life in Russell's biographies (p. 299). He is aided in this by the release of the embargo on Patricia Russell's letters, which aid "a holistic picture" (p. 300). Stevenson makes a detailed case for Peter's influence in Russell's life and work, her collaboration with various projects he was engaged on (*Freedom and Organization* [1934]; *The Amberley Papers* [1937]; the abandoned "The Problems of Democracy"; *Authority and the Individual* [1949]); and her support of him during the crisis over his appointment at City College in 1940 (pp. 307–11). Peter also ran interference for importunate requests on Russell's time during a period when Russell, quite short of money, took on a significant number of journalistic writing projects to bring in an income. Some of these were credited to Russell but were almost certainly written by Peter (p. 313).

Stevenson's essay, like that of Senechal, is perhaps the most successful in helping to make the most robust case for at least some of the volume's aims, which were (1) to examine some of Russell's romantic relationships in the light of his own ethical and political views; (2) to "recover and re-examine" the contributions of women in his circle; and to make (3) "a more nuanced appraisal" of Russell's legacy by way of these considerations. However, the rest of the essays, for their part, bring a resourceful lens to the history of analytic philosophy. This

[8] SENECHAL, p. 118.

shows the ongoing, deep, and rich nature of this history, and this volume adds several thought-provoking elements to the historiography of analytic philosophy.

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PROPOSITIONS THROUGH TWISTS AND TURNS

GIULIA FELAPPI
Philosophy / U. of Southampton
Highfield Road, Southampton SO17 1BF, UK
G.FELAPPI@SOTON.AC.UK

Sanford Shieh. *Wittgenstein and Russell*. (Cambridge Elements: the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.) Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2024. Pp. 106. ISBN: 978-1108925099, CAD$24.95 (pb); 978-1108950442, CAD$22.95 (ebook).

In this Cambridge Element, Sanford Shieh admirably reconstructs the philosophical interaction between Russell and Wittgenstein. While also what happened at later periods is briefly discussed, the focus is on the