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MOORE'S BEGINNINGS

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Consuelo Preti. *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics: G. E. Moore and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xx, 268. ISBN: 978-0-230-27762-5, US\$57.50 (hb); 978-1-137-31907-4, US\$44.99 (ebook).

For many years now Consuelo Preti has been studying the life and work of G. E. Moore, especially in the period before the First World War when he and Russell were closest. In a series of important publications, she has transformed our knowledge of the early Moore, making full use of his papers, now in the Cambridge University Library after many years in private hands. Of these, the most important, at least for Russell scholars, was the publication of Moore's two Fellowship dissertations, which she edited with Thomas Baldwin,¹ for it was with the second of these that Moore broke free from neo-Hegelianism and took Russell with him. Preti now follows this up with an extensive and detailed account of the dissertations' intellectual background.

Moore submitted two dissertations—both called “The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics”—in an attempt to win a six-year Trinity College Prize Fellowship. The first, in 1897, like most first attempts at a Trinity Prize Fellowship, failed; but the second, the following year, was successful. In his autobiography Moore famously said that he didn't think “the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world

¹ MOORE, *Early Philosophical Writings* (2011). The volume includes only the two dissertations (and the examiners' reports on them), though the title might suggest that it contains other early works, of which there are several (some unpublished). My references to the dissertations and the examiners' reports are to this volume (hereafter “Metaphysical Basis” [1897] or *idem* [1898]).

and the sciences.”² Accordingly, his first dissertation was “an attempt to make sense” of Kant’s “extremely mysterious assertions” about freedom and the second an attempt “to see clearly what Kant meant” by the “very mystifying manner” in which he used the word “reason”.³ This may seem a long way from the metaphysical basis of ethics, but the concept of will was central to Kant’s ethics, so it was natural to inquire in what sense, if any, an action could be said to be freely willed and this in turn to the distinction between actions which were caused and those which were undertaken for a reason.

As Moore admits in the preface to the first dissertation, he had not had time to complete it as he intended. As it stands, it consists of a longish introduction, a single very long chapter on “Freedom, with special reference to Kant”,⁴ and an appendix on Sidgwick’s hedonism. Almost all this material reappears in the second dissertation, but the long chapter was there divided into two, separating Moore’s treatment of Kant from his own views on freedom. (Both Sidgwick and Edward Caird, his examiners in 1897, had complained that it was not easy to tell when he was interpreting Kant and when he was giving his own views.)⁵ The appendix on Sidgwick’s hedonism is joined by a new one on the dating of Kant’s ethical writings. (Caird had complained that he had not paid enough attention to this in the 1897 dissertation.) There is a new introduction and a brief concluding chapter directly on Kant’s ethics. But, most importantly, Moore opened the 1898 dissertation with two wholly new chapters: “On the meaning of ‘Reason’ in Kant” and “Reason”. It was the second of these, the bulk of which Moore published in *Mind* in 1899 under the title “The Nature of Judgment”, that inaugurated the revolution in philosophy associated with his name and Russell’s.

Preti doesn’t get to this part of the story until her fourth and final chapter. Most of her book is taken up with a wide-ranging and detailed back-story to the dissertations and she begins, reasonably enough, with what has become known (even in English) as the *Psychologismsstreit*: the quarrel about psychologism. Psychologism was a doctrine defined to be false: an inappropriate appeal to psychological elements in constructing a philosophical position. Of course, the keyword here is “inappropriate”, and substantive debates raged as to which psychological elements were inappropriate to which philosophical projects.⁶ By the late nineteenth century, most Anglophone philosophy, from Locke to Bain, and much Germanophone philosophy, from Kant to Husserl, had been condemned as tainted by psychologism, yet the debate continued as its critics continued to hunt out lingering vestiges of psychologism in each others’ work.

² “An Autobiography” (1968 [1st ed., 1940]), p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴ “Metaphysical Basis” (1897), p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 99.

⁶ The standard survey work here is MARTIN KUSCH, *Psychologism* (1995).

No one, it seemed, had been quite anti-psychologistic enough. Both of Moore's dissertations were part of this work and, with the advantages of hindsight, we can see the second as one way of bringing the *Psychologismusstreit* to an end by pushing anti-psychologism as far as it was possible to go. If, as Moore maintained in the second dissertation, the entire world and *every* object of thought (including propositions)—with the sole exception of those items, like minds and ideas, which were explicitly psychological—consists of mind-independent concepts which are *directly* grasped in thought,⁷ there would seem to be nowhere for any residual psychologism to hide. Preti's first chapter surveys the *Psychologismusstreit* starting with Kant and ending with Bradley (in between, Lotze and Brentano get sections of their own and many less important figures are dealt with briefly).

Kant and Bradley are both of special importance here. Kant had argued that human volition was free because it was determined by reason. Moore, already in his first dissertation, had argued that this depends upon a crucial ambiguity: by "reason" either Kant means an abstract reason ("a logical reason", "a mere conception", "a universal")⁸ or else he means the presentation of such a reason. The latter, however, is simply a "psychical existent" and as such is subject, like all phenomena, to natural causal laws. Abstract reasons are not so constrained, but it is utterly implausible to suppose that human volition is determined by reasons in that sense, absent the presentation of them to the agent.⁹ The ambiguity on which Kant's position depends is exactly the sort of conflation of logical with psychological matters which is the hallmark of psychologism. The criticism of Bradley with which "The Nature of Judgment" opens (and which occurs early in the chapter on reason in the second dissertation¹⁰) is of a very similar kind. Bradley draws a distinction between ideas, which are "psychical facts" in the mind, and ideal contents ("logical ideas", "universal meanings") which are abstracted or in some way derived ("cut off" and "fixed" by the mind) from the former.¹¹ Though Bradley explicitly draws the sort of distinction between the logical and the psychological that Kant overlooked, Moore will have none of it because Bradley still makes the logical dependent on the psychological: "It is our object", Moore writes, "to protest against this description of a concept as an 'abstraction' from ideas".¹² Arguments like this—e.g., drawing distinctions between ideas as mental existents and ideas as the meanings of words—had been used to great effect by the neo-Hegelians themselves against the egregious

⁷ "Metaphysical Basis" (1898), pp. 165–7.

⁸ "Metaphysical Basis" (1897), p. 60 = *idem* (1898), p. 191.

⁹ "Metaphysical Basis" (1897), pp. 60–1 = *idem* (1898), pp. 190–1.

¹⁰ "Metaphysical Basis" (1898), pp. 162–5.

¹¹ F. H. BRADLEY, *The Principles of Logic* (1967 [2nd ed., 1922]), pp. 5–8.

¹² "Metaphysical Basis" (1898), p. 163.

psychologism of the British empiricists.¹³ Indeed, this was what Bradley himself was trying to do in the chapter from which Moore quoted—to little effect, as Moore showed.

The two middle chapters of Preti's book are devoted to the state of philosophy in Cambridge and what Moore would have learnt there in his two years studying for Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos.¹⁴ There is a substantial literature on the Mathematical Tripos at Cambridge but relatively little on the Moral Sciences Tripos and Preti gives us one of the most detailed accounts available. She concentrates of course on the two disciplines (of the many which comprised the moral sciences at Cambridge) which Moore actually studied: mental philosophy (which included both psychology and metaphysics) with Stout, Ward and McTaggart in Chapter 2 and moral philosophy with Sidgwick in Chapter 3.¹⁵ For each of the four philosophers, Preti considers their work prior to Moore's studying with them to establish what he might have learnt from them, as well as the notes he took at their lectures (Moore was an excellent note-taker), the work he did for them as a student, and the comments they made upon it. As regards Moore, most of this information is new (except insofar as Preti herself has presented it in previous papers) and is of considerable importance to Moore scholars. Equally important is Preti's positioning of Stout and Ward at the forefront of British psychology in the *Psychologismusstreit*.¹⁶ There is a great deal of information in Chapter 3 which helps us assess Moore's deep and complex debts to Sidgwick. Moore has quite a few criticisms of Sidgwick in both dissertations, and not just in the appendix. Sidgwick, in his report on the 1897 dissertation, noted that about a fifth of it was critical of him, but he confined his report to other matters which he was "able to judge . . . more impartially".¹⁷

¹³ Most notably by T. H. GREEN in a comprehensive assault in his book-length introduction to his and T. H. GROSE's edition of Hume's *Philosophical Works* (1874).

¹⁴ He took two years, rather than the usual one, because he was simultaneously studying Greek philosophy for Part II of the Classical Tripos.

¹⁵ Curiously, she says nothing of Moore's classical studies at Cambridge, either in Part I of the Classical Tripos or his special study of Greek philosophy in Part II. Maybe the necessary documents no longer exist or maybe they shed no light on Moore as a philosopher. But reading the careful way in which, in the two dissertations, he picks Kant's (and Bradley's) words apart to try to establish some clear meaning, it's hard not to think that this was a habit he picked up from his years studying Greek and Latin texts as a classics student. There may also be some doctrinal influence, for, in both dissertations, Moore says his position "seems most to agree with that of Plato" ("Metaphysical Basis" [1897], p. 14 = *idem* [1898], p. 128). One wonders if he had picked up anything relevant in his studies with Henry Jackson, of whom he speaks warmly in "An Autobiography" (pp. 19–20).

¹⁶ Stout's role in this story has already been recovered through the work of MARIA VAN DER SCHAAR, most notably her *G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (2013). Ward, so far, has not been the subject of any comparable scholarship.

¹⁷ "Metaphysical Basis" (1897), p. 97.

Preti reveals that Moore was also critical of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* in the essays he wrote for him while preparing for his Tripos (pp. 164–76 summarize Moore's criticisms and Sidgwick's replies). And yet *Principia Ethica* (and Moore's lecture course, "The Elements of Ethics", which preceded it) owe a great deal to Sidgwick—most notably, perhaps, the idea for the Open Question Argument which is commonly ascribed to Moore.¹⁸ Preti has already commented on this issue¹⁹ and does not take it up here, but the new material she includes in the book shows that there is scope for a wider-ranging study of the influence the two men had on each other. Although Sidgwick did not reply to Moore's criticisms in the 1897 dissertation, he did suggest that they were not without merit, and one wonders whether perhaps the revisions he was making at the time of his death in 1900 for the seventh and final edition of the *Methods* owed something to Moore's dissertations.

Both Sidgwick and Caird, who examined the first dissertation itself, as well as Bosanquet, who examined the second, admired Moore's critical abilities: his "independence of thought", his "power of following his ideas to their ultimate results", and his "continuous persistence in a line of argument".²⁰ And, indeed, Moore pursued Kant with the tenacity of a bulldog and the precision of a brain surgeon.²¹ But all three of the examiners had misgivings about the position to which Moore's line of argument was leading. The one reader of the second dissertation who had no misgivings on this point was Russell. Russell was already under Moore's severe scrutiny for the first instalment of his neo-Hegelian encyclopedia of the sciences, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*, which Moore was reviewing for *Mind*. Russell had tried to be a good anti-psychologist in the

¹⁸ The Argument appears also, but without reference to Sidgwick, in the introductions to both the 1897 and the 1898 dissertations (pp. 9–10 and 123, respectively). MOORE acknowledged Sidgwick in *Principia Ethica* (1903), p. 17, and *The Elements of Ethics* (1991), p. 25, citing in both places a footnote on Bentham in *The Methods of Ethics* (1907 [7th ed.]), p. 26 (1893 [5th ed., which Moore used], p. 27). In fact, Sidgwick gave a rather more general statement of the Argument, not noted by Moore, at p. 109 of the 7th edition (5th ed., p. 110).

¹⁹ PRETI, "The Context and Origin of Moore's Formulation of the Naturalistic Fallacy in *Principia Ethica*" (2018).

²⁰ See "Metaphysical Basis" (1897), pp. 97, 99 and *idem* (1898), p. 245, for these comments by Sidgwick, Caird and Bosanquet, respectively.

²¹ This was what impressed me when I first read the dissertations in the Wren Library at Trinity in 1986: it helped me understand why Russell was *so* taken with Moore's philosophical ability at this time. It impressed me again when I had the opportunity to reread them when they were published. Moore seemed absolutely fearless as a critic. Preti (p. 203) remarks on his relentless criticism of Kant in the first dissertation. Something of the same bravado is to be found in his "Kant's Idealism" (1903–04), one of my favourites among his early papers—but that was written after the new philosophy had begun to establish itself (and he had allies); in 1898 he was very much out on a limb.

Essay, but in this, Moore argued, he had done no better than Bradley—indeed, considerably worse. When the review came out Russell told Moore that “on all important points I agreed with it”.²² In the second dissertation Moore not only offered a prophylactic against any taint of psychologism but did so in a way which turned Russell’s thought in a completely new direction.

In 1898 Russell’s ambitious project for an encyclopedia of the sciences was in trouble. The source of the trouble was the widely-held doctrine of internal relations, according to which all relations had to be grounded in the intrinsic properties of their terms. Russell had found that relations were essential for the special sciences, but that the terms they needed to relate were in many cases lacking the intrinsic properties needed to relate them. Throughout most of 1898 Russell struggled to cope with this difficulty. Then, in November, he read the second dissertation and the problem was solved: Russell simply rejected the doctrine of internal relations; taking it, in fact, to be refuted by the insuperable problems it had created.²³ Moore certainly did not offer a critique of internal relations in the second dissertation. In fact he said very little at all about relations of any type, but he gave them a role in his metaphysics that Russell was able to make use of. Moore had given Russell advance notice of his new position in a letter of 11 September,²⁴ which in some respects gives more useful information than the dissertation, but it was not until he read the dissertation in November that Russell realized it gave him a way out of his difficulties. Moore’s position was that propositions and the world consisted of mind-independent concepts compounded together by “several kinds of ultimate relation”²⁵ which were not “in some obscure sense, the work of the mind”.²⁶ But beyond that, as he told Russell in his letter, he “said nothing” about the relations. But that was enough for Russell. That the relations were not the work of the mind preserved anti-psychologism and gave them metaphysical standing; that they were ultimate ensured that they could not be derived from the intrinsic properties of their terms. If Moore’s metaphysics was possible then the doctrine of internal relations was not necessary. If the latter were abandoned then the problems of Russell’s encyclopedia could be avoided.

I think this sudden revelation explains why Russell credited Moore with taking the lead in rejecting neo-Hegelianism and also why he expressed his debts to Moore, especially as concerns relations (*cf. e.g., PoM*, pp. xviii, 24), in

²² 18 July 1899, RAI 710.053014 (photocopy); original in Moore papers, Cambridge University Library.

²³ I have told this story in detail in “Russell on Relations, 1898” (2022).

²⁴ It is printed in full in Baldwin and Preti’s editorial introduction to MOORE’s *Early Philosophical Writings*, pp. xxxiv–xxxv. The relevant passages of the 1898 dissertation are at pp. 165–9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxxv.

²⁶ “Metaphysical Basis” (1898), p. 169.

what otherwise seems to be a very exaggerated way. But then the problem arises: how come Moore, who had barely thought about relations, could free himself from the doctrine of internal relations so easily, when Russell, who had fretted about them for more than a year, could not? I thought one possible explanation might be provided by T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*. In the *Prolegomena* Green maintains that philosophers have fallen into a simple antinomy—he references Locke frequently but makes it clear that many other philosophers find themselves in the same predicament. They maintain, what seems to Green undeniable, that reality is a system of related elements. They also maintain an *exclusive* disjunction between what is real and what is (merely) the work of the mind. Finally, they maintain, as most then did, that relations are the work of the mind. So relations are both an essential part of reality and excluded from it. Bradley's solution, of course, was to deny that reality was a system of related elements. Green's solution (like Kant's) was to deny that the distinction between reality and the work of the mind was exclusive. Green maintained instead that reality is the work of a single, self-conscious intelligence.²⁷ Moore's solution was to deny that relations were the work of the mind. It seemed to me possible—indeed, likely—that Moore knew well how Green started the *Prolegomena* and that, after a year of struggling with Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena and the free will problem,²⁸ would have been able to see easily which of the three initial assumptions had to be given up. It seemed to me almost impossible that Moore had not made a careful study of one of the great founding documents of late nineteenth-century idealist ethics. Moreover, he said in the preface to the first dissertation that he had intended to write appendices with “special criticisms” of Green and Bradley, though this was never done. But Preti assures me that there is *no* evidence that Moore studied Green closely or was specially influenced by him.²⁹ It seems, rather, that Moore came upon a simple, straightforward account of relations because he hadn't been bamboozled

²⁷ *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1906 [1st ed., 1883]), §§14ff.

²⁸ GREEN treats both matters, albeit in different chapters—noumena and phenomena in Bk. I, Ch. 1 and free will in Bk. II, Ch. 2—though it should be noted that the book and chapter divisions were imposed on Green's manuscript by his posthumous editor, A. C. Bradley. Green has little to say about Kant in the chapter on free will, but interestingly, Caird, in a preface to the fifth edition of 1906, presents Green's project as an attempt to combine a world of natural laws and causality with freedom, reason, and morality (very much the problem to which Moore examined Kant's response). Moreover, Caird claims that Green's approach was a “somewhat modified” version of Kant's (p. [iii]). It may be suspected, however, that Caird saw more Kant than was actually there.

²⁹ Personal communication. There is an early paper by RUSSELL, “The Free-Will Problem from an Idealist Standpoint” ([1895]; 37 in *Papers* 1), in which he chides Balfour for relying upon Green as a proponent of idealism because, according to Balfour, there was no work representing “the constructive views of the younger school of thinkers”. Russell protested that Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* was exactly such a work (*ibid.*;

by philosophers into adopting a more complicated one. There seems to be little direct evidence that he had ever subscribed to the doctrine of internal relations or even thought much about it. He may well have thought the doctrine was one of the puzzling things that philosophers said and that he should withhold his assent until he had worked out exactly what it meant. If so, his approach stood him in good stead.³⁰ Russell, by contrast, having recognized the importance of relations took on board what philosophers had said about them and then tried to solve the problems that resulted. By the time he began to appreciate the importance of relations, in the middle of 1897, he was heavily invested in his massive neo-Hegelian encyclopedia of the sciences project, all of which would have to be redone if an idealist conception of relations failed him. Moore had no such prior commitments, and this was a great advantage when it came to finding an account of relations that actually worked.

Preti, indeed, goes further than this and doubts that Moore had any serious prior commitment to neo-Hegelianism. I find this surprising because she acknowledges much of the evidence which suggests to me that he did. On some matters, I think she is absolutely right: she does well to remind us, for example, that the widespread philosophical enthusiasm for Bradley that broke out in the 1890s was not a Cambridge affair. Ward and Sidgwick, she points out (pp. 91–5, 127–38), conducted long, fierce exchanges with Bradley in the journals, which left both men exasperated: Bradley was a notoriously abrasive disputant. Stout's engagement with Bradley was less intense and came later, but it was evident enough by the 1890s that the psychology for which he was then best-known had little in common with Bradley's, though Russell did report that he said that *Appearance and Reality* had "accomplished as much as is humanly possible in ontology" (*MPD*, p. 38). This was not the view of McTaggart, Cambridge's card-carrying neo-Hegelian, who, in his first important philosophical work, *The Further Determination of the Absolute*, privately circulated in 1893, the same year that Bradley published *Appearance and Reality*, proclaimed by its very title that more could be done and, in subsequent works, went on to do it in a way diametrically opposed to Bradley's. But while none of Russell's and Moore's teachers were Bradleyans, all but Sidgwick were idealists and Russell maintained that he was "indoctrinated with the philosophies of Kant and Hegel" at Cambridge (*MPD*, p. 11). Moreover, the fact that the philosophy dons at Cambridge were either hostile or indifferent to Bradley, does not mean that their students had the same attitude. It seems to me that this was true of both Moore and

Papers 1: 230). Russell clearly thought Green was out of date, and Moore may well have shared that opinion.

³⁰ Even so, Preti (pp. 100–1) presents some evidence that he may have been bamboozled by Lotze and there is more serious, but still indirect, evidence that he gave some thought to relations in his appeals to Bradley's arguments against the reality of time. The latter will be considered below.

Russell. Russell had a great respect for Bradley which persisted even after he had abandoned neo-Hegelianism. He originally got this direct from Oxford through a family friend, Harold Joachim,³¹ widely regarded (not entirely fairly) as Bradley's most faithful disciple. It was Joachim who advised Russell to read Bradley's *Principles of Logic* ("First rate—but very hard") before he started work on his Moral Sciences Tripes, which Russell did.³²

Where Moore got his regard for Bradley from is not so obvious—it's not inconceivable he got it from Russell—but there seems good evidence for its existence, much of which Preti publishes here for the first time.³³ For example, Moore not infrequently appeals to Bradleyan doctrines in the essays he wrote for McTaggart (p. 109) and especially Sidgwick (pp. 165–6, 169–73). Moreover, the criticisms that Moore makes of Kant's moral psychology in the dissertations bear comparison with those made by Hegel.³⁴ Moore, who studied Hegel with McTaggart, shows some awareness of Hegel's critique in his 1895 paper to the Moral Sciences Club, "Kant's Ethical Principle", though there he sides with Sidgwick and argues that neither Hegel nor Bradley have done any better than Kant (*cf.* Preti, p. 191). The misgivings about Bradley do not appear in the first dissertation, where in the preface, after noting his differences with Caird, Moore expresses his "far greater agreement" with Bradley's "general philosophical attitude" and adds: "It is to Mr. Bradley's *Principles of Logic* and *Appearance and Reality* (2nd edn. 1897) that I chiefly owe my conception of the fundamental problem of Metaphysics. . . ."³⁵ Preti is right that the fundamental problem of metaphysics was the relation of appearance to reality and that there was "nothing particularly idealist or absolutist" about this (p. 201). Moore's intention, she explains, was to replace Kant's overly psychologistic treatment of the problem by developing "Bradley's notion of Reality as, specifically, an adequately non-psychologistic candidate upon which to base a metaphysics of ethics" (p. 202). This hope, of course, failed in the second dissertation, when Bradley's philosophy was diagnosed with fatal psychologism. Nonetheless, in the first, it was specifically Bradley's metaphysics that was co-opted for this purpose and

³¹ Russell's uncle, Rollo, married Joachim's sister.

³² *Cf.* GRIFFIN, "Joachim's Early Advice to Russell on Studying Philosophy" (1987).

³³ One piece of evidence she doesn't mention is that Russell, who was in a position to know, clearly thought that Moore had been a neo-Hegelian. *Cf.* MPD, p. 54; "My Mental Development" (1944); I in *Papers* II: 11.

³⁴ At least as the latter are presented by HENRY E. ALLISON, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (1990), pp. 187–90, who replies on Kant's behalf. Allison, of course, would have had no reason to be aware of Moore's views.

³⁵ "Metaphysical Basis" (1897), pp. 3–4. In the preface to the second dissertation he is more circumspect: "For my own metaphysical views, I am no doubt chiefly indebted to Bradley. But I have come to disagree with him on so many points, and those points of importance, that I doubt if I can name any special obligations" (p. 117). The wording, however, clearly implies that formerly he had agreed on these points of importance.

there is no indication there that it will not bear the weight Moore wants to put upon it. Even more telling (though without philosophical consequence, so far as I can see) is the letter Moore wrote to Desmond MacCarthy on 14 August 1898 with news of the second dissertation as it was nearing completion. The main new doctrines are described and Moore should by now have been entirely free of neo-Hegelianism and, by Russell's account, rejoicing in his liberation. "[B]ut", he says, "I don't know what I shall be able to say about the Absolute, which I want to keep." Though it "did not make the final cut", as Preti nicely puts it (p. 215), the remark does make it seem as if the Absolute was a cherished but superfluous old retainer whom Moore was reluctant to pension off.

Other important evidence from around the same time is found in Moore's contribution to a symposium with Bosanquet and Shadworth Hodgson on the question "In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?". His answer is that they don't, and his reason is "because they wholly lack that immediacy, which, according to Mr. Bradley, is a necessary constituent in reality".³⁶ Preti (p. 115) notes that Moore makes anti-psychologistic points against both Bosanquet and Hodgson, and one wonders that he didn't make similar points against Bradley's appeal to "immediacy", for that surely raises the question: immediate to whom?³⁷ But the strongest evidence on this point comes from the article "Freedom", which was derived from the first dissertation. There he says: "I can only state that the arguments by which Mr. Bradley had endeavoured to prove the unreality of Time appear to me perfectly conclusive."³⁸ Interestingly, this remark does not appear in Moore's first dissertation, nor in the second (although the unreality of time is maintained there³⁹), which suggests (perhaps) that it was not a settled opinion.⁴⁰ But more importantly, if Moore had thought that Bradley's arguments against time were conclusive then he must have given them some thought and that means that he had given Bradley's arguments against relations some thought as well. For Bradley says that the problem he has with both space and time is "a peculiar form of the problem which we discussed in the last chapter",⁴¹ that is, in the chapter which contains his attack on relations. And indeed his central argument against both space and time is that they must

³⁶ "In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist" (1897), p. 238.

³⁷ It is also surprising that Moore does not mention McTaggart in this paper, for McTaggart was the neo-Hegelian who had the hard arguments against time: cf. his "Time and the Hegelian Dialectic (I)" (1893), for a source which must have been known to Moore.

³⁸ MOORE, "Freedom" (1898), p. 202.

³⁹ "Metaphysical Basis" (1898), pp. 127, 174.

⁴⁰ It may equally indicate merely that the genealogy of the copy-text of the 1898 dissertation was directly from the 1897 dissertation and not through "Freedom" as an intermediary. A collation of the three texts should be able to establish whether or not this was the case.

⁴¹ *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 31.

be, and yet they cannot be, relations.⁴² If Moore was persuaded of the validity of these arguments, then he must have been persuaded of the validity of Bradley's case against relations. In this case, he would have had to reverse himself before he could appeal in the second dissertation to relations as ultimate and real, mind-independent constituents of propositions. How and why he did so remains a mystery.

One might expect that Preti's book will end with the second dissertation, but it actually ends with a strange sort of coda (pp. 226–36), under the title "Fellowship Years", i.e., 1898–1904. This period would include *Principia Ethica*, and several important papers, but little is said about any of these. Of Moore's two important but baffling logic papers of this period, "Necessity" (1900) and "Identity" (1900–01),⁴³ only the first is even mentioned (p. 232). Most of the attention goes instead to the course of lectures on "Elements of Ethics" (1898), which forms a sort of bridge between the dissertations and *Principia Ethica*. But even here the coverage is neither full nor systematic. Preti does cover at greater length (pp. 230–2) the comments Moore wrote on essays written for the course by his brother, Sturge Moore, the poet, who attended the lectures. I suppose the reason is to draw attention to this material which otherwise would be unavailable. But, still, it is an untidy way to end the book. It should also be said that it is not easy to find your way around the book, for the short sections into which Preti divides her long chapters are not listed in the table of contents and the index is generic rather than specific. My other complaint is that the references, which are copious, frequently do not give page numbers, even when the work cited is a book and the point for which it is cited is very specific. That said, the book contains so much new information about Moore and philosophy at Cambridge during his formative years that it will be essential reading for anyone working on either topic or on the beginnings of analytic philosophy.

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⁴² For time, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 33–4, 35.

⁴³ Published in *Mind* and *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, respectively.

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