

*“Yours Fraternally”: Russell and Moore*

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I. Introduction

Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore first met as undergraduates at Trinity College Cambridge in 1893. Both turned to study of the moral sciences (philosophy) for the second part of their Tripos examinations, Russell from his Part I in mathematics and Moore from his Part I in classics. Both were members of the intimate and semi-secret Apostles’ Society, a discussion group of 12 young men who met every Saturday evening for sometimes raucous philosophical debate. Russell’s *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM) and Moore’s *Principia Ethica* (PE) both appeared in 1903, and stand as early testaments to a philosophical method that has grown, for better or worse, to characterize analytic philosophy for over a century.

By now, the tale of their “rebellion” and “revolt” from the smothering and amorphous mix of neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian and Bradleyan Idealism of their undergraduate days to the implementation of the clarity and rigor of new discoveries in formal methods and analysis has passed effectively into legend. Russell and Moore were thought to be not just like-minded allies in the inception of analytic philosophy and close intellectual comrades, but also friends. However, most of the traditional account is based largely on Russell’s own published recollections, and there are reasons to question some of the particulars.<sup>1</sup> The evidence from a variety of surviving sources in fact suggests instead that their rapport was a tricky balance between respect and regard, tinged privately with occasional frustration (on Russell’s part) and downright ire (on Moore’s).<sup>2</sup>

The highest point of intellectual and personal connection between Russell and Moore came early, between roughly 1897 and 1899. The next period of close proximity (but not exactly intimacy) was between 1911-1915 when both were back at Trinity as lecturers. After this Russell and Moore’s paths crossed less frequently, although they did correspond from time to time.<sup>3</sup> There was indeed a bond between them, but it is difficult to deny that it

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<sup>1</sup> Russell scholars are not strangers to the delicate job of examining Russell’s own accounts of his own work and amending the details. See Galaugher (2017), Griffin (1991), Hylton (1990).

<sup>2</sup> See Preti (2008-09), and below.

<sup>3</sup> There are 43 letters from Russell to Moore that survive; but only 11 between 1905 and 1957 (Moore died in 1958). The Russell archive at McMaster University contains only six letters from Moore to Russell. There are no letters from Moore to Russell that survive at the Russell archive between 1905 and 1925. In the early letters, Russell asks to see Moore for “philosophical talk,” or asks him to come for a visit, 17 times, but Moore rebuffed him often.

was clouded by Moore's apparent antipathy to Russell, which never entirely left him.<sup>4</sup> This is all the more perplexing, since in Russell's case, there seems to have been sincere affection toward Moore, a genuine feeling of indebtedness, and, as Russell himself put it more than once, "great admiration".<sup>5</sup>

There are a number of questions about the relationship between Russell and Moore that have so far received little if any scholarly attention. For instance: if Russell and Moore worked so closely together, how and why did Moore become so irritated by Russell that by 1898 even philosophical *tete-a-tetes* with Russell became a challenge for him?<sup>6</sup> Why does Moore not acknowledge Russell (or anyone else) in the preface to PE? What (on earth) could have prompted Moore to write to Russell (who had been invited to join one of Moore's reading party holidays in 1903 by a mutual friend) to tell him he was not welcome? Why do Moore's diaries record him as so persistently stressed about Russell when they were colleagues at Trinity in the years before and during the First War (noting, for instance, his deliberately avoiding Russell at High Table time and time again)? What explains Moore's weird diffidence in sharing with Russell the notes that Wittgenstein had dictated to him when Moore visited Norway in 1914?<sup>7</sup> These questions (and others) deserve detailed inquiry, to be sure. But as it is difficult to underestimate the impact of the relationship between Russell and Moore in the inception of analytic philosophy, I will begin there.

This is because the story of the origins of analytic philosophy in the early work of Russell and Moore hangs largely on the effusive credit that Russell gave to Moore's influence. Russell's acknowledgements to Moore on the inception of the "new philosophy" were personal as well as professional; immortalized in print; lifelong (even posthumous); and unstinting.<sup>8</sup> But they are slightly puzzling. Russell was an innovative mathematician and logician, indefatigably resourceful in producing ideas, drafts, and various forms of solutions to conceptual puzzles. Along the way, he made foundational discoveries in formal methods, but also in practically every sub-region of philosophy. Moore, by contrast, was trained as a Classicist, focused his philosophical work on metaphysics and ethics, wrote almost nothing on logic or mathematics, and before 1901, published very little. Why was the influence of Moore so celebrated by Russell throughout his own life and work, and what exactly does it consist of?<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Preti (2008-09).

<sup>5</sup> Russell (1959b).

<sup>6</sup> See Preti (2008-09).

<sup>7</sup> See below.

<sup>8</sup> See also Levy (1979) and Griffin (1991).

<sup>9</sup> See also Baldwin (1993); Galaugher (2013); Hylton (1990); Griffin (1991); Levy (1979); and MacBride (2018).

- II. "...the men who changed my opinions at that time were two: McTaggart in one direction and then, after I had become a Fellow, G.E. Moore in the opposite direction."<sup>10</sup>

Russell's tributes give a sense of what he took himself to owe to Moore.

Some of these were contemporaneous, and some came later. Some were technical, and some concerned the more general shift in philosophical method that Russell believed he was inspired to by Moore. But all consistently accord to Moore a leap of insight that had (i) eluded Russell himself and (ii) changed philosophy from that moment forward. The very first ones appeared throughout PoM (1903):

On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G.E. Moore. I have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms or of the whole which these compose. Before learning these views from him, I found myself completely unable to construct any philosophy of arithmetic, whereas their acceptance brought about an immediate liberation from a large number of difficulties which I believe to be otherwise insuperable. (1903, 4)

...it has always been customary to suppose relational propositions less ultimate than class-propositions (or subject-predicate propositions, with which class-propositions are habitually confounded, and this has led to a desire to treat relations as a kind of classes. However this may be, it was certainly from the opposite philosophical belief, which I derived from my friend Mr. G. E. Moore, that I was led to a different formal treatment of relations. This treatment...is certainly far more convenient and far more powerful as an engine of discovery in actual mathematics (1903, 24).

The logical opinions which follow are in the main due to Mr. G. E. Moore, to whom I owe also my first perception of the difficulties in the relational theory of space and time. (1903, 446).<sup>11</sup>

Further details appear in Russell's recollections in MPD (1959a):

It was toward the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the first published account of the new philosophy was Moore's article in *Mind* on "The Nature of Judgment." .... I, and I think he, would still agree...with the doctrine that fact is in general independent of experience...I think that we differed as to what most interested us in our new philosophy. I think that Moore was most concerned with the rejection of idealism, while I was the most interested in the rejection of monism. The two were, however, closely connected. They were connected through the doctrine of relations...

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<sup>10</sup> Russell, MRR, in (Slater, 1961: 3-8).

<sup>11</sup> This may refer to Moore's review of EFG, which appeared in 1899 (402-3).

And in MMD (Schilpp, 1944: 1-20), Russell put it like this:

During 1898, various things caused me to abandon both Kant and Hegel. I came to disbelieve Bradley's arguments against relations, and to distrust the logical bases of monism. I disliked the subjectivity of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. But these motives would have operated more slowly than they did, but for the influence of G. E. Moore. He also had had a Hegelian period, but it was briefer than mine. He took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of emancipation. ...we ...thought that *everything* is real that common sense, uninfluenced by philosophy or theology, supposes real. ...and also that there is a pluralistic timeless world of Platonic ideas...Mathematics could be *quite* true, and not merely a stage in dialectic.

The clues in these accolades can be summarized roughly as follows: Russell took himself to owe to Moore the insight that reality could be formulated as a multiplicity of mind-independent entities bearing relations to one another in an equally mind-independent way. The relations themselves, moreover, were irreducible to one or another of their *relata*, and required a formal treatment quite different from what had come before. So let us consider the old "Hegelian period" understanding of the nature of relations and reality, from which, according to Russell, at least, Moore's views touched off the rebellion.

### III. Late 19<sup>th</sup> Century Metaphysics and Epistemology at Cambridge

The "old" views of relations, knowledge, and reality were those of the British and Continental idealists, reaching back to Kant, Hegel and R. H. Lotze, and including T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley.<sup>12</sup> Their work was studied closely at Cambridge, though the prevailing authorities at this period were Kant and Bradley. Considerable levels of detail distinguished these views, but all articulated a metaphysics and an epistemology at some odds with Moore's emancipating insights. For instance, what Russell referred to as the "logical bases of monism" above involved in particular the formulation of relations as characteristics of one or the other *relata*, a characteristic of Bradleyan metaphysics, but also of Lotze's.<sup>13</sup> These were formulated in the terminology of the day as "adjectives" of their subjects.<sup>14</sup> This metaphysical picture in particular was monistic: reality was construed as an undifferentiated unity. Any apparent relations between the elements of the unity were distortions of true reality. Relations belonged to what Bradley called appearances—inaccurate representations of Reality. These were imposed one way or another by mental activity, usually, an act of judgment. Judgment itself was conceived of as an act of unifying the objects of knowledge in an assertion of whatever incomplete truth the human mind was capable of.

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<sup>12</sup> Rudolph Hermann Lotze, 1817-1881.

<sup>13</sup> Russell cites Lotze for the view that "all relations only *are* as presentations in a relating consciousness" or "as internal states of the elements supposed to be related..." PoM (1903: 446).

<sup>14</sup> What today we would call properties. (CPBR, vol. 2, xxii).

Kant also defended the existence of an epistemologically unattainable Reality though he stopped short of characterizing it as an undifferentiated whole. Kant's focus was epistemological: human knowledge is limited by conditions projected onto the data of the senses by innate governing structures of the mind. Kant's so-called "Copernican" insight was that the structures of the knowing mind were necessary (transcendental) conditions for knowledge to be possible at all. Knowledge, expressed in judgment, was an activity: "ways of rationally projecting ourselves onto actual truth-makers."<sup>15</sup> So for the idealist judgment was an activity of a rational mind, and the logical conditions that governed it were, in the main, located in the nature of the mind.<sup>16</sup> What idealist approaches have in common is the notion that judgment—how we express knowledge—is a mental act of an assertion of a unity of some kind, which falls short of total truth (Reality as it is in itself) but is the best we can do.

Asserting a unity between elements or asserting a relation on this view does not, however, entail that the relations (or unities) are separable from the nature of those entities themselves. This is what Russell, above, alludes to as the doctrine of internal relations. If a relation is internal, it holds between terms in virtue of the intrinsic properties of those terms. Internal relations are not really relations in the sense that we understand them, post-quantification.<sup>17</sup> Bradley, specifically, held that although we think and judge in seemingly relational terms, Reality is an undifferentiated whole. Thus the seemingly relational aspect of thought and judgment must be explained, or explained away. Bradley thus took the view that what appears as a relation is an intrinsic property of one or the other entity in the apparent relation. And to explain what in Russell's thinking explains the galvanizing effect that Moore's ideas had on him, we need to consider the role of neo-Hegelian metaphysics and the doctrine of internal relations in Russell's developing thought of the late 1890s.

Russell had completed his Moral Sciences Tripos exams in 1894, and in 1895 submitted a dissertation for a Trinity Fellowship on the foundations of geometry (EFG).<sup>18</sup> This work became part of a project that Russell conceived at the end of his exams, whose underlying metaphysical framework was largely Bradleyan.<sup>19</sup> The idea was to reveal how individual sciences were one system, to support the view of Reality as one unified entity, by identifying the *a priori* foundations of each science. Russell's strategy was also broadly Kantian, which may help to explain the apparent oddity, from the contemporary point of view, of his project of unifying the sciences in a progression from the foundations of

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<sup>15</sup> Hanna (2001).

<sup>16</sup> "A judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason* (B141)).

<sup>17</sup> In a later formulation, Russell states that what he calls the axiom of internal relations in effect denies diversity, complexity, and so, in short, relativity itself. See Russell (1906-08, 37-39).

<sup>18</sup> It was successful. Trinity Fellowships were six-year posts, with no residence requirement and no teaching responsibilities. No copy of the Fellowship dissertation survives to compare to EFG, published in 1897.

<sup>19</sup> CPBR, vol. 1, 8-9; CPBR, vol. 2. See also Griffin (1991, 312-320).

geometry to those of physics and then arithmetic. It was also neo-Hegelian: the contradictions that spring up when each science is (erroneously) differentiated from the others were meant to dialectically resolve into a higher -level new science.<sup>20</sup> A science of space (geometry) thus was meant to dialectically resolve into a science of matter or physics, requiring a formulation of dynamics and kinematics, and then onto the science of quantity itself (mathematics).<sup>21</sup>

As if that were not ambitious enough, Russell began pursue an inquiry into the foundations of pure mathematics simultaneously with his proposed dialectic of the sciences.<sup>22</sup> This parallel project was an attempt to discover the *a priori* ground of mathematical judgment, and Russell proceeded in a generally Kantian spirit to account for this. But there were contradictions that arose here too. The general problem concerned items that shared all the same intrinsic properties (points, kinematic atoms, or quantities) but bore relations to other items which would suggest properties *not* shared by the others. A formulation of relations as internal gives no way to account for this, as an internal relation between A and B in effect makes B a property of A or vice versa. The puzzle for Russell was that he began to discover that the problems in working out his foundations of mathematics were similar to those he had run up against in working out his dialectic of the sciences of space and of matter, and that the sticking point was the nature of relations.<sup>23</sup>

This gives us a way to explain Russell's seemingly genuine gratitude to Moore for the influence on the development of his views at a crucial juncture, however. Although the traditional story of Russell and Moore's revolt toward a new philosophy was that it was a revolt from idealism, and that idealist metaphysics in one guise or another dominated philosophy in England at this period, this was not completely true in the study of moral sciences at Cambridge.<sup>24</sup> McTaggart was the resident neo-Hegelian at Trinity, and did defend Bradley's metaphysics with verve in his own lectures and at Saturday night Apostle's meetings. However, Russell and Moore's teachers G.F Stout, James Ward and Henry Sidgwick all took on Kant, Lotze, Hegel, Green, Bradley and others in their lectures in History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Psychology, and Ethics.<sup>25</sup> And a thorough look at the positions taken by Stout, Ward and Sidgwick on Kant and later idealisms reveals that these

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<sup>20</sup> See CPBR vol. 2, xiv-xvii.

<sup>21</sup> The understanding of mathematics, geometry, dynamics and the like at the tail end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century does not conform to contemporary understanding of these disciplines. The same holds for the understanding of logic, metaphysics, and psychology. See below for why this matters to the account of Russell and Moore's work at this period.

<sup>22</sup> CPBR, vol. 2 gives a sense of Russell's prodigious output at this period.

<sup>23</sup> Griffin 1991 (316).

<sup>24</sup> Note that Russell himself is part of the reason that the details of this period went uncritically accepted (Slater, 1961): "The influence of German Idealism in England...was almost completely dominant. Green and Caird converted Oxford, and Bradley and Bosanquet were more in agreement with Hegel than with anyone else. In Cambridge Henry Sidgwick still represented the Benthamite tradition, and James Ward was a Kantian, but the younger men—Stout, MacKenzie, and McTaggart—were in varying degrees, Hegelians." This is not completely accurate. See Preti (2008, 2018, 2022).

<sup>25</sup> Add. 8875 10/10/1-7, Cambridge University Library.

were mostly *critical* of the idealist metaphysics and account of knowledge of the day and of the past.<sup>26</sup> All three published extended critical assessments of Kantian views, for instance, details of which can be traced in their lectures, which both Russell and Moore attended.<sup>27</sup> Stout and Ward also repeatedly locked horns with Bradley on the nature of logic, judgment, thought and psychology itself in journal articles and symposia. Moore's revolutionary insight was an important advance, as Russell held it to be, but it had its roots solidly in a strong anti-psychologistic/anti-idealist tendency in the study of the mental and moral sciences at Cambridge.<sup>28</sup>

#### IV. 19<sup>th</sup> Century Mental Science at Cambridge

The moral sciences at Cambridge in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century consisted of logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, but these disciplines bear little structural or conceptual similarity to their contemporary descendants.<sup>29</sup> This period was one of a great deal of turbulence, with little consensus in the professional literature concerning definitions and terminological formulations. Disputes between psychologistic formulations and anti-psychologistic formulations of thought, knowledge, judgment, logic, truth, metaphysics, and even psychology itself were fierce and widespread throughout nearly every intellectual discipline of this period, and crucially, neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian conceptions of thought and reality began to come in for broad critical opposition during the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>30</sup>

The shift to the new philosophy rested in Russell and Moore's work was concentrated on (at least) three main planks: (i) a rejection of Kantian accounts of knowledge and cognition as unsatisfactorily subjectivist, (ii) a rejection of neo-Hegelian metaphysics and its conception of reality as a unified and unrelated whole, and (iii) a shift in the logical and metaphysical understanding of the nature of relations and the nature of judgment.<sup>31</sup> These issues are interconnected in a variety of ways. The neo-Hegelianism that played a significant role in British philosophy in the mid-to-late 19<sup>th</sup> century was heavily saturated with Kantian and post-Kantian formulations of cognition, knowledge, and judgment. Logic at this period was conceived of as the study of concepts and judgment, with the emphasis, as we have seen, on formulating the nature of judgment as the mental

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<sup>26</sup> Preti (2008, 2018, 2022).

<sup>27</sup> See also Moore's own words about his indebtedness to Sidgwick's criticism of Kant (Baldwin and Preti 2011, 117).

<sup>28</sup> See Preti (2008, 2018, 2022) for more detail.

<sup>29</sup> These were the explicit examination categories for both parts of the Moral Sciences Tripos. See the Cambridge University Calendar and the Cambridge University Reporter (1894-6).

<sup>30</sup> Kusch (1995); Preti (2022). The dispute did also include controversy concerning whether or not psychologism and subjectivism were equivalent; and also whether or not these were *pejorative* characterizations of a field of study.

<sup>31</sup> See Preti (2018) for more detail. See Galaugher (2017) and Griffin (1991, forthcoming) for Russell's developing shift in the understanding of the nature of relations, and the conceptual confusions of the period.

act of asserting (some kind of) relations between concepts.<sup>32</sup> The neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian treatment of knowledge that featured in the work of Edward Caird, T. H. Green, Bradley, McTaggart and other British idealists emphasized the justifying or grounding conditions for knowledge as the work of the mind, and the truth of a judgment itself as ultimately a feature of, if not the work of *a* particular mind, then of a form of rationality that was a necessary condition of reality itself.

Things were changing, however. Innovations in mathematics had made marked progress on the continent, though this was unknown at Cambridge. Continental developments in the science of psychology, by contrast, were very well known at Cambridge. And this offers a way to highlight the turning point at the heart of Russell's and Moore's new philosophy. This was centered on the new and developing reformulation of psychology as a science.<sup>33</sup> As it happens, the scientific formulation of psychology—mental science—was a principal element in the work of Russell's and Moore's undergraduate teachers, G. F. Stout and James Ward. Their work was specifically focused on the defense of a scientific and commonsense formulation of the categories of mind and the nature of thought, one that avoided metaphysical (specifically, idealist) implications. The conception of thought, judgment and knowledge that they defended was characterized by an anti-psychologism opposed to that of the idealist conceptions of judgment and thought of the day. Stout and Ward took it as nothing less than a scientific obligation to defend an objective and scientific distinction between an *act* of thought or judgment and an *object* of thought or judgment, where the object was taken as entirely independent from the mental act.<sup>34</sup> At the forefront of this disciplinary tug-of-war was Brentano, whose own account of psychology was adapted by Stout (1896), which served as one of the main texts on the reading list for the Moral Sciences Tripos for years. Ward himself authored another classic source on this new psychology (Ward 1883), also featured on the Moral Sciences Tripos reading list.<sup>35</sup> Russell and Moore had read the same texts for their Moral Sciences Tripos exams, but the work of the Cambridge mental scientists seems to have made more of an impact on Moore than it did on Russell. How?

The chief impediment to the development of Russell's ideas at this juncture was his significant investment in a complex framework of a Bradleyan monistic metaphysics, a Kantian epistemology, and a neo-Hegelian dialectic against which he persevered in his project of unifying the sciences as well as his parallel project in the foundations of mathematics. It took some years for the development of his ideas to seriously hit the resistance that would prompt his realization that an abandonment of the background

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<sup>32</sup> Consider Bradley's *Principles of Logic* (PL), which no contemporary reader would recognize as logic.

<sup>33</sup> Preti (2008, 2018, 2022); Baldwin and Preti (2011).

<sup>34</sup> It is true that Kant, Bradley, Caird and others paid lip service to this distinction. Moore's insight was that it *was* lip service—for Bradley, the content or object of the act of judgment was not formulated as mind-independent, as it was for Stout and for Ward. See Preti (2018, 2022).

<sup>35</sup> See Baldwin and Preti (2011); Preti (2008, 2018, 2022).



framework was the answer. It was only when Russell began to run up against tensions between the monism supported by the doctrine of internal relations (which in effect *denies* the possibility of genuine relations) and the inescapable realization that the foundations of mathematics featured irreducible relations at its core that he could make forward progress.<sup>36</sup> This did not happen all at once. Some critical elements needed to fall into place for Russell to be on course to have “invented a new subject” and to “have written 200,000 words...all better than any I had written before.”<sup>37</sup> These were, as we know: the logico-realist metaphysical framework against which Moore launched his account of the nature of judgment (in late 1898); Russell’s deeper immersion into questions concerning the logical form of propositions during his lecture preparation on the philosophy of Leibniz (in 1898-99);<sup>38</sup> and, finally, his introduction to continental advances in formal methods and mathematics at the Paris conference in 1900.<sup>39</sup> Let us look more closely at Moore’s influence in this story.

V. “It was toward the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel...”

Russell was not entirely right when he said that Moore “had had a Hegelian period, but it was briefer than mine.” In his first published paper (**PPT**), Moore does appear to enter into the spirit of the idealist position at a symposium on past and future time, arguing in Bradleyan fashion that “neither Past, Present, nor Future exists, if by existence we are to mean the ascription of full Reality and not merely existence as Appearance.” But he also makes a comment in criticism of his co-symposiasts, that: “...I cannot help making a distinction between the process of thinking and the content of thought...” which, in a realist formulation, is a year later deployed against Bradley in order to support the new mind-independent construal of thought.<sup>40</sup> As for **F**, Moore’s argument was critical of the psychologism he took to infect Kant on free will, a criticism he similarly directs to one of the scholarly sources he consulted on Kant for the 1897 dissertation.<sup>41</sup> There, Moore wrote

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<sup>36</sup> See Griffin (1991; forthcoming). The kinds of relations in question are what we would call transitive/asymmetrical, which could not be accounted for on a doctrine of internal relations. This began to become clear to Russell throughout 1898.

<sup>37</sup> Griffin (1992, 208-9)

<sup>38</sup> Russell was asked to lecture on Leibniz at Trinity in Lent term 1899 for McTaggart, who was traveling. He began to read and take notes on Leibniz in the summer of 1898 (see *Russell*, 2017, 6-7). See also Griffin (1991). Moore attended the Leibniz lectures (see *Russell* (2017)), and is later acknowledged for his help with translations and proofs when Russell published **Pol** (1900).

<sup>39</sup> “...the most important event in this year [1900] was my visit to the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris...Basing myself on [Peano], I invented a notation for relations.” (Schilpp, 1944: 12).

<sup>40</sup> See Preti (2022) for detail on Moore’s initial attraction to the unreality of Time in his early work.

<sup>41</sup> In **F**, Moore states: “But it is only the more remarkable that [Kant] should speak of Reason in the same context as ‘giving laws of Freedom,’ as if it were Reason in the same sense, which is the source on the one hand of objectivity, and on the other hand of abstract ideas, whether true or false. In this Kant betrays the too psychological standpoint above which he seems never to have completely risen....” (**F**, 199-200).

that he was indebted to [Edward] Caird's general conception of Kant, "especially with regard to the 'Ding An Sich.'" But Moore then adds: "But with Dr. Caird's consistent use of 'the unity of consciousness' I am prevented from sympathizing very much by my far greater agreement with Mr. F. H. Bradley's general philosophical attitude." But we should note that Moore here alludes to Bradley's influence in order to underscore his *resistance* to Caird's interpretation of Kant, which was notably idealist/psychologistic in the Kant scholarship of the day.<sup>42</sup> One year later, in any case, in his revised dissertation, Moore states that "I have come to disagree with [Bradley] on so many points, and those points of importance, that I doubt if I can name any special obligations."<sup>43</sup>

As half-hearted an Idealist as he was, it is nevertheless not entirely clear exactly when Moore formulated his new ideas, nor when he communicated them (nor what in state of development) to Russell.<sup>44</sup> Moore spent the summer of 1898 revising his own Trinity Fellowship Dissertation, which had failed to win him a fellowship in 1897. The 1898 version kept a sizeable portion of the 1897 material intact, dropped some of it, and added a few chapters.<sup>45</sup> A combination of material from Chapter I and Chapter II was published in 1899 as **NJ**,<sup>46</sup> the paper that Russell later described as a momentous event in philosophy:

[Moore's] first important publication, "The Nature of Judgment" (published in 1899) retains, to my mind, more of the early quality of intellectual intensity than is to be found in his later writings. I do not mean that what is said in that article is more true than what is said later. I am thinking only of the kind of intellectual passion that it displays.....but I do know—and of this, I feel no doubt—that Moore performed an enormous work of liberation for British philosophy. It is difficult for the present generation to realize what academic philosophy was like when he and I were young...with Moore, British philosophy returned to the kind of work in which it had been pre-eminent in former centuries. Those that are too young to remember the academic reign of German Idealism in English philosophy after T.H. Green can hardly appreciate what Moore achieved in the way of liberation from intellectual fetters. All honor and gratitude are due to him for this achievement. (CPBR, vol. 11: 210, 212)

And I still think that this article gave conclusive proof of philosophical genius. (CPBR vol 11: paper 27).

The revolution for both men took hold in earnest in the spring and summer of 1898 and went on to the end of the year. At the beginning of the year, Russell was writing "On the Idea of a Dialectic of the Sciences" (dated January 1, 1898,) so he was still immersed in that project. But both Russell and Moore attended McTaggart's lectures on Lotze in the Lent term at Trinity, so there will have been opportunities for philosophical talk at this time (no record of any exists).<sup>47</sup> By March 1898, Russell was mulling over the constituents of space

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<sup>42</sup> See Watson (1909).

<sup>43</sup> Baldwin and Preti 2011, 117.

<sup>44</sup> Moore kept chronologies of work, books, and people he became acquainted with (Cambridge University Library, Add. 8330 1/1-5). One entry for 1898 reads: "During first two terms and Long til end of August, work for second dissertation but probably write nothing til May Term."

<sup>45</sup> Baldwin and Preti (2011, lxxv-lxxix); Preti (2022).

<sup>46</sup> Baldwin and Preti (2011, 135-39; 162-69).

<sup>47</sup> Both sets of their notes survive.

and “their mutual relations,” and also delivered a paper, with Moore in the audience, where the topic of existence was discussed.<sup>48</sup> In early May, Russell spent a few days with Moore, and worked on amending his paper “On the Relations of Number and Quantity.”<sup>49</sup> This paper had been delivered the year before, and in writing to his wife about it afterward, Russell stated “Moore despised it...we had a long argument ... afterwards...in which he completely vanquished me as usual, but I couldn’t find out how he proved his own view, so I don’t see how to amend my paper....”<sup>50</sup> A year later Russell’s amendment involved connecting “number and quantity ...by using the idea of relation.”<sup>51</sup> That is: “quantity is a conception of relation, of comparison; it expresses the possibility of a certain kind of comparison with other things.” But Russell’s conception of relations here was still internal.

By April, 1898, however, Russell began to write **AMR**, which appears to have been completed in July, 1898.<sup>52</sup> **AMR** is a piece of abandoned work that among other things represents Russell’s probing toward a connection between the nature of judgment and the nature of relations, although **AMR** proceeds against a backdrop of the neo-Hegelianism he still could not shed.<sup>53</sup> Russell and Moore met a number of times for philosophical talk in May and June, 1898, and it is possible that Russell’s thoughts on the nature of mathematical judgment in Book I were written last, after discussion with Moore. After a meeting at the end of June,<sup>54</sup> Russell reported to his wife Alys that he and Moore had been up until the wee hours talking and that Moore had been “not at all discouraging.”<sup>55</sup> Moore also shared something of his thoughts, as Russell added that “we talked also about his work a great deal, and as usual I was pleased with his remarks.”

Two months later, just before submitting the dissertation, Moore wrote to his friend Desmond MacCarthy that he had written 60 new pages in “Metaphysics—not a word of Ethics,” adding: “I have arrived at a perfectly staggering doctrine....”<sup>56</sup> This “staggering doctrine” was that “reality is in fact independent of existence.”<sup>57</sup> This was the crucial shift in metaphysical perspective that grounded the new philosophy and made such an impact on Russell. There is little evidence that Moore had had this idea in June when he was

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<sup>48</sup> CPBR, vol. 2: xxxvii

<sup>49</sup> CPBR, vol. 2: 68-82.

<sup>50</sup> CPBR, vol. 2: 68-82. The “as usual” suggests that Russell did derive a great deal of stimulation from Moore. In a letter to Ellis Edwards in 1904, Russell states that “it was chiefly in the course of conversation that I was led by Mr. Moore to adopt his rather unusual views on truth and knowledge” (Russell Archive RA 3 797.1904/07/30.56677). Moore also wrote about seeing Russell (1942, 15): “...I used, for some six or eight years after [1894], to see him frequently and discuss philosophical questions with him.”

<sup>51</sup> CPBR vol. 2, 69.

<sup>52</sup> CPBR, vol. 2, chapter 18.

<sup>53</sup> A key point in Book I is Russell’s acknowledgment that most judgments are of subject/predicate form, “but we shall find...that the vast majority of mathematical judgments...are essentially of various other kinds.” CPBR vol 2, chapter 18.

<sup>54</sup> CPBR, vol. 2: 160.

<sup>55</sup> CPBR, vol. 2: 167.

<sup>56</sup> Add. 8330 1/2/5 (Cambridge University Library).

<sup>57</sup> Add. 8330 1/2/5 (Cambridge University Library).

talking with Russell. But in a letter to Couturat dated 3 June 1898, Russell wrote that “In truth, I have changed my philosophy greatly since I wrote my book [EFG].” Given how Russell phrases it, this could conceivably refer to something of Moore’s ideas. Moore wrote to MacCarthy saying he had not done much work on his revision by mid-June, 1898, but it is possible that any ideas he was even dimly formulating may have come up at their talks.<sup>58</sup>

Moore wrote to Russell in early September, telling him about the finished dissertation, and it does not sound like Russell will have known totally what to expect. Moore there gives what might be the first explicit statement to Russell of his logico-metaphysical-realism on the nature of propositions and the nature of the relations between their constituent concepts:<sup>59</sup>

Almost all the addition to my dissertation was metaphysical... I see no proof that there is any existent reality, beside Appearance... I fear the present dissertation is much more paradoxical than the last, and will deprive me completely of Caird’s sympathy. My chief discovery, which shocked me a good deal when I made it, is expressed in the form that an existent is a proposition. I see now that I might have put this more mildly. Of course, by an existent must be understood an existent existent—not what exists, but that + its existence. I carefully state that a proposition is not to be understood as any thought or words, but the concepts + their relation *of* which we think. It is only propositions in this sense, which can be true, + from which inference can be made. Truth therefore does not depend on any relation between ideas and reality, nor even between concepts and reality, but is an inherent property of the whole formed by certain concepts + their relations; falsehood similarly. True existential propositions are those in which certain concepts stand in a specific relation to the concept ~~of~~ existence; and I see no way of distinguishing such from what are commonly called ‘existents’, i.e. what exists and its existence. This explains how it should be commonly be thought that a proposition can be inferred from an existent. Existents are in reality only one kind of proposition. The ultimate elements of everything that is are concepts, and a part of these, when compounded in a special way, form the existent world. With regard to the special method of composition I said nothing. There would need, I think, to be several kinds of ultimate relation between concepts—each, of course, necessary. (11 September 1898)

Russell’s reply to Moore described his own work in working out the nature of relations, and sounds a bit as if Moore’s views concerning “several kinds of necessary relations among concepts” had also been at the forefront of his own thought, perhaps as a result of the conversations they had been engaged in in summer:

I fear Caird’s hair will stand on end when he hears that an existent is a proposition. I think your expression needlessly paradoxical, but I imagine I agree with what you mean. I agree most emphatically with what you say about the several kinds of necessary relations among concepts, and I think their discovery is the true business of Logic (or Meta. if you like)... I am really discussing all relations of a certain type. If a relation be indicated by  $\cap$  and A and B be two terms having this relation, symmetrical relations are defined by these 2 axioms:

(1) if  $A \cap B$ ,  $B \cap A$

(2) IF  $A \cap B + B \cap C$ , then  $A \cap C$ . The type is equality, or identity of content. Unsymmetrical relations do not satisfy one or other of these necessarily, + never satisfy the deduction from them,  $A \cap A$ . The first type does

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<sup>58</sup> “...about 6 pages dissertation [*sic*] and done less work than ever.” (Add. 8330 1/2/5 (Cambridge University Library)).

<sup>59</sup> Russell Archives, McMaster University, 710.052.981

not always satisfy case (2): such is the diversity of content. Math[ematical] relations, however, normally satisfy case 2 but not case 1. Such are whole v part, greater v less, before v after, cause v effect...I should be very grateful if you would send me a post-card telling the result of the Fellowship ....I try not to allow myself to think the event doubtful, but I am anxious all the same. .. may you prosper! (13 September 1898)

Throughout the rest of 1898 Russell puzzled over relations.<sup>60</sup> Russell wrote to Moore about it, saying he was finished “skating over the difficulties” in Book I on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1898 (RAI 710). Then between October 1898 and January 1899, things changed fairly dramatically in Russell’s thinking.<sup>61</sup> He read Moore’s dissertation in November, 1898 (“it appears to me to be on the level of the best philosophy I know”), and shortly after, he began to make connections between the nature of mind-independent relations and the nature of mind-independent judgment, and to work out a new classification of relations as self-subsistent, and mind-independent, finally rejecting the doctrine of internal relations.<sup>62</sup>

We can appreciate the impact that Moore’s thought had on Russell by considering that Moore’s views arose from a unique set of conceptual pre-conditions, fundamentally stemming from a dissatisfaction with what he called “Kant’s too-psychological standpoint” in the formulation of thought, knowledge, and reality.<sup>63</sup> What Moore grappled with in 1897 was the project of trying to make coherent sense of the causal *and* normative properties of ethical thought assuming a Bradleyan metaphysics, with the Kantian analysis of free will as the initial spur to his ideas. But Moore had along the way also absorbed a few significant insights from his teachers: Sidgwick’s own criticisms of Kant’s psychologism<sup>64</sup>, and the anti-psychologism of Stout and Ward on both Kant’s transcendental arguments and an account of the nature of judgment from the point of view of psychology as a science. The turning point in Moore’s thinking was his realization that he could reject the background Bradleyan metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality from the same motives as he was rejecting Kant’s psychologism, captured in his August 1898 letter to MacCarthy that “it had never occurred to me that existence was separate from Reality.”

It is also fair to say that there was a greater interconnection between the conceptual and philosophical elements that informed Moore’s project than there were in Russell’s. The emphasis on the weaknesses of Kantian psychologism was far more greatly highlighted in the literature on the nature of thought and judgment that Moore had been exposed to as a student in Stout and Ward’s lectures and publications than it was in the mathematical literature of Russell’s undergraduate examinations. The conceptual and terminological disputes of day centered explicitly on anti-psychologism, and we know that Russell had indeed had reservations as early as 1895 about a lurking subjectivism in Kant. But the

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<sup>60</sup> See Griffin, 2022.

<sup>61</sup> See Griffin, 2022.

<sup>62</sup> See among other things CPBR, vol. 2, chapter 16.

<sup>63</sup> F: 199-200.

<sup>64</sup> “I am glad to find how largely I agree with [Sidgwick’s] ‘Criticism of the Critical Philosophy’ *Mind* viii, 29, 31 in my discussion of Kant’s speculative philosophy also” (Baldwin and Preti 2011, 117).

influence of the “definitely bad”<sup>65</sup> Cambridge mathematics—and the neglect at Cambridge of continental progress in mathematics—caused Russell’s ideas to deadlock, stymying even his diligence at resolving a complex set of puzzles, antinomies, and contradictions. This is where Moore had the advantage. He wasn’t wedded to Bradleyan metaphysics in any deep way, and the moral sciences tripos made a far more intelligible blend of conceptual and terminological elements in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, than it did with respect to logic, psychology, metaphysics and *mathematics*. Moore’s influences were, in this context, a more natural blend of criticism of the epistemological and metaphysical conclusions of Kant and their specific outcomes for ethics (via Sidgwick); the more informed mental science at Cambridge (Stout and Ward), and the criticism both of Kantian psychologism and Oxford neo-Hegelianism (Sidgwick, Stout and Ward).

Part of what held Russell back as well was he had been working his way through an account of the foundations of mathematical and related concepts which did not take a distinction between mathematical judgment (the assertion of knowledge) and the object of mathematical judgment/ knowledge, as a primary focus. Nor did it feature a connection between this and the nature of relations. Russell’s metaphysical backdrop was well-entrenched, that is to say, and although it did not deny that there was such a distinction, it denied that the distinction was anything other than mind-asserted. Moreover, the nature of mathematics itself was understood as one stage in a dialectical process. Moore, by contrast, found himself working to account for the normative properties of ethical judgment against what he (and others) took to be a subjectivist conflation in Kant (and others) between the act of judgment and the nature of its objects. By distinguishing the two, Moore’s new view managed to cut across the logical, epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical disputes of the day in one fell swoop. By asserting a wholly mind-independent formulation of the constituents of propositions and their logical form (“a proposition is not to be understood as any thought or words, but the concepts + their relation *of which we think*”) and by asserting that reality consists of these elements standing in necessary relation to one another (“truth... is an inherent property of the whole formed by certain concepts + their relations; falsehood similarly”), Moore was able to put an end to any metaphysics that mapped reality onto the mind and thus opened a path to account for the mind-independent nature of ethical (and ultimately, in Russell’s hands, mathematical) propositions.

It is true that Russell did not seem to know the precise details of Moore’s “staggering doctrine” until September, 1898, and he didn’t read the dissertation until November, 1898. By the end of the summer 1898, Russell was still some way away from learning the formal techniques that would supply a way to express relational variables and relational logical form, but he had begun to embark more clearly toward what in **PoM** he called “the eternal self-identity of all terms and all logical concepts, which alone form the constituents of propositions,” which he attributed to Moore (1903, 448). But Russell could develop and

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<sup>65</sup> MPD p. 38.

refine an idea practically overnight, on very little input. Once Russell came to the realization that an account of relations as irreducible and mind-independent could be formulated, he began to cultivate it, with powerful results.

I would argue—though this is very speculative—that Russell consistently extolled Moore’s boldness in **NJ** and the monumental influence of those ideas on him precisely because Russell himself had not managed it. Russell had been methodically grinding it out for years, when what was needed instead (apparently) was a simple but audacious metaphysical step. What Moore did was to take that step—one “which shocked me a good deal.” It may not be entirely clear to contemporary readers how daring Moore’s new views actually were. So to underscore the effect they had on Russell, we can briefly look at the effect they had on his examiners.

Moore was relatively unlucky in the selection of examiners for both his dissertations. The Oxford Kantian Edward Caird was an examiner for the 1897 dissertation (which failed to gain Moore a Fellowship), and the Oxford neo-Hegelian Bernard Bosanquet examined the 1898 dissertation.<sup>66</sup> Neither were pleased. Caird remarks that Kant, according to Moore, “confuses his epistemological view of things...with a psychological view of them as determined by their relation to man’s peculiar kind of subjectivity,” which, Caird goes on to say, is “unfair...or at least reached by merely emphasizing Kant’s weaknesses.” Bosanquet, a year later, remarks “...I found myself almost wholly unable to appreciate the theoretical point of view which the author has adopted. It appears to me to lie beyond the limits of paradox....”<sup>67</sup> He goes on to say:

The intellectual motive of the Dissertation...is to dissociate Truth from the Nature of Knowledge, and Good from the nature of Will, so as to free Metaphysic from all risk of confusion with Psychology. The theory of the proposition and the concept...is set out in chapter 2. I confess that I feel a difficulty in regarding it as serious...To get rid of mere psychology, the essential idea of consciousness and cognition as an endeavor towards unity has been abandoned...if it had been sent to me for review by ‘Mind,’ I should...have endeavored to point out that its positive stand-point and ...treatment of the subject were hopelessly inadequate...the writer was not successful, to any appreciable extent, in representing the real nature and interconnection of the factors involved in the problem with which he was concerned (Baldwin and Preti 2011, 247-9).

Russell understood immediately how these stalwart elders of the prevailing British Idealist faction might have been as flummoxed as they were. In a letter to his wife he noted that “Bosanquet, according to Moore, betrayed a crass ignorance of the subject, even of its literature. I am confirmed in all I ever thought: for this is the impression which a really first-rate young man ought to make on men of 50.”

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<sup>66</sup> Russell reported to his wife that Moore had had a “close shave” of it (Griffin 1992).

<sup>67</sup> Baldwin and Preti (2011, 246). In a letter to Ellis Edwards (1904), Russell explained: “the reality of relations is a fundamental point in Mr. Moore’s philosophy. Kant, and all subsequent idealists, depend throughout upon the assumption that relations are not objective, but are the work of the mind.”

## V. “Yours Fraternally”

All of the above was only a few years after Russell and Moore had met, and about the young Moore, Russell tended toward the spectacularly generous:

In my third year...I met G. E. Moore...who was then a freshman, and for some years he fulfilled my ideal of genius. He was in those days beautiful and slim, with a look almost of inspiration...He had a kind of exquisite purity (Autobiography, I: 64).

We all felt electrified by him, as if we had slumbered hitherto and never realized what fearless intellect pure and unadulterated really means....I cannot doubt that he will somehow mark himself out as a man of stupendous genius (Russell to Alys, 18 February 1894).

We saw above that Russell’s acknowledgments inclined to the highly appreciative. And even to the last, Russell was demonstrative. Upon learning of Moore’s death, Russell sent this telegram to Moore’s wife: “Profoundly grieved by your husband’s death deepest sympathy Russell.”<sup>68</sup>

For all this, however, the plain truth is that Moore could not stand Russell. Although Moore did circumspectly note in Schilpp (1942, 14-16) that his greatest influence philosophically was Russell, he did not, for instance, acknowledge Russell in the preface to PE. In addition, Moore’s letters to MacCarthy between 1899- 1903 contain a number of descriptions of the evasive maneuvers he employed to avoid visiting Russell, or being around him when he was in or near Cambridge, or limiting his time with Russell if he couldn’t get out of seeing him.<sup>69</sup>

One surviving piece of direct evidence about Moore’s feelings is in a letter to MacCarthy when he learned that Russell had been invited by a mutual friend to a reading party holiday organized by Moore (without clearing it with Moore first). Moore did not want Russell along, and astonishingly, wrote to tell him so: “About the reading-party, since you ask me to say if your coming would make any difficulty, I think I had better tell you that it would. As this is so I am very sorry Bob suggested it to you.”<sup>70</sup> In explaining his feelings about the *imbroglio* to MacCarthy (who acted as intermediary), we get a picture of Moore’s feelings about Russell:<sup>71</sup>

Don’t you think I have done the best I could? If he had only proposed to come for a few days...I think I should have agreed; but you see he is proposing to come for nearly a fortnight...Of course, I can’t be sure that he

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<sup>68</sup> Add. 9778 5/62 (Cambridge University Library).

<sup>69</sup> Preti (2008-09), 117-121. “Quarrel with Russell at beginning of Lent Term (1899)” is suggestive, but there is no surviving evidence about it.

<sup>70</sup> Robert Trevelyan was a fellow Apostle.

<sup>71</sup> March 18 and March 20, 1903 (Add. 8330 2/5/28, Cambridge University Library).



would spoil it for anyone but me...And then I do think that the effect he would have on me would also indirectly make it more unpleasant for the rest of you: I can't be at my ease, while he is there, and I don't know how miserable I might not get.

Moore did go on to say that the mutual friend could not be blamed for inviting Russell: "Of course, he has never known that I had the least dislike to Russell." After MacCarthy replied to say that he would talk to Russell and to the mutual friend ("I think I can make the state of things better, without glossing anything over"), Moore responded with a bit more about his feelings:

The worst of it for me is that I cannot be sure how unpleasant I should have found it; nor, however unpleasant it might be, that I ought not to bear it...[T]he fact that you like Russell so much makes me think that I ought to like him. But I can't help thinking that even you would have found him embarrassing before a fortnight was over...if he did not imagine he would be in the way, it seems to show that he has not been nearly so conscious of strained relations with me...

MacCarthy wrote back: <sup>72</sup>

My talk with Russell was as satisfactory as such talks can be...He said he would not have proposed himself had he known the party was to be so small and intimate. He has been quite aware of your feeling toward him though, I think, not of its intensity and supposed lately things were mending.

We do not know what the root cause of this *froideur* was, but things were not mending. Russell and Moore were both back at Trinity as lecturers between 1911 and 1915, and Moore's diaries for this period are interleaved throughout with entries about avoiding Russell at Hall, not having anything to say to Russell at Hall, moving place settings to avoid sitting next to Russell at Hall, etc.<sup>73</sup> And as if things weren't weird enough, the advent of Wittgenstein as a student at Trinity in 1911 led to even further tension.<sup>74</sup>

After a few years in Cambridge, Wittgenstein took himself off to Norway in 1914 to work on problems of logic in relative solitude. He invited Moore for a visit (March 29-April 14, 1914), and Moore returned with notebooks containing Wittgenstein's dictation on the current state of his logical thoughts.<sup>75</sup> Moore was aware that Wittgenstein had dictated a prior set of notes on his logical thinking to Russell before he left for Norway (he had studied them before traveling),<sup>76</sup> and must have at least supposed that Russell would have been interested in anything brought back from Norway. But strangely, Moore did not share the notebooks immediately with Russell. Moore may not even have mentioned to Russell

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<sup>72</sup> March 28, 1903 (Add. 8330 8M/3/17).

<sup>73</sup> Add. 8330 1/3/3 and 1/3/4, Cambridge University Library.

<sup>74</sup> See Monk (1990; 1996 (vol 1)).

<sup>75</sup> Add. 8875 10/7/1-3 (Cambridge University Library). These were published as an Appendix to *LW Notebooks 1914-1916* (von Wright and Anscombe, 1961).

<sup>76</sup> Add. 8330 1/3/4 (Saturday 28 February 1914); Potter (2008).

that he had them. Russell could have been unaware that Moore even possessed the dictated notes until he received a letter from Wittgenstein in June, 1914: "...my work has made considerable progress in the last four or five months...I explained it *in detail* to Moore when he was with me and he made various notes. So you can best find it all out from him." The previous month (on May 11<sup>th</sup>), however, Moore had received a very ratty letter from Wittgenstein concerning the submission of his logical work for the BA, after Moore had told him it could not be submitted in that form.<sup>77</sup> Moore was so disturbed by it that it's possible he couldn't stand the idea of even talking about Wittgenstein to Russell, and thus avoided it. But it does not, in any case, seem as if Russell had further enquired about Wittgenstein's work just after Moore returned (which is odd in itself).

Moore spent a few weeks of July reading his notes of Wittgenstein.<sup>78</sup> Russell and Moore did talk about Wittgenstein in July at Hall, where Russell alluded to a quarrel of his own with Wittgenstein, but Moore did not share his own falling-out.<sup>79</sup> The next time that Moore's diary alludes to the Norway notebook material is an entry for January 20, 1915. Wittgenstein had written to Russell around Christmas, 1914, saying "I find it inconceivable that Moore wasn't able to explain my ideas to you. Were you able to get anything at all out of his notes?" Russell showed the letter to Moore on January 20, 1915, who noted in his diary: "R[ussell] gives letter from Wittg[enstein]: says W says 'he can't understand my not being able to explain his ideas.' R must have told him that I couldn't, but he had no right to say this, because he has never tried to get me to explain them." Wittgenstein had also written to Keynes about the notes ("I wonder if Russell has been able to make anything out from the notes I gave to Moore last Easter?"), and Russell showed this letter to Moore as well, on February 14, 1915. This all could suggest that Russell had been unaware that Moore had notes, and was annoyed that Moore hadn't mentioned them or showed them to him. Russell explicitly asked Moore for the notes on February 10, 1915 ("R asks to see my notes of W."), and on April 29, 1915, Moore noted in his diary that Russell, next to him in Hall, "says he hasn't been able to understand my notes."

What these snippets show is that there was certainly some strain underneath the professionally gracious *homages* that Russell and Moore publicly asserted of the other. After Russell left Trinity in 1915, Moore stayed on in a conventional academic career until he retired in 1939. They did however continue to correspond and to cross professional paths from time to time. As we have seen, there is no doubt that Russell felt himself indebted to Moore and was unafraid to evince a lifelong regard for him. But the same cannot be said for Moore. It is safe to say there is, as yet, more to uncover in the story of the relationship between Russell and Moore.

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<sup>77</sup> Monk 1990, 103.

<sup>78</sup> Add. 1/3/4 (Cambridge University Library).

<sup>79</sup> Diary entry (Add. 8330 1/3/4) 23 July 1914. Wittgenstein had by this time written again to apologize. Moore did not answer. The quarrel with Russell is alluded to in McGuinness and von Wright, p. 74-80.

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