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EXTERNALISM AND ANALYTICITY*

I

1. *Introduction*

Quine's scepticism regarding the notion of analytic truth should be understood within a framework that presupposes an ontological distinction between intensions, meanings, or concepts, and the extra-semantic world. This is evident in Quine's diagnosis of the issue (1980, p. 21):[1]

Kant's intent ... can be restated thus: a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact ... Meaning, let us remember, is not to be identified with naming. Frege's example of 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star', and Russell's of 'Scott' and 'the author of *Waverly*' illustrate that terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning ... It is indeed a commonplace in philosophy to oppose intension (or meaning) to extension, or, in a variant vocabulary, connotation to denotation.

Recent developments in the theory of meaning might seem to add further support to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Semantic externalism claims that neither meaning nor mental content can be determined independently of an individual's environment. Given externalism, then, to say that a sentence is true in virtue of meaning is to say, ultimately, that it is true in virtue of *reference*. And if all sentences are true in virtue of the world of reference, it is difficult to see how we can even in principle distinguish some sentences from others as true in virtue of the world-independent, purely semantic entities that their truth-conditions involve.[2]

I believe, however, that semantic externalism instead exposes – and, ultimately, challenges – an uncritical assumption about the nature of analytic truth, one grounded in the traditional distinction between meaning

and reference. According to this assumption, analytic truth is that species
of truth that is linguistic or 'purely conceptual' truth. But note that it is
the traditional independence between meaning and reference that makes
it possible to claim that truth is either 'in virtue of meaning alone,' or 'in
virtue of the world.' Given the complete autonomy that the traditional
conception posits regarding meaning and reference, there is clearly no
obstacle to claiming that some statements are true independent of any
recourse to the world; true in virtue of meaning *alone*.[3]

The trouble with this (familiar) picture, however, is that it flies in
the face of a piece of straightforward common sense to do with the
nature of truth. Truth is, surely, a *univocal* concept; there is no reason
to suppose it divides into subspecies, into this or that kind of truth. And
if we accept this commonplace as a constraint on any account we are
tempted to give of the analytic/synthetic distinction, then we highlight
a real difficulty with the whole enterprise of distinguishing a species of
purely conceptual, world-independent truth from the ordinary kind of
truth that is correspondence to the world.

Accordingly, it is imperative to reject a sharp distinction between
two different kinds of truth; between sentences whose truth-conditions
involve a linguistic or 'conceptual' component alone, and those whose
truth-conditions involve reference to worldly objects and properties.
Quine, for one, is famously dismissive about just this kind of distinction
(1980, p. 36):

It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. Thus
one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable
into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next
seems reasonable that in some statements the factual component should be null; and
these are the analytic statements. But, for all its *a priori* reasonableness, a boundary
between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn ....

I read Quine here as (correctly) rejecting as incoherent the division of
truth into two kinds. But, as I will argue, it is far from clear that it follows
from this that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction. I contend that
by rejecting the traditional distinction between meaning and reference,
semantic externalism makes it possible to render consistent the idea that
analytic truth is truth in virtue of meaning, with the idea that there is
only *one* kind of truth; namely, truth in virtue of the world.

What follows is an account of analytic truth from the perspective of semantic externalism. On this view, the truth-conditions of analytic sentences will not be distinguished from those of synthetic sentences; all sentences, given externalism, are true in virtue of the world. It will emerge, however, that the truth-conditions of an analytic sentence are to be distinguished from what makes it *analytic*. This account is one that will revoke the customary world-independence of analytic sentences – but will not sacrifice their unique modal and epistemic features.[4]

A programmatic proviso should be noted at the outset. These remarks are not intended as an *argument* for analyticity; such an argument is a project to be pursued independently. Rather, the notion of analyticity as truth-value in virtue of meaning alone is here presupposed,[5] in order to reveal an interesting consequence of semantic externalism.

II

1. *Externalism: A Distinction*

Externalism is a thesis about the individuation of mental states. It claims that our ordinary ascriptions of beliefs, desires and the like are 'governed by relations between the subject of those states and the world beyond the subject.' (McGinn 1989, p. v.) We can understand this claim as the denial of methodological solipsism, the view summarized by Putnam as follows (1975a, p. 220):

... no mental state, properly so-called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed.

Now, at least two things might be meant by externalism. One formulation, employing the familiar device of twin earth, entails a failure of supervenience of mental states on inner states. This view takes content to be determined by a causal or contextual relation between the subject and the world outside his head, from which it follows that the mental states of two internally indistinguishable subjects fail to supervene on the internal states when the subjects inhabit different environments.

The other formulation of externalism involves no entailment of non-supervenience; it is the view that only the co-existence in a world of a

subject and the relevant worldly entity to which he is related is required
in order to effect the individuation of his mental states. This latter is
a more general formulation of externalism, and is best understood as
a thesis concerning under what conditions someone may or may not
possess a thought: it will be a necessary condition on the possession
of a thought that the subject be related to extra-cranial objects and
properties – the worldly entities that are the reference of the expressions
he employs. It follows from this that should the requisite objects or
properties fail to exist, the thought in question is, in Noonan's terms
(1991, p. 1), 'not available to be thought.'[6]

This more general formulation of externalism may be understood as
the claim that it is the reference of the speaker's words that (necessarily)
individuate her mental states, a claim that is in every essential respect
equivalent to the denial of methodological solipsism, and vividly illus-
trated by Putnam both with his twin earth thought experiments and the
familiar – though overstated – slogan, 'meaning ain't in the head.'[7]

We can think of externalism as a genus of which there are two species.
Following McGinn (1989), we will distinguish externalist claims as
follows: *strong* externalism is the species of externalism that entails
non-supervenience. *Weak* externalism is the species of externalism that
claims that the existence and identity conditions of content are those of
the objects of the attitude in question.[8] In neither case are a subject's
mental states essentially independent of his extra-cutaneous surround-
ings. This distinction appears extremely plausible given that there appear
to be concepts for which twin earth cases cannot be constructed, yet for
which we are not willing to concede that externalist individuation can-
not apply. Thus there is reason to claim that externalism is a thesis of
the individuation of content that holds, either weakly or strongly, for all
concepts. (See McGinn 1989, pp. 36–43, among others, for details).

An account of analytic truth given strong externalism would be
unnecessarily restrictive, since, arguably, only a limited number of con-
cepts are capable of strongly external individuation. Accordingly we
will develop an account of analytic truth along the lines of weak exter-
nalism, and go on to consider some objections.

2. *An Externalist Account of Analytic Truth*

Two questions must be carefully distinguished: first, by reference to what are the truth-conditions of sentences like

(1)   Bachelors are happy

and

(2)   Bachelors are unmarried males

to be given? What is it, that is, that determines the truth-value of these sentences? Second, what is it that makes the second of these sentences *analytic*? In what terms, that is, are its *analyticity*-conditions to be made?

With Frege, we will say that the constituent expressions of a sentence have both sense and reference. We take the reference of singular terms to be individual particulars, and those of predicates to be properties (parting company with Frege). Further, we take it that properties are characterized by what we will call 'structural complexity,' to be defined shortly. Now, it is objects and properties that are meant to individuate the senses of expressions given externalism about meaning. How does this picture of meaning constrain an account of truth in virtue of meaning alone?

The answer to the first question above need raise no especial difficulties. Both (1) and (2) have their truth-value determined by the reference of their constituent expressions, as is consistent with externalist criteria.[9] Such sentences are composed of general terms whose reference, as we have said, are properties. Now, given the characterization of a property as a mind-and-language independent entity with structural complexity of varying degree, we can begin to construct an account of the features that contribute to the semantic profile of those sentences we call analytic truths.

First, we understand the structural complexity of a property to comprise: 1) its identity with other properties; 2) its component structure – the simpler properties of which it is composed; and 3) the relations it bears to other properties. We take a property to have the structural com-

plexity it has necessarily,[10] and to bear either necessary or contingent relations to other properties in virtue of that structure. Accordingly, we say that the reference of the expression 'bachelor' in (1) – the property of being a bachelor – has structural complexity, and, in virtue of such structure, bears either necessary or contingent relations to other properties, such as, for example, the property of being happy, the reference of the predicate 'happy' in (1). The truth-conditions of (1) are made in terms of the properties to which the expressions in that sentence refer.

Given externalism, the same, naturally, holds for (2). The reference of the expression 'bachelor' in (2) – the property of being a bachelor – has structural complexity. One of the properties with which it is identical is the property denoted by the expression 'unmarried male.' Thus, (2) is true in virtue of the (improper) componential relation between the reference of its constituent expressions.[11] So much for what makes (2) true – what is it that makes this sentence an analytic truth?

3. Property-Revealing Sense

Consider the role of sense. While all senses are individuated by properties, as is required by weak externalism, we contend that it is not the case that all senses will be such as to reveal the structural complexity of the properties that individuate then. We may say, accordingly, that while all senses are *property-involving*, not all senses are *property-revealing*.[12] Property-revealing senses will reveal both the (proper and improper) structural composition of the properties that individuate them and the necessary or contingent relations borne by those properties.[13] An analytic sentence, thus, is one whose constituent terms express senses that reveal the necessary relations borne by the properties denoted by the terms.

How is the property-revealing function of sense to be understood? This does not readily admit of a summary formulation. Nevertheless, a number of clarificatory remarks can be made.

First, the property-revealing character of the sense of an expression is not a direct function of any syntactic complexity in the expression itself. One cannot, that is, distinguish the property-revealing sense of an

expression by simply looking at the syntactic structure of that expression. Any correlation there is a contingent one.

We can enlarge on this point by considering some contrasting cases. First, take a predicate with, as it happens, syntactic and semantic structural complexity: 'is an unmarried male.' Now compare the predicate 'is a bachelor.' Here there is no obvious syntactic complexity, but it would be difficult to deny its semantic complexity: it has the same complex sense as the syntactically complex 'is an unmarried male.'

Nor, further, is it the case that a term expresses a property-revealing sense context-independently. Whether the sense of an expression reveals the structural complexity of the property that, on this view, individuates it, is a matter of its relation to the other senses with which it co-occurs in a proposition. An expression has sense and reference, and such reference has constituent structure, but this will not necessarily be revealed by the sense of that expression on its own (among other things, it would difficult to see how there could be different senses associated with the same expression if this were so). Instead, we want to say that the structure of the properties that individuate senses may be revealed in the relation of one sense to another. The structural complexity of a property, something that may remain hidden when one considers an expression and its sense and reference in isolation (consider 'water') may better emerge in the encounter of senses in a proposition.

Thus it is that the relation of senses to one another will sometimes be such as to manifest the structural complexity of the properties that individuate them, by displaying a property's (proper or improper) relations to another in virtue of its structure. It may help to consider that while it is true, following Frege, that sense is the mode of presentation of reference, it does not follow that a mode of presentation will illuminate the structural features of the reference of the expression, by which it is individuated.

It may be useful, in this context, simply to think of the distinction between property-involving and property-revealing sense to be analogous, respectively, to the distinction between directly referring to an object and referring to it via a description. A descriptive term obviously contributes, in the act of reference, much more information about the entity referred to than does a mere label. Property-revealing sense is

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descriptive in a literal sense: it informs you of the structural nature of the property referred to.[14]

So, given an externalist individuation relation, we will say that senses sometimes mirror the structural relations of the properties that individuate them – by bearing those relations themselves. And, if all this is plausible, we are now in a position to entertain an account of analytic truth made in terms of property-revealing sense.

Property-revealing senses account for the modal features that characterize analytic truth as follows. An analytic sentence is necessarily true in that 1) it is true in virtue of the reference of its terms and 2) the objects of reference of the terms of analytic sentences are, as we have said, properties, which have the constituent structure they have necessarily, and which bear a number of necessary relations to one another as a result. So (2), above, is necessarily true on the view we have sketched, in that what it is to be an unmarried male is part of the necessary structural complexity of what it is to be a bachelor. The structural composition of the property of being a bachelor, we may say, necessarily comprises the property of being an unmarried male: the properties in this case are identical. What may come as some surprise is that analytic sentences will be, on this account, necessarily true *de re*.[15]

Property-revealing senses further account for the unique epistemic features characteristic of analytic truths. How is it that a sentence composed of terms that express property-revealing senses is a sentence knowable *a priori*? Recall that, given weak externalism, senses are individuated by properties and their relations; all senses are property-involving. For one class of sentence, however, the properties referred to by the constituent terms of the sentence will bear a (*de re*) necessary relation to one another, and, as we have said, a necessary relation will be borne by the senses individuated by those properties themselves, if those senses are property-revealing. No other appeal will be needed to grasp the structure and the relations characteristic of the properties that determine the truth-value of the sentence. Grasp of the (property-revealing) senses is sufficient. Propositions whose constituents are property-revealing senses are thus both necessarily true and knowable *a priori*. The sentences that express such propositions are analytic sentences.

4. *The Account Applied: Examples.*

The following examples[16] will serve to illustrate this account of analytic truth:

(i) 'H_2O is partly oxygen.' Here the properties referred to by the terms bear a necessary componential relation to one another: it is part of the structural complexity of the property of being H_2O that it is partly composed of oxygen. The senses of these expressions reveal this structural complexity by bearing a necessary relation themselves. Grasp of the senses is sufficient for knowledge of the truth of the proposition. The sentence is, accordingly, an analytic truth: necessarily true and knowable *a priori*.

(ii)[17] 'A fortnight is a period of 14 days.' Here the properties referred to by the terms bear a necessary component relation to one another: the constituent structure of the property of being a fortnight is such that being a period of 14 days is a necessary (improper) part of it. The senses of these expressions mirror the necessary structural complexity of the properties denoted by the expressions, and grasp of these senses is, again, sufficient for the knowledge of the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence. The sentence is, accordingly, an analytic truth.

(iii) 'Water is partly oxygen.' The senses of the expressions in this case are property-involving, but, while the properties denoted by the expressions bear a necessary relation to one another in virtue of their component structure, the senses fail to capture it; they are not property-*revealing*. The structural complexity of the properties – crucially, the necessary relations borne by the properties – is not graspable by mere grasp of the senses of the terms in this sentence. Accordingly, we say that the sentence is a necessary but synthetic sentence.

(iv) 'There are puddles of water on 73rd street.' In this case, the senses of the expressions can be said to property-revealing, in that they reveal that the constituent structure of the properties referred to by the terms of this sentence is such that they bear only a *contingent* relation to one another. The senses mirror that contingent relation themselves; but grasp of the senses alone is insufficient to know the truth of the

proposition. The sentence that expresses the proposition made up of these senses is a synthetic sentence, contingently true.

III

We turn now to some of the objections that might be raised to the foregoing account of analytic truth, both from the point of view of the externalist as well as from that of the traditionalist about meaning. We can begin with the traditionalist.

1. *Sense and Reference*

Given the – deliberate – points of contact between the account of analyticity proposed here and the familiar view, the traditionalist might pose an objection along these lines: surely there is no appreciable difference between the two accounts. On the traditional account, it is the relations between the senses of expressions in certain sentences that make those sentences true; what's more, the sense-relations are sufficient for the truth of those sentences. And on the externalist account, we find that, again, it is sense-relations that confer the analyticity on a sentence, albeit property-revealing sense-relations. What's more, it is the sense-relations that are sufficient: only the sense need be inspected in order to grasp the truth of an (externalist) analytic sentence.

The traditionalist has a further quibble, namely that the claim that externalism has the surprising but desirable result that there is no genuine distinction to be drawn between truth in virtue of meaning and truth in virtue of the world is misleading. For there is nothing, in principle, to prevent the traditionalist from agreeing with the claim that the expressions in analytic sentences refer to properties that stand in nec-' essary relations to each other, without thereby agreeing that it is those property-relations that confer the analytic truth on a sentence. Let the referents fall where they may – the traditionalist could claim – what makes the sentence analytically true is the relation between senses; both tradition and the externalist agree here. But if it is the sense-relations that are sufficient for analyticity, then the contribution of *reference*-relations to the analytic truth of a sentence is, at best, redundant.

There are three points to make in reply to the traditionalist:

1. The traditionalist, in fact, begs the question against the externalist. The traditionalist interprets the situation as one where it is *either* the sense or the reference of expressions that will play a role in the attribution of analyticity to a particular sentence. The idea then is that once the externalist has conceded that it is the sense-relations that suffice, then there is no more to be said; the reference-relations drop out. So there is no significant sense to the externalist's claim that analytic sentences, from the externalist point of view, are, in contrast to the traditional conception, actually true in virtue of the *world*: the doings of the world with respect to analyticity are supplanted by the relevant sense-relations.

Note, however, that it is only by way of the traditional conception of the distinction between sense and reference that the traditionalist can frame the objection; the very question, 'What suffices, the sense or the reference?' is itself only askable from the traditional point of view; the very point of view *rejected* by externalism.

Externalism does away with the option of being able to claim that reference-relations drop out; that the relevant semantic role can be assumed by either sense or reference, *but not both*. The traditionalist, of course, can make this move only because he embraces a complete dichotomy between sense and reference. And the externalist reply to this is clear. The claim cannot be that it is either sense or reference that confers analyticity; rather, the claim is that there is no genuine opposition between the claims that analyticity depends on sense or depends on reference. The externalist, in fact, can *agree* with the traditionalist that a relation between the senses is sufficient for analyticity; but – and this is the key difference – it follows from externalist principles that sense-relations *entail* reference-relations. So, although the senses do suffice for analyticity, on the externalist view, it doesn't follow from that that the referents don't belong in the truth conditions. Given the necessary individuative relations between the reference of expressions and the sense they express required by externalism, it will follow that truth-conditions involving sense will likewise involve reference. The traditionalist can claim that sense-relations suffice and that *therefore* reference-relations are beside the point; externalism, in rejecting the autonomy of meaning, blocks this move.

The best way to understand the externalist reply is to recall the constraint on this account of analyticity alluded to above. Recall that what we are presupposing is a univocal theory of truth; given this, we naturally wish to avoid claiming that analyticity is a function of sense *as opposed to* reference, since this would pave the way for a distinction between an analytic kind of truth and a synthetic kind, as tradition will attest. Instead, we take it that analyticity quite naturally depends on sense and take the question to be: does it *also* depend on reference? We take it that it is a desirable feature of any account – given the integral nature of truth – that reference should play a part; and, on this account, it can play a part. Externalism allows us to agree with the traditional idea that sense suffices for analyticity, while rejecting the idea that there are two kinds of truth: it combines the idea that the truth-conditions of analytic sentences (must) be made in terms of the reference of expressions, with the idea that sense-relations are indeed sufficient for analyticity.

2. The next point is related, and highlights what we might call the dialectical intention behind this account. Intuitively, the idea behind the externalist account is to claim that the truth-conditions of analytic sentences depend on the reference of their constituent expressions – that is, depend on the world – *but in a special way*. That special way, of course, involves the role of sense, and is possible because of the way that sense and reference are related according to externalism.

As we noted above, the truth-conditions of analytic sentences, on this account, should be distinguished, strictly speaking, from their *analyticity*-conditions. And it is here that the contrast with the traditional view becomes most evident. The traditional account of the truth-conditions of analytic sentences will involve reference to *meanings or concepts*; nothing else is implicated, given the traditional world-independence of intensional entities. But now compare the account of the truth-conditions of analytic sentences from the externalist perspective. These must involve reference to the world of objects and properties, since, according to the externalist, *meaning* implicates the world. So there is a straightforward contrast between the terms in which tradition characterizes analytic truth-conditions and the terms in which the externalist does so. The most significant thing to note is that the externalistically characterized truth-conditions are related to the senses of the

expressions involved by way of implication; what is most emphatically not the case, however, is that the truth-conditions *themselves* involve reference to the senses alone.[18]

3. The last point against the traditionalist involves the understanding of the notion of 'analytically true.' Given the constraints we are presupposing, and the fundamentals of externalism, it seems we can analyze this notion a bit further. The attribution of analytic truth to a sentence should be understood as follows: when a sentence is analytically true its truth should be understood in the ordinary, worldly sense. Its truth is *determined*, however, in virtue of the meaning of its terms. The notion of 'in virtue of,' however, should be understood as *sufficient for*, or *supervenient on*; what is not the case, however, is that externalist analytic truth is merely or even essentially a matter of the relations between the senses.

One way to appreciate the point here is to avoiding thinking of the word 'true' as being modified by the adjective 'analytic' so as to give rise to a different kind of property; i.e. that of being an *analytic* truth. Truth is always the same property, but it can be produced in different ways: from meaning, for example, or from the world.

In short, I take the univocal nature of truth to be a condition of adequacy on any account of analyticity. Externalism permits an account of analyticity that is consistent with holding that truth is a unitary property; namely, correspondence to the world. But given that necessity fails as a criterion for distinguishing sentences like 'Cats are cats' from sentences like 'Cats are animals' then, clearly, there is something to preserve as correct about the traditional conception of analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning.[19] The account of analyticity from the externalist point of view preserves the spirit of the tradition, without, however, entailing the disagreeable division of truth into two kinds, characteristic of the traditional view.

2. *Externalism: Proper Formulations*

The next objections are from the externalist point of view. The first sort of objection may be traced to a possible misunderstanding concerning the nature of externalism as a theory of content. It takes the form of resisting

what may seem to be the prima facie implausibility of an account of analytic sentences whose truth-conditions are made in the same terms as those of synthetic sentences. This kind of objection goes more or less as follows: suppose one takes Fregean senses to individuate mental states. Fregean senses are not in the head; indeed, Frege was adamant about their abstract nature. The view that takes Fregean senses to individuate mental states is not thereby, internalist, and – crucially – such a view preserves the classic distinction between sentences true in virtue of meaning alone and those true in virtue of meaning and the world. Such a view, it is claimed, is externalist at less cost (a related objection takes the favored individuative entity to be a structured proposition; the gist is the same).

Now I take it as obvious that it is an error to suppose that internalism is circumvented by mere appeal to entities no one would claim are in the head to play the relevant role in the determination of a mental state. Something's being merely external to the head is insufficient to generate any interesting externalism. To see this, let us ask ourselves whether the following two accounts of the content of a belief differ in any crucial way.

One account specifies the content of

(3)   Lois Lane believes that Superman is a hero

in terms of the belief relation holding between Lois and the structured *singular* proposition whose constituents are the individual particular Superman and the property of heroism. The other specifies the content of (3) in terms of the belief relation holding between Lois and the structured proposition whose constituents are, instead, the modes of presentation expressed by 'Superman' and by 'heroism,' where these do not involve the reference essentially. It seems obvious, in spite of the fact that both accounts specify belief as a relation to a proposition – an abstract object, one not in the head – that there is a difference in what it is that bears the individuative burden. As the controversy in the literature will attest, there is a critical difference in what each view takes to be the constituent structure of the proposition, a difference that is essential to the account – and to the theoretical slant of the account – of the

there is that other sort of truth (p. 87): "the truths of pure reason ... which do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact."

The difficulty of squaring empiricist criteria for knowledge with the idea that there are propositions true independent of experience appears to be behind the classical conception of analytic truth as a different kind of truth from that of synthetic truth. Empiricists could accept *a priori* propositions under one condition: they are not to be considered at all in the same league as real, informative, factual truths, the proper province of empiricism. Externalism, of course, blocks this move. I pursue this in another paper.

[4] I have already acknowledged the controversy surrounding analyticity and I do assume throughout that analytic truths are necessary and knowable *a priori*. A brief comment on a notorious counterexample to the necessity condition might be useful, however. 'I am here now' would appear to be known *a priori* yet be *contingently* true: I might well have been somewhere else. Kaplan's distinction between character and content is useful in taking the sting out of this putative counterexample. As Kaplan puts it (1977, pp. 71–2):

... a truth in the logic of demonstratives, like 'I am here now' need not be necessary ... how can something be both logically true and thus *certain*, and *contingent* at the same time? ... in the case of indexicals the answer is easy to see ... the bearers of logical truth and of contingency are different entities ... it is the *character* that is logically true ... but it is the *content* that is contingent or necessary.

We might represent the distinction as a distinction of scope. From the fact that:

(1)   Necessarily, every utterance of 'I am here now' is a true utterance

it does not follow that:

(2)   Every utterance of 'I am here now' is necessarily true

[5] See Kripke (1980, p. 39) for the working definition, and see Burge (1992, p. 9) for a useful exposition of the lack of consensus concerning the characterization of analyticity.

[6] Note that the conditions may just as well be counterfactual: *were* the requisite objects and properties to fail to coexist with an individual in a world, that individual would not possess the concepts held to be individuated by those entities.

[7] Some have thought that the relation between twin earth-type thought experiments and externalism is a necessary one. This is false. Externalism can be established quite independently of anything that shows that some content or other fails to supervene on internal states. For many kinds of content, it will not be possible to produce a case of environmental variation; both relational individuation and supervenience will apply. See McGinn (1989) for the arguments.

[8] Those familiar with the claims of Evans (1982) will recognize an affinity between weak externalism and object-dependent or Russellian thoughts; weak externalism extends, to general concepts, the idea of the identity-and-existence-dependence of content on the world outside the subject's skin. These views are best understood as the denial of description or Fregean theories of meaning, following Kripke (1980), Putnam (1975a) and Kaplan (1977).

It is worth noting here a point I develop in later sections of the paper: from the fact that a theory of *descriptive* sense is denied, it does not follow that a theory of *sense* is denied. Those familiar with the views of McDowell (1977. 1984) will recognize the allusion to the idea of a *de re* sense.

[9] Familiar problems arise for an account of certain kinds of expressions when reference is taken to determine meaning: the problem of opacity is the most notorious. See Salmon and Soames (1988) for a useful introduction to so-called direct reference semantics. Also see my (1992), where I argue that semantic innocence – in spite of appearances – can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of indirect discourse.

[10] Here I agree with Forbes (1989, p. 132). I should say that it was my misfortune to have worked out this account before I came across his book. I was no less elated (and somewhat relieved) to discover support for it there. This is not to say that I am confident that he would agree with everything I have claimed in this paper.

[11] A distinction between proper and improper subset with respect to the constituent structure of properties will help to make this clear. We can understand some of the componential relations between properties to be improper, so to speak; to include the identity of properties as well as the relation of proper parts of properties.

[12] See McDowell (1984, pp. 283–94) for a profitable comparison. McDowell argues there for what I would call *object-involving* senses for singular terms. I extend the idea to predicates, and claim that while all terms express senses that are property-involving, some of those senses will be property-revealing. Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977, 1984) were the first to suggest and defend a distinction between descriptive (so-called Fregean) sense and an alternative, so-called *de re* sense. Briefly, the distinction turns on the relation between sense and its bearer. Frege argued that the sense of an expression could exist independently of the reference of the expression. Evans and McDowell deny this, defending a necessary relation between the existence and identity conditions of the reference of an expression and its sense. Object- and property-involving senses should be thought as *de re*.

[13] The structural composition of a property is not to be confused with its essence.

[14] Two points need to be made in conjunction with this. First: it is by no means trivial that a sense is property-revealing. Take a member of a community who begins to use an expression she has picked up ('bachelor', say). If she is still finding her way, semantically speaking, then she doesn't really understand the expression; she can use it, however, as a label. The term is certainly non-property-revealing for her; she doesn't know what it means.

Second: The use of the term 'descriptive' here can be a little misleading, since it is ambiguous. The question: 'Are property-revealing sense descriptive?' could mean one of two things, and the answer will depend on which is intended. On the one hand, the answer is yes: property-revealing sense is descriptive in the literal sense of *gives information about* the referent in question (such as, for example, its structural complexity). It should be understood this way here.

The answer is a little more complicated when 'descriptive' is understood as theoretical shorthand for 'is a definite description,' however. Those familiar with this issue will recall that there is some dispute as to whether externalism can be true of definite descriptions. Briefly, definite descriptions are classically thought to have sense even if there is nothing to which the description applies. The externalist reply to this, however, is that definite descriptions are composed of predicates, for which externalism goes through. Predicates refer to properties – extracranial entities – and it is those properties that individuate the sense expressed by the predicate.

[15] One thing I take to result from this view of analyticity is the need for a reconsideration of the familiar categories of the *de dicto* and the *de re* as they apply to propositions. In particular, I believe that this view of analyticity recommends abandoning entirely the notion of the *de dicto* proposition. I pursue this in another paper.

[16] Relational predicates are no less capable of being illustrated in this way: take the analytic sentence 'If x is a nephew of y, then y has at least one sibling.' Y's property of having at least one sibling is a necessary structural component of the property of being a nephew of y's.

[17] I am grateful to Graeme Forbes for supplying me with this example. He did also include: 'Every number has a successor,' but I believe that this one is possibly more controversial. One might argue that mathematics is the sort of area where *discoveries* take place, and that it is more akin to a discovery about the nature of numbers that they in fact have successors, than anything about the meaning of the word 'number.'

[18] Think of it this way: truth is the destination, sense-relations are the route to that destination; and there's no reason to confuse the route with the destination.

[19] See Kripke (1980), particularly Lecture III, for remarks on the distinction between epistemological necessity and metaphysical necessity.

[20] There are others. See Putnam (1975b, pp. 429–40). Perhaps, in addition, the standard debate concerning intension and extension has resulted in an unwarranted conflation of the sense and reference of a predicate. Since extension is not sufficient to fix the meaning of a predicate, given non-synonymous predicates with the same extension, intensions were invoked to satisfy the demand for the meaning of a predicate – but intensions are commonly held to be the property or attribute denoted by a predicate. This may be a case were convenience sacrifices clarity – or even truth.

[21] See McGinn (1989) for more on this point.

[22] See, among others, Armstrong (1983, 1989), Dretske (1977, pp. 248–68), Shoemaker (1984, pp. 206–33 and pp. 234–60), and Tooley (1987).

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Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina – Greensboro
Greensboro, NC 27412
USA