9 What Russell Meant When He Called Moore a Logician

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On September 11, 1898, G.E. Moore wrote to Bertrand Russell to give him a synopsis of the views he had developed in his Trinity Fellowship dissertation, submitted the month before.[1] Moore's 1898 dissertation was an analysis of Kant's arguments on freedom and on reason, a revision of the version Moore had submitted in 1897, which had failed to win him a fellowship. Chapter II of the 1898 dissertation included a formulation of the nature of judgment described by Moore to his friend Desmond MacCarthy as "a perfectly staggering doctrine."[2] As Moore explained to Russell,

> I carefully state that a proposition is not to be understood as any thought or words, but the concepts + their relation of which we think. It is only propositions in this sense, which can be true, and from which inference can be made. Truth therefore does not depend on any relation between ideas and reality, nor even between concepts and reality, but is an inherent property of the whole formed by certain concepts <that> stand in a specific relation to the concept of existence…There would need, I think, to be several kinds of ultimate relation between concepts—each, of course, necessary.

Upon receipt of this letter, Russell replied, "I agree most emphatically with what you say about the several kinds of necessary relations among concepts, and I think their discovery is the true business of Logic (or Meta[physics] if you like)."[3] Once he'd digested Moore's complete dissertation (he didn't read it in full until November 1898),[4] Russell went on to press a series of debate points with Moore, writing to him that "when I see you, I should like to discuss some difficulties which occur in working out your theory of Logic." A few years later, in correspondence with Couturat (May 5, 1900), in advance of the International Congress

1 The Trinity College Fellowship was a six-year post which carried no teaching responsibilities or residence requirements.
2 Moore to MacCarthy, August 14, 1898 (Add. 8330 2/5/6).
3 September 13, 1898 (McMaster Russell Archives (710.052981).
4 Russell to Moore, December 1, 1898 (Add. 8330 8R/33/10).

in Paris that had such a radical effect on the development of his ideas, Russell reported that "I see that I have chosen a topic that cannot be treated briefly, largely because my arguments depend in part upon a new logic (*vide* Moore, 'The Nature of Judgment,' Mind April 1899)."[5] By July 1900, in correspondence again with Couturat, Russell claimed "My friend G.E. Moore is, in my opinion, the most subtle in pure logic."

Now what could Russell have meant by all this? How exactly could Russell have called Moore a *logician*? The main features of the story I want to tell are as follows: (1) that an amalgam of logic, psychology, and metaphysics made up the study of philosophy during this period, and that the way these notions were understood at this period needs to be untangled; (2) that the way to understand how Moore can be construed as a logician is to understand how Bradley could be construed as a logician; but (3) that how Bradley can be construed as a logician has its roots in how Kant can be construed as a logician. Kantian conceptions of logic, 19th-century reactions to it, and, in particular, how Kant was read at Cambridge are key elements of the intellectual reconstruction of Moore's thought at this period, and what I will mainly focus on below.

Philosophy at Cambridge in the 19th Century

We need to set the historical/conceptual scene in order to understand the conception of logic that was dominant in late 19th-century Cambridge. Philosophy at Cambridge was long known as moral science. The inauguration of the Moral Sciences Tripos (first held in 1850) had its basis in 19th-century university reform controversies. One important dispute centered on the mathematics to be taught at Cambridge. Continental developments in the calculus, partial to the analytical, Leibnizian notation, were ignored and derided at Cambridge for decades, in favor of local loyalty to Newtonian fluxions. This led to a serious decline in Cambridge mathematical study, later bemoaned by Russell in his complaint about the "definitely bad" quality of the mathematics which comprised his Mathematical Tripos Part I. (Russell 1959a, p. 38). Where Cambridge mathematics went wrong, however, was not echoed in philosophy at Cambridge. Though continental headway in mathematics was ignored in Cambridge for some time, not every continental development was entirely disdained there. In particular, new directions in the science of psychology played a major role in the study of philosophy.

The Moral Sciences Tripos had at first consisted of moral philosophy, logic, history, political economy, general jurisprudence, and the laws of England. According to Sidgwick's summary of the state of philosophy at Cambridge (1876), this was because it was formed on the basis of subjects "in which the University happened to possess Professors," and not the more natural divisions by which philosophy then was studied. Moral

5 Griffin (1992, 191).

science, Sidgwick claimed, should more naturally consist of logic, metaphysics, and psychology (Sidgwick 1876, 242). Indeed, by the late 1890s (when Russell and Moore sat their exams), the Moral Sciences Tripos had been divided into two parts. Part I consisted of (I) Psychology, (II) Logic and Methodology, and (III) Political Economy.[6] The Part II Tripos consisted of a number of complex options. The regulations required that "every candidate shall be examined *either* in Ethical and Metaphysical Philosophy *or* in Ethical and Political Philosophy, also in one or two but not more than two of the four special subjects." The compulsory subject Ethics and Metaphysics was divided into two sections. In Metaphysics (I(a)), there were six sections: (I) Knowledge, analysis, and general characteristics; (II) Fundamental forms of the object of knowledge; (III) Certainty; (IV) Criteria applicable to special kinds of knowledge; (V) Sources and limits of knowledge; and (VI) Coordination of knowledge. For the Ethics part, there were four sections: (I) Analysis of the moral consciousness;[7] (II) The end or ends of rational action; (III) Exposition and classification of particular duties and transgressions; and—notably—(IV) Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics, Psychology, Sociology, and Politics.[8]

There is a welter of archival evidence that shows that Moore's undergraduate Tripos preparation included exposure to the psychology prevailing in Cambridge (and elsewhere) at this period.[9] Thus Moore's intellectual environment was characterized by the attempts of thinkers of the day to developing a modern conception of the relation between thought and reality—one that importantly included a deepening awareness of a gap between the logical and metaphysical properties of mental states and their purely psychological/subjective ones.[10] Highly visible during this period were Moore's and Russell's teachers G.F. Stout, James Ward, Henry Sidgwick and John Ellis McTaggart, all of whom participated in spirited debates (often spanning multiple issues of *Mind*) with each other, with F.H. Bradley at Oxford, and with the American and continental psychologists, on concerns that crosscut psychology and

6 Among the readings recommended for the Part I.1 (Psychology) part of the examination were Ward's 1886 article "Psychology," a *locus classicus* for decades; Hermann Lotze's *Microcosmus*, vol. I (1897).; and Bradley's *Ethics* (1876), *Principles of Logic* (1883), and *Appearance and Reality* (1893). Herbart was included, too.

7 Analysis of the moral consciousness included, among other things, moral perception, moral judgment, object of the moral faculty, and freedom of the will.

8 The special subjects in 1894 and 1896 were History of Philosophy, Advanced Psychology and Psychophysics, Advanced Logic and Methodology, or Advanced Political Economy. Russell and Moore both chose History of Philosophy for their respective special subjects. In 1894, the examination in History of Philosophy was Bacon to Descartes; in 1896, it was The Philosophy of Hegel. Russell did the former; Moore, the latter (CUC, 1896).

9 And direct evidence from Russell: 'What Shall I Read?' (*CPBR*, Vol. 1; p. 345–365).

10 Thus Dummett (1993, 1) was flat-out wrong when he claimed, with respect to the origins of analytic philosophy in Austria and Germany, that "Russell and Moore sprang from a different *milieu*."

logic, logic and metaphysics, and metaphysics and psychology.[11] But to us, Moore's early philosophical background looks like a set of quite incongruent views: Bradley's Absolute Idealism, McTaggart's idiosyncratic Hegelianism, Sidgwick's hedonism, Kant's ethics, and the mental science of Stout and Ward. It is anything but obvious how these coalesced into a position so influential that it sent Russell into somersaults of acclaim—and changed the history of philosophy in the 20th century.[12]

There are two significant historical developments that I would argue are an important part of an account of this period. The first is the so-called *Psychologismusstreit*—a quite virulent dispute between (so-called) psychologist and anti-psychologist views that swept through nearly every academic discipline throughout Germany and Austria, migrating to Great Britain and beyond. The other was the inauguration of physiological or laboratory psychology.[13] Both of these developments lie behind the kind of psychology—the mental science—that had developed on the continent and then prevailed in the study of philosophy (moral science) at Cambridge in the late 19th century.[14] It is probably clear by now that disciplinary turbulence was the order of the day during this period. In particular, the expressions "logic," "psychology," and "metaphysics" could mean just about anything depending on who employed them; what country they were in; what interests they had; how little they took account of other thinkers' work; and how confused they were accused of being. No contemporary understanding of these subjects will serve to explain how Moore, his contemporaries, or his teachers and examiners will have understood them. So we need to sort out the mess of terminological ambiguity.

11 Stout and Ward were not only deeply familiar with the all of continental turmoil in their field but were leading and influential players in its discussion and dissemination in Britain. Stout was the leading conduit for Austrian mental science via his own work (Stout 1896) and also through his editorship of *Mind*. Ward's seminal (1886) article was a *locus classicus* for decades as a then contemporary formulation of the nature of psychology.

12 Russell (1903, xviii); (1975, 61; 70; 146); 1959a; 1959b.

13 I will say less about that here, except to say that the philosophers at Cambridge were not inclined to consider this development as sufficiently philosophical for the claims they wanted to defend about the mind and its objects.

14 An important source of evidence for the reconstruction of the intellectual environment at this period are the journals. *Mind* was among the first of these for the Anglophone thinker: it was founded in 1876 explicitly as "[T]he first English-language journal devoted to Philosophy and Psychology" and was a vital hub for contemporary thinking in philosophy and psychology on the continent, in Britain, and elsewhere. Digital search functions now possible reveal how much of *Mind* was (unsurprisingly) peppered thickly with debates and inquiries into (among other things) the nature and processes of mind; validity and truth; subject of thought and object of thought; act of mind and object of thought; and the customary divisions of traditional logic (concepts, inference, and judgment). These debates display the attempts on the part of the thinkers of the day to grapple with a more modern, developing conception of the relation between thought and reality.

Nineteenth-Century Psychology, Logic and Metaphysics

We should start briefly with the so-called *Psychologismusstreit*.[15] This was a dispute between psychologism and anti-psychologism that cut across nearly every intellectual discipline of the day. It has received less attention that it could have in a complete account of the origins of analytic philosophy at Cambridge, most likely because even a rough look must contend with the fact that "psychologism" has a spate of definitions, not all of them cohesive.[16] Kusch (1995, 119–121) comprehensively catalogues a set of definitions and criteria in the literature of the day, among which are the following: any philosophical view that regarded philosophy as applied psychology; advocated subjectivism and relativism; conflated genesis and validity; or that combined psychology and empiricism. There were metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, logical, ethical, aesthetic, and mathematical varieties of psychologism (1995, 108). I want to argue here that the intellectual context in which Moore formulated his views can be best understood by fitting it under the theoretical canopy of the *Psychologismusstreit*, with a particular emphasis on the disputes characteristic of this period on the formulations of subjectivity and objectivity in the study of cognition and judgment. This, I also believe, will help to understand how Kant was read in Cambridge, will explain the evolution of Moore's views via his postgraduate work on Kant's ethics, and will explain how Russell could have called Moore a logician.[17]

15 See Kusch (1995) for the definitive detail.

16 Kusch (1995) provides a set of tables documenting the number of accusations across schools of thought or individual thinkers.

17 I think this line of reconstruction helps to put a bit of an end to the usual story of Frege's influence on analytic philosophy and the (common) attribution to Frege of a groundbreaking anti-psychologism in logic. In fact, Frege's own views were part of the *Psychologismusstreit*; the intellectual context in which the *Psychologismusstreit* played out in the 19th century incorporated Frege's work but was broader than his mathematical logic. It must be said that the role of Frege's work in the specifically Cantabrigian origins of analytic philosophy is, in effect, nil. It was not discussed in the mental science literature most likely to have been a direct influence on Moore. References to Frege in the philosophy journals amount to 14 citations between 1879 and 1900, for instance. None include extended discussion. "On Concept and Object" and "On Sense and Reference" are given a one-sentence summary in *Mind* in 1892 and noted as having appeared in two German journals (literature reviews of the contents of other journals was then a common practice). The mathematical training that Russell received at Cambridge, as we know, did not include any notice of Frege's work. Frege was quite isolated at Jena, and his contributions were unheeded or downright derided by his peers (Schroeder (1898) is particularly scathing, for instance). Frege was aware of the difficulties: in the preface to his *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (Ebert and Rossberg (2013, xiii), he wrote morosely, "the prospects for my book are dim. In any case we must give up on those mathematicians who, encountering logical expressions like 'concept,' 'relation,' 'judgement,' think: *metaphysica sunt, non leguntur!* and also those philosophers who, sighting a formula, cry out: *mathematica sunt, non leguntur*!"

The mental science—that amalgam of logic, psychology, and metaphysics—that shaped the British intellectual scene came from two different sources: (i) the Germanophone tradition, which, given the mid-century discoveries in physiology and allied sciences, had begun to get out from under the legacy of Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics; and (ii) the British tradition, steeped in but officially rejecting the associationist views of the classical empiricists (as well as those of 19th-century empiricists like Mill). That is, a traditional element of philosophical enquiry was, of course, the nature of thought: mind, reason, knowledge, etc. Logic—understood as what characterizes thought—was itself divided into three traditional categories: concepts, inferences, and judgment. Components of thought included ideas and presentations. For the mental scientists at Cambridge, the conceptual crisis inaugurated by the *Psychologismusstreit* was deeply felt, amplified by the threat coming from the laboratory "to which the name Psycho-Physical Materialism is given" (Ward 1893, 54). What Stout and Ward did, I would argue, was to carve out an understanding of "psychology" that would operate as a transition between 19th-century mental science and 20th-century philosophy of mind: an anti-subjective, systematic, scientific taxonomy of the nature of subjectivity.

Psychology at Cambridge was to be understood thus as an "empirical" psychology, whose inspiration was Brentano,[18] in that it proceeded by scientific method: analysis of the contents of mind via a set of systematic necessary and sufficient conditions.[19] It was not "modern" psychology, which to Stout and Ward meant "physiological" psychology.[20] Nor was it the "psychology" of the classical or then contemporary empiricists, which Stout and Ward understood as (and further dismissed as) suspect *epistemology*. For Stout and Ward, a scientific psychology was one that took the realm of subjectivity as a proper concern of scientific enquiry but was employed to give an account of the features of subjectivity *common* to all subjects. "Psychological" analysis was what the psychological observer could objectively attribute to the "psychical," a term that described the immediate experience of the subject observed,[21] but *their* psychology was *science*, in that it tended toward an objective examination of subjectivity *itself*. Stout and Ward conceived of the nature of subjectivity as essentially directed onto its objects: subjectivity as inextricably *relational*. In short, psychology at Cambridge was characterized

18 Who himself called it 'descriptive' in contrast to 'genetic' (Brentano, 1874).

19 So a "scientific" psychology did not necessarily mean empirical in the sense of physiological: Brentano's was empirical, and it was scientific, but it was not physiological.

20 Ward (1893).

21 Moreover, the psychologist can make a distinction between, for instance, subject and object, which is not necessarily something the psychological subject can apprehend for himself (Stout, 1926, 28).

by disciplinary attention to the distinction between the nature of subjectivity treated scientifically (and as a source of objective knowledge *about the mind*), in contrast to both the associative and the synthesizing role of the thinking subject with respect to reality and truth in pre-19th-century epistemology and metaphysics.

Stout and Ward also took their notion of psychology, as a matter of disciplinary principle, not to imply commitment to any particular metaphysical view, and indeed they assumed that they could maintain its independence from any such view.[22] The priority for both of them was: (I) to defend a conception of philosophical psychology against the encroaching physiological methods that were transforming psychology into a lab science on the continent; and (ii) to (at the same time) formulate a properly systematic, scientific psychology, entirely independent of metaphysical and epistemological considerations they associated with traditional philosophy.[23] And this makes sense in the context of the study of mind that they had inherited. One issue was: how to account for knowledge, when, inevitably, its origin is in subjective processes of mind. Another issue was connected with the traditional opposition of the sensible faculties and the reasoning faculties, which entailed a number of attendant epistemological and metaphysical conclusions that were to be rejected at Cambridge. One of those was that reason or thought had special powers of transcendence, synthesis, and unification, all of which permitted its penetration of and grasp of the ultimate nature of reality, which was itself logical (in the sense of necessary, universal, unified, unconditioned one).[24] Thus, for the 19th-century psychologist (mental scientist) at Cambridge, the pressure was on to give a legitimately scientific formulation of mind and thought—and one that was independent of any particular philosophical entailments that could be drawn from it.[25] The one Stout and Ward defended, as we alluded to above, was a relational one that sidestepped (i) any particular metaphysical commitment to the object side of the relation but which (ii) implicitly defended an objectivist account of the relationality.

Now, a central element here is that Stout and Ward both systematically criticized Kant and Bradley as confused on just these conceptual issues. Stout and Ward, when they were in a critical mood, called Kant a "psychologist," by which they meant a bad epistemologist, precisely on grounds that the Copernican insight did nothing much more than elevate the mind's own (alleged) principles of organization into an (alleged)

22 Broad (1945).

23 Stout (1926, 28–9).

24 Bradley, Green, Stirling, and others.

25 It didn't help that the conception of 'reality' was subject to ambiguity: Bradley, for instance, took it as logical; Ward took it as that of objectively scientific common sense. This affected their accounts of psychology, of course.

justification of knowledge that ran subjectively—aground. But they also called him a *really bad* psychologist ("psychologist" in their sense, that is), in that he wasn't even right on the mind's own principles of organization.[26] Kant's views on "logic" as part of his Critique of cognition—and more generally his examination of reason and attendant notions—was read either metaphysically (when it was being embraced) or psychologically (when it wasn't, and mostly it wasn't, in Cambridge). Bradley fared little better in Cambridge: the Cambridge mental scientists of the 1890s were very concerned about the associationism of the empiricists (both classical and contemporary) and likewise called them "psychologists," meaning "bad epistemologists"[27] (a criticism in fact that Bradley shared). But, as Cantabrigians would see it, "psychology" for Bradley meant "logic" because "logic" meant "thought"; both "logic" and "thought" meant "reality," and "reality" meant the Absolute, which was a universal, necessary, perhaps logical (in *our* sense) entity, all of which was derided by Ward as the worst mental science ever and waved away with less than disdain by Stout.[28] We need to set Bradley aside for the time being, however. In order to fully understand Bradley's role in the influences on Moore, we need to clarify how "logic" in Kant's wake was understood at Cambridge.

Reading Kant in Cambridge in the 1890s

I noted earlier that the *Psychologismusstreit* was a useful canopy under which to investigate the philosophical influences on Moore. Here is why I think so. It turns out that for Moore's teachers, Kant was public enemy number one with respect to a suspect subjective psychologism concerning notions proprietary to the new mental science (or even, as Sidgwick argued, a half-decent ethics[29])—and Moore's approach to Kant was deeply influenced by his teachers' reading of Kantian views.[30] Most crucially:

26 The Kantian offenses against a proper scientific psychology, as far as they were concerned, included the outdated notion of mental faculties; the lack of a causal account of how the *ding an sich* was connected to phenomena; and no realistic account of how the Categories actually applied in thought, let alone what justified them.

27 Ward (1886).

28 "A view so unclear I suspect a clerical error" (Ward, 1887) is one of the milder criticisms Ward made of Bradley in print. Bradley took himself to be discussing what he calls 'psychology' in his articles in the 1880s and in the PL, but he would not take his 'psychology' to be that of the classical empiricists he criticized. And as far as the Cambridge mental scientists were concerned, he was no psychologist in *their* sense.

29 See Sidgwick (1907, chapter V).

30 By Moore's teachers, I mean Stout, Ward, Sidgwick, and McTaggart. Moore attended lectures by all of them in preparation for his Tripos Part II. McTaggart examined the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1896 (CUC 1896, 339) and prepared Moore for the History of Philosophy special subject (The Philosophy of Hegel). Sidgwick and Ward examined Moore's fellowship dissertations in 1897 and 1898, respectively (Baldwin

Moore's 1898 dissertation was a critical account of reason and freedom in Kant, and Moore would have been expected to explain the Kantian conception of these notions in his own analysis of it. Kant's conception of reason was squarely within the conception of "logic" of the day. It had to account for the nature of the understanding: that is, of judgment, of the logical form of judgment, of the components of judgment (concepts), of intuitions, and of truth and falsity (among other things). Kant's account, as we know, included the formulation of a *transcendental* logic, to provide an account and a justification, of reason by reason, of our acquisition of knowledge, including an account both of judgment, and of the nature of the reality we can genuinely know. The upshot: reason itself contains *a priori* elements that make knowledge possible. As for Freedom, Kant made a distinction between rational and empirical psychology via the notion of a *transcendental freedom,* wherein our will is determined to be free to be rational. Kant's account of freedom included an account of the self (which according to both Ward and Stout was misformulated against the standards of their contemporary mental science), and an account of moral agency, which (Kant believed) the psychology (epistemology, in our sense) of *his* day could not provide. Kant also bequeathed some of the terminology that the late 19th-century mental scientists at Cambridge took to be highly suspect: (i) a so-called *faculty psychology*, whereby the 'soul' is characterized by a variety of innate faculties, which are its capacity to carry out its activities; and (ii) a division of these activities into thinking, cognizing, feeling, and willing.[31] Last but not least, at the foundation of all of the activities of the mind (reason, understanding) in this tradition was the notion of *unity*: the mind was the active, integrating sensory experiences according to universals or universal laws of integration (or a transcendental self).

I would argue that the way Kant was read at Cambridge was of a piece with what Kitcher (1990) has called the "psychological" readings of the first *Critique*. (Kitcher 1990, 3–7).[32] All of Moore's teachers

and Preti, 2011). Stout (1931; 1952, Gifford Lectures), Sidgwick (in *Mind*), and Ward (posthum, 1922) all published their views on Kant, most taken from their lectures, which Moore attended. Sidgwick was also entirely *au courant* with the streams of mental-science influenced philosophy at Cambridge and, moreover, explicitly distanced himself from the Bradleyan metaphysics of day (Baldwin and Preti, 2011, xxxvi). This needs greater attention than I can give it here, however.

31 Kant got this from Wolff (Murphy and Kovach 1972).

32 Noting here that ambiguity reigns when it comes to parsing out what terms like "psychological," "anthropological," and "subjective" will have meant. The key is that Kant himself made the attempt to understand the nature of subjectivity (and, in particular, cognition) by way of a formulation of its a priori conditions. His German critics tended to think he failed on his own terms, and his English critics tended to think he failed to formulate a convincing non-subjectivist account, his transcendental arguments notwithstanding.

were entirely familiar with both Germanophone and Anglophone criticism of Kant's views, which informed their own contributions to the literature. That "psychological" readings dominated Kant scholarship during this period, as Kitcher (and others[33]) note, was in part due to Kant himself. Kant took the project in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to examine the faculties of sensation, understanding, imagination, and reason—*prima facie* psychological ('anthropological') if anything is—in order to determine the nature of the knowing mind. In order to avoid a collapse into subjectivism, Kant sought to tie some aspects of knowledge to a priori conditions of the nature of our cognitive faculties: specifically, what they had to be like in order for knowledge to be possible. In this respect Kant did address psychological elements directly, criticizing the rational psychology of his predecessors who tried to derive a substantive claim about the soul from "I think"; criticizing empirical psychology for lacking the pure or non-empirical grounding that a genuine science must have; and (arguably) all but explicitly defending a transcendental psychology.[34] The project of establishing the a priori conditions of our cognitive faculties just is, as Kitcher notes, Kant's transcendentalism. What she emphasizes is how much it is centered on what could be understood to be, implicitly, a "transcendental psychology" (1990, 16–9).[35]

Classic criticisms in the wake of the publication of the *Critique* from this angle included that the *Critique* was an attempt to derive normative conclusions from factual premises; another was that Kant tried to ground necessary conclusions from psychological premises. Kitcher argues that such criticisms dogged its interpretation for 100 years after its publication (thus, we should note, featuring squarely in the literature of the *Psychologismusstreit*).[36] Early continental readers, according to Kitcher, took it that Kant failed to distinguish between questions concerning the logical conditions of knowledge and questions about the subject of knowledge.[37] Kitcher cites Fries, for example, as taking it that the *Critique* was a failed exercise in presenting arguments that attempted to

33 Cf. Guyer (1998).

34 Cf. the paralogisms concerning the self.

35 Kant, it should be said, never explicitly defends a transcendental psychology. But his critics did not hesitate to attribute it to him from the start. I am not here taking a position on this reading of Kant, only trying to elucidate how much of it was characteristic of the way Kant was read in Moore's *milieu*.

36 See Kusch (1995) and Kohnke (1991), among others.

37 Leary (1978) argues that there is a connection to be made between the criticisms of Kant on the part of Fries, Herbart and Beneke and the onset of what he calls "the philosophical justification of psychology as a natural science." Stout was thoroughly familiar with the work of these thinkers (Stout 1896). Ironically enough, many of the early criticisms of Kant centered on what was perceived to be Kant's *failure* of the strongest defense possible of a theory of subjectivity.

derive a priori formal conditions of the mind from empirical or a posteriori mental facts instead of presenting a thorough account of the latter (Kitcher 1990, 22–3).

Reinhold[38] tried to insert a Cartesian ego as a first principle on Kant's behalf from which to derive the nature of psychological concepts like the pervasive but ambiguous *Vorstellung*. Herbart, she claims, attributed to Kant the failure of trying to ground philosophy on psychology (1990, 6, 9); in the language of the day, this will have meant grounding metaphysics in an illegitimate subjectivism. Kuno Fischer put it even more strongly: "The question of whether the critique of reason is supposed to be metaphysical or anthropological is a real problem, unavoidable in the history of the development of German philosophy since Kant."[39]

Commentators in English to this scrum of Germanophone Kant criticism in their turn did not hesitate to add their own criticisms of Kant in terms of a suspect subjectivism that they took to infect his account. Green, Hamilton, Stirling, Caird, and Sidgwick (cf. Walsh 1981, 723–29) also took exception to Kant's psychologism, and all feature in Moore's exposure to and writings on Kant.[40] These critics imputed to Kant a variety of "psychologisms": from (i) accounts of his views refashioned according to the kind of Hegelian he ought to have been; to (ii) more sober criticisms of his account of the mind and its objects. Hamilton stressed the apparent divide between phenomena (knowable) and noumena (unknowable) and the tension between these and Kant's conception of the ego, which is (somehow) both source and ground both for knowability of objects and for objects themselves and also (somehow) a moral agent. Green took the view that everyone misunderstood Kant (except presumably himself), arguing that Kant ought to have realized that without "the unifying principle the manifold world would be nothing at all" (PE 75). Caird,[41] an eminent Kant scholar of the day (and who examined Moore's 1897 dissertation), tried to rehabilitate Kant in the face of what he took to be a variety of incoherent and incompatible claims, such as the claim that perception and thought were to be strictly distinguished, but were nevertheless inseparable elements of phenomenal knowledge. Caird, however, rendered Kant as defending the dialectical nature of human thought, proceeding in stages of self-transcendence to a purer grasp of reality, which was ultimately indistinguishable from the nature of Thought itself. That is, Caird read into Kant what idealist views he

38 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (October 26, 1757–April 10, 1823).

39 Kitcher (1990, 6–7). All of these thinkers were entirely familiar to Stout (and to Ward), and Moore himself refers repeatedly to Fischer in his dissertations. 'Anthropological,' at this time, referred to any account of human processes, like that of mind.

40 See, for instance, his undergraduate lecture notebooks (Add. 8875 10/1/1; 10/2/1; 10/3/1; 10/3/2; 10/3/3).

41 See Lindsay (1877).

took seriously himself (Walsh 1981, 724–5).[42] Stirling, who for his part was opposed to the idealist/Hegelian reading of Kant, read Kant charitably as having desired to make good the claim that the subjective elements of mind could nonetheless supply necessity and objectivity, but argued that Kant failed to succeed (Walsh 1981, 727).

Sidgwick, for his part, published a number of critical commentaries on Kant, an important one in 1883 on the critical philosophy.[43] Sidgwick, for instance, makes a reproach that also turns up in Stout's undergraduate Kant lectures:[44] that "if we are unable to penetrate to things *beyond* experience, why would we be any more able to discover the conditions which lie—if I may say so—behind it?" (1883, 320). Sidgwick also raises the objection, among other things, that Kant fails entirely to coherently account for what he calls the "objectivity of our empirical cognitions." This takes Sidgwick to a crucial criticism of Kant's transcendentalism. Sidgwick contends that Kant's view imports a tension into his conception of 'object':

> that I can know objects to be merely modifications of my sensibility, combined in certain ways by my understanding; while at the same time I also conceive them as different from the modifications of my sensibility and as perduring when the latter cease.
>
> (1883, 318)[45]

This persistent conflation, Sidgwick argues, is due to Kant's apparent insouciance with respect to his own distinction between *phenomenal* and *noumenal*:

> Kant always regards the one object as phenomenal of the other, but often identifies the two so completely that he speaks of both indifferently by the same name in the same passage, even in the very

42 Walsh claims (1981, 724) that for Caird, "the important question to ask about Kant was not what he believed but what he got right." In the light of Caird's nonplussed reaction to Moore's 1897 Kant commentary, it is all the more ironic that, in what is a slightly mysterious notation on the 1898 dissertation, Moore exhorts himself (or is reporting the advice of another) that "you should not merely find your own views in Kant, but unless you carefully compare him with what you yourself can really understand and think to be true you are in great danger of never finding what he meant at all…" (Baldwin and Preti 2001, li).

43 Walsh in fact characterizes Sidgwick's reading of Kant as containing the essentials of an attack on "transcendental psychology," and even of an attack on the possibility of a critical philosophy itself.

44 Moore's notes are preserved (Add. 8875 10/1/).

45 Lindsay (1877, 483) explains that the "Hegelian Contributions to English Philosophy," especially those of Caird and Green, emphasize the failure of psychological formulations as atomistic or "isolated" to one mind, which nevertheless try to give an account of *mind*.

> transcendental discussions in which the distinction between the two is of fundamental importance.
>
> (1883, 318)

I have tried to underscore a few key elements that stand out as regards the main tendencies in Kant interpretation in the 19th century: (i) that a variety of readings of Kant that saw him as confused about the study of subjectivity then held sway, consistent with the disputes of the *Psychologismusstreit* across epistemology, psychology, metaphysics, and logic; (ii) that a clue to Moore's developing metaphysical realism had its source in the anti-transcendentalism of his teachers' attacks on what they took to be Kant's subjectivism; and (iii) that these elements were a notable component of the Kant criticism in Moore's *milieu*. Kant was criticized for failing to commit to a full-dress idealism (by his Idealist critics), for bad psychology (by the Cambridge mental scientists), and for bad epistemology (by everybody else). I would argue that, in all of these lines of attack, there is a similar perspective: that Kant failed to show how the a priori conditions that (allegedly) ground our cognitive faculties result in anything but some kind of mentalism: in either a metaphysical idealism, or an epistemological subjectivism. For the Idealists, it was obvious that they could not but do so, in spite of Kant's protestations; for the mental scientists, such a claim was just bad psychology with respect to their own contemporary standards.

And That Is How Russell Could Have Called Moore a Logician

I began this paper with the question as to how Russell could have ever called Moore—let alone repeatedly and admiringly—a logician. The answer to this, I have been arguing, is to situate Moore's influences in the context of the disciplinary turbulence that marked out the late 1890s, at Cambridge and on the continent. On the terminological order of the day, Kant and Bradley were logicians; both Kant's formulation of judgment in the Critique and Bradley's in the *Principles of Logic* (PL) featured foundationally in Moore's preparation for the Moral Sciences Tripos. Moore's innovative account of the nature of judgment precisely broke new ground—new for late 19th-century analyses of mind and its objects—in that it both rejected the Kantian/Bradleyan formulation of judgment as unifying (conflating, his teachers will have said) thought and its objects and offered a metaphysics of propositional content that underscored the relational, non-subjectivist formulations of the Cambridge mental scientists. That Moore's teachers found none of the psychological, epistemological, or metaphysical implications of Kant's or Bradley's respective theories of the nature of judgment plausible, is, I would claim, the most significant part of the story of the influences on

Moore's own views on the nature of judgment. I will conclude here with a gesture toward how I believe Bradley fits into this story.

Bradley's historical standing as the British Absolute Idealists' British Absolute Idealist is what gets the most attention in investigations of his role in Moore's early developing thought. That Bradley's PL was part of Moore's pre-dissertation reading is not at issue, but I would argue that a proper contextual understanding of the role of Bradley's work in Moore's developing thought would involve situating Bradley's work within the framework not just of the metaphysics but of the mental science of the day. Recall that the late 19th-century mental sciences included *logic*, understood of course to mean the workings of the mind in *judgment* or (more generally) cognition; in itself, of course, a legacy of Kant. Certainly, the mental science influencing Moore when he began his Fellowship work reflected the more scientific and up-to-date analyses of his teachers rather than Bradley's more traditional idealist considerations concerning knowledge, justification, and reality. But Bradley's anti-psychologism, no less than that of Stout and Ward, was itself influenced by the continental mental scientists who had begun to examine distinctions as to psychological and logical questions (Lotze, in particular, whose work was well known and influential during this period to all the British philosophers). PL was Bradley's foundational attempt at grappling with that distinction. It is thus possible to make the case that Stout, Ward and Bradley can all be seen as integrating the logic, psychology, and metaphysics characteristic of the continental mental scientists into their own views, which, in their turn, were fundamental in the progression of British mental science (and Moore's developing thought) at this period.[46]

Epilogue

I want to end here with a very brief sketch of an explanation of the effect that Moore's views on the nature of judgment had on Russell. Russell's fulsome acknowledgments to Moore—over his lifetime—have for the most part been greeted with attitudes ranging from bemusement to dismissal. The most thorough examination of Moore's influence on Russell is Griffin's (1991). But even Griffin falls short, I think, in being able to explain just what it was about Moore's ideas that could have had the seismic effect on him that Russell emphasized again and again. Here then is rough take of what I think that is. As I have argued, Moore managed

46 See, for instance, Dyde's review of PL (1884; 85); also Adamson (1884). Dyde puts it this way (289): "First of all it must be made particularly prominent that no treatment of the principles of Logic is worthy of consideration that does not attempt to explain the connection between consciousness on the one hand and the world on the other. The failure to recognize the urgency of this need has led to the tremendous amount of almost useless writing commonly known as formal logic."

to articulate dramatically (even, Russell thought, too dramatically[47]) a realist metaphysics of judgment built up from the views that he had absorbed via Ward and Stout on a relational view of consciousness and its objects during his Tripos preparation. Russell, of course, had been exposed to the same material. But I would argue that Moore had the advantage, because the Moral Sciences Tripos drew a much straighter line between metaphysics, logic, psychology, and *ethics* than it did between metaphysics, logic, psychology, and *mathematics*. Schooled in the bad Cambridge mathematics at his Tripos Part I, Russell found it difficult to shake the Bradleyan conflation of metaphysics, logic, and psychology while trying to work out his "Tiergaarten program" of this period, conceived as a *dialectic* of the sciences (Griffin 1991).[48] Since part of this included a commitment to mathematics being a stage in that dialectic, and the formulation of a conception of its ground, Russell's thinking just at this period did not as effortlessly include a formulation of mathematical *judgment* as being relational. For Moore the distinction between the mind and objects of thought emerged more effortlessly from his focus on ethics and on the nature of *moral* judgment, that is, in Moore's developing thought, the objectivism of the mental scientist concerning judgment blended with the objectivism that Moore was looking for to ground ethics and ethical judgment. Moore had, to all appearances, temporarily sought refuge in the Bradleyan Absolute, which he seems to have initially thought would offer an adequate objectivism for the object of moral judgment. But as I have shown, the Bradleyan Absolute was ultimately no match for the anti-psychologistic formulations of the nature of judgment that Moore absorbed from his teachers. Russell's characterizations of "Moore's logic"—Moore's theory of judgment—are what show the light beginning to dawn on Russell. And once Russell digested it, the rest was history. Here the hope is that this history has been additionally clarified with this look at the role of logic in Kant's wake in Moore's *milieu*.

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47 Russell to Moore, September 18, 1898 (Add. 8330 8R/3/8).

48 It could even be suggested that Russell gave such fulsome credit to Moore because he realized that he *should* have seen for himself the significance of "the non-existential nature of propositions…and their independence of any knowing mind" (1903, xviii).

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