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# SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF MOORE INTERPRETATION[1]

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## Introduction

Interpreting a philosophical view, tradition, or set of arguments raises questions about the assessment of those views in their own historical context. Is the value of a philosophical view only its contribution to problems that *we* want solved? Or is there value to a contextual study of what a thinker thought and why? Can a historical account, for instance, reveal ways in which a tradition or a view has become entangled in interpretations that need some clarification?[2] These questions and others like them are rapidly drawing interest in the history of analytic philosophy. Until fairly recently, the practice of analytic philosophy did not readily embrace accounts of its own history,[3] even squaring off antagonistically with history of philosophy.[4] Glock (2008, 868) has classified the standoff between analytic philosophy and the history of analytic philosophy as ranging from ignoring or despising the past (what he calls "historiophobia") to reading features of the present into the past and distorting it ("anachronism").[5] The issue here is sometimes formulated as that between doing "genuine" philosophy (critical analysis and evaluation) and mere or "slavish" exposition.[6] But we should note that even this distinction is a function of interpretation: in particular, a common interpretation of analytic philosophy, at least by its own lights.

This interpretation stresses a characterization of analytic philosophy as a genuinely critical and productive methodology for identifying, evaluating, and solving philosophical problems—with other approaches dismissed as "not philosophy."[7] The approach began in new discoveries in formal logic and their subsequent application, which elevated formal methods to the practice of philosophy in the early and mid part of the 20th century.[8] The method—based on logic, analysis, and conceptual clarification—was widely regarded as having effected a sweeping

change in the very practice of philosophy, distinguishing it from science on the one hand and from nonsense on the other (Ayer, 1936).[9] A central thesis of this new approach was that accounting for meaning or truth—hallmarks of philosophical endeavor—was not possible without some method of analysis. And no philosopher in the analytic tradition stands more for "analysis" than does G. E. Moore (1873–1958).[10] In this paper I will critically examine some of the cornerstones of Moore's work and their role in traditional interpretations of the nature of analytic philosophy.

Moore's standing for well over a century now has been as one of the three founding fathers of analytic philosophy, alongside Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951).[11] The role of these figures in the inception of what became known as analytic philosophy was cemented in their early work, heralded as the founding basis of this new approach to philosophy.[12] As noted above, a key idea was that only through some kind of analysis—of our expressions, concepts, meanings, or something else—could we hope to discover their correct meaning; or (more abstractly) whether they could mean anything in the first place. Russellian and Wittgensteinian approaches in the first few decades of the 20th century took the view that the *grammatical* form of our expressions was misleading as to their *logical* form, and were focused on developing a formal apparatus to reveal that correct form.[13] Moore approached the same idea by instead minutely analyzing the content of natural language expressions like "good."[14] In paper after paper Moore's method was a painstaking exploration of a given concept (and its entailments), often initiated in some form of the question, "But what does *p* mean?" In what follows I will look more closely at the some of the central features of Moore's views to suggest where the standard readings veer toward historical distortion or misunderstanding (or both). Along the way I will propose some adjustments in order to reflect a more contextually faithful understanding of Moore's philosophy and its place in the shaping of the nature of analytic philosophy.

## The Interpretation of Moore's Philosophy: The Usual Suspects

There are four main elements to the established picture of Moore's philosophy and his philosophical method and one principal theme that links them. First, the main elements: (1) that as a young student of philosophy, he embraced the Bradleyan idealist metaphysics then dominant in British philosophy, rebelled against it, and transformed philosophical method for good; (2) that having devoted his early philosophy to metaphysics and ethics, he shifted his philosophical interests to epistemology (but with little success); (3) that his style of philosophy introduced a notion of "analysis" to philosophical method that became the very essence of 20th-century analytic philosophy; (4) that he introduced and was an epitome of "commonsense" method in philosophy, particularly with regard to epistemological issues like skepticism and the nature of sense-data.

What links these elements in the interpretation of Moore's philosophy is the view that his main claim to fame, in many ways, *is* his philosophical method of analysis and common sense. What I want to propose instead is that accounts of Moore's philosophical "method" have overshadowed what his method was *for*. One deeply entrenched tradition-shaping interpretation of analytic philosophy is that the analytic approach was directed onto language and meaning. I want to make the case here that an ambiguity with respect to the notion of "meaning" led to this interpretation, which we can examine more closely through a contextual look at Moore's philosophical views. In brief: I want to argue that Moore's signature methods never were concerned with language in itself nor with linguistic meaning (depending on how we formulate that notion). Rather, Moore's method and views consistently displayed a deep-rooted interest in coming to grips with what we would call the *metaphysics* of meaning.[15] I will begin with brief comments on (1) and (2);[16] and go on to discuss (3) and (4) in more detail.

## Moore and the "Revolt" from Idealism

One thing to square away is that the traditional picture of Moore's philosophical evolution is mostly due to Russell.[17] Moore and Russell were students at Cambridge together in the mid-1890s; according to the Russellean version, their undergraduate exposure to philosophy was characterized by the Absolute Idealism dominant in British philosophy of the late 19th century, mostly through the work of F. H. Bradley. But (seemingly out of nowhere) Moore published a radically new account of the nature of judgment ("The Nature of Judgement", 1899; hereafter NJ) that resolutely spurned Bradleyan metaphysics and its monism, with its denial of definitive truth-value for our judgments; its insistence on the incoherence and illusion of "appearances" or ordinary experience; and the mentalism ingrained in its account of reality as "intelligible." In NJ, Moore argued that the object of thought was to be conceived as a mind- and language-independent entity, a proposition, composed of concepts related to one another. Thus, what we meant, what we thought, what we said, and what was true was conceived of as having the same nature as a mind- and language-independent reality, combining and recombining in necessary relations to one another. This "atomic realism," coupled with newly discovered formal techniques, was the beginning of what today we call "analytic philosophy."

When it came to Moore's influence on him, Russell did not mince words. The preface to Russell's 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM), for instance, contains a long acknowledgment to Moore:

> On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr G.E. Moore. I have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which

> regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms of the whole which these compose. Before learning these views from him, I found myself completely unable to construct any philosophy of arithmetic, whereas their acceptance brought about an immediate liberation from a large number of difficulties which I believe to be otherwise insuperable. The doctrines just mentioned are, in my opinion, quite indispensable to any even tolerably satisfactory philosophy of mathematics, as I hope the following pages will show.

Effusive stuff; moreover, Russell never understated his conviction that Moore's philosophical insights of this period (1897–9) were vital not just to his own views but in effect spared British philosophy in general from further asphyxiation from the institutionally and intellectually then-prevalent neo-Hegelian metaphysics. Throughout his life Russell gave Moore lavish credit for having put an end to that metaphysical idealism, characterizing it as a "revolt" and "rebellion" by Moore (with Russell following closely after) to the bracing lucidity of logical realism.

A close look at the context in which Moore and Russell developed their early views, however, reveals that this picture is somewhat misrepresentative.[18] Examination of documents that survive from this period, for instance, show that in Moore's early philosophical forays the influence of Bradley was counterweighted by a new scientific objective conception of psychology ("mental science") that was also prevalent at Cambridge philosophy during this time. The fundamental notion in the mental science of the day was that psychological states could have non-psychological objects. That is, the metaphysics of content (as we would say today) was more realist in the psychology of the late 19th century than were the accounts of states like judgment and thought in the work of Bradley and Hegel. Moore's insights did not come out of nowhere, it turns out, but right out of his philosophical *milieu* at Cambridge. Moreover, Bradleyan metaphysics was not as dominant in Cambridge as it may have seemed, and British idealism did not wither away as quickly as Russell (and a common interpretation of the inception of analytic philosophy itself) tells it.[19] To call Moore's view a "revolt" or a "rebellion" somewhat mischaracterizes how Moore's logical realism developed in its own context. Moreover, it supported the historical distortion, at the foundation of analytic philosophy, of radically differentiating so-called analytic philosophy from continental philosophy.[20] The consequences of the new view for 20th-century philosophy, however, could not have been predicted (even by Russell).

## *From Metaphysics and Ethics to Epistemology*

Another standard interpretation of Moore is that he started off as an ethicist, even a metaphysician of ethics,[21] but that after 1903, his concerns became mainly epistemological.[22] Thus Braithwaite for instance (1961, 27) captures the general

sense of Moore's philosophical reputation when he notes that "The main feature in the public image of Moore is his appeal to 'common sense' in his refutation of what Hume called 'excessive scepticism.'" These concerns are thought to come to a head in his 1939 "Proof of An External World" (PEW). The main line of argument in PEW concerns our understanding of the notions of *things outside of us* as well as of the *external world*. Moore asks: if our aim is to prove "the existence of things outside of us" what is it that we are aiming to prove? What is the "point in question?"

In the interpretive literature on PEW, however, approaches to it are split between what are known as epistemological and metaphysical readings.[23] The metaphysical readings of PEW mostly take it that whatever metaphysical conclusions Moore was interested in establishing concerning the nature of the external world, he fails—and fails miserably.[24] The epistemological interpretations of PEW in the literature, on the other hand, take its central critical target to be a skeptic who denies our knowing that there is an external world, and that Moore's main interest in this paper is in exploring notions like knowledge, certainty, and proof.

One point that cuts against this interpretation—and the related interpretation of the (alleged) shift in Moore's philosophical views—is that Moore *himself* explicitly rejected an epistemological reading of PEW not long after it was published (1942, 668–72). Moreover, although his own replies to critics of PEW concede that the arguments in PEW do not succeed against skepticism, it is significant that he does not disavow them (1942). This suggests that the usual interpretation of PEW as purely "epistemological" is missing something. As it turns out, a closer look at the Moore's extensive draft revisions of PEW, many of which survive, show him struggling less with the problem of "things external to us" rather than the issue with "things external to our minds."[25] What the PEW drafts show is that Moore's main concern in PEW was getting clear on the notion of "things outside of us," and that what he aimed for in his account was to capture what philosophers have been interested in when addressing this and related questions. Thus Moore appears to be arguing, in his characteristic manner (about which more below), that there is a *logical* distinction between the notion of a thing to be met with in space and a thing that is presented to the experiencing subject as in space, and that this distinction can support a distinction between things that are mind-dependent ("in the mind") and those that are mind-independent ("outside of us"). What this suggests is that Moore's concerns as formulated in PEW are on a continuum in the development of his thinking across his career, with important links to even his earliest work. If this is right, there is a case to be made that the right way to interpret his body of work—if PEW is any example—is as an extension of his arguments first developed in 1897 against metaphysical idealism, rather than as a wholesale (and mostly futile) shift to purely epistemological issues. I will draw out this line of thought below with a look at two canonical Moorean methodological concepts: analysis and common sense.

## *Analysis*

Considering that Moore's reputation is that of the supreme analyst of analytic philosophy, it may come as a surprise that there are conflicting formulations of what he may have meant by "analysis" and conflicting examples of the sort of thing referred to by "analysis" in his work.[26] Moore isn't terribly helpful himself, giving a series of equivocal remarks on "analysis" (1942) that fail to settle the question.[27] There is also the related issue of the paradox of analysis. What is to be analyzed is known as the *analysandum* (G); what does the analysis is the *analysans* (F). So what is the status of "F is G"? If it is an identity statement then it would seem that "F" and "G" have to have the same meaning (the statement is an analytic identity). But if so, then the "analysis" is trivial. But if they do not, then the statement "F is G" is false; so the analysis is not correct or is not a success. The problem is to formulate an analysis that is both correct *and* not trivial.[28] Moore formulates one version of the paradox in PE; and there are a variety of interpretations of what it amounts to. In addition, there are by now many accounts of a puzzle that Wittgenstein christened "Moore's paradox"; though Moore's paradox is not a paradox of analysis.[29]

The growing role of formal methods in analytic philosophy meant that "analysis" was often construed as "logical analysis," especially early on. A paradigm case of logical analysis is Russell's theory of descriptions (1905). On Russell's account, the logical form of "The present King of France is bald" is that of an existentially quantified sentence.[30] That is: the surface grammatical form of that sentence is misleading. The definite description in the subject place of the sentence, grammatically speaking, is not a *logical* subject (a singular term).

Another conception of analysis is connected more closely to Moore's work, however. This has to do with the (presumed) connection between "analysis" and the ordinary language philosophy characteristic of Oxford-based philosophers in the period after World War II, where the primary focus of attention is expressions of natural language in their ordinary use.[31] This approach in turn evolved into the notion that analytic philosophy involved something like the analysis of language or linguistic meaning. This tradition in analytic philosophy is most often taken to encompass Moore's methodology, given its emphasis on "analysis" and "common sense." From the historical point of view, however, the meaning of "meaning" in this context is significant. Let us look at this more closely.

Moore's most detailed reply concerning what he meant by "analysis" came in (1942, 660–xx) in his reply to Langford (1942, 323f), who lodged the complaint that Moore had not been sufficiently explicit on his own position on the nature of analysis. Moore proposes a formulation or a set of conditions. The first is that he conceives of analysis as being directed onto "an idea, or concept or proposition," and not a verbal expression (word or sentence). The next is that (merely) claiming that two verbal expressions have the same meaning is not an analysis. The third is more complex: that there are (at least) three necessary conditions to what Moore

conceives of as an analysis proper of a concept. These are that (i) a concept C can only be analyzed by another concept C★ iff there is no way to attribute C to an object without also attributing C★; (ii) that there is no way to verify that C can be attributed to an object without attributing that C★ can be attributed to that object; (iii) C and C★ are synonyms. Moore takes these conditions as necessary, but not as sufficient, for the analysis of a concept.

I would argue, however, that what we see Moore as particularly stressing in his reply to Langford is that "analysis" is not a linguistic endeavor—it is a metaphysically oriented one, where the role of analysis is to clarify what it is for something to be what it is. We see this direction of thought in Moore's earliest philosophical efforts, and (as I argued above) in his later work. In NJ (1899), where Moore argues that a judgment is composed of non-psychologically construed (objective) concepts bearing necessary relations to one another, the interpretive issue is what is meant by "concept." Roughly speaking: on the one hand, there is an inevitable mental component to our use of language; our formulation of "meaning"; and our understanding of "thought." On the other, there is the problem of accounting for what it is that our thoughts and words are *about*. Thus our construal of notions like "language," "meaning," "concept," and "thought" will need to contend with what is known as an act/object distinction.[32] When we think, we are certainly performing a mental act; but what we are thinking *about* need not be mental in itself. Moore was clear in NJ that he did not mean anything mentalistic or psychological by "concept," or by "judgment"; for Moore, the objects of ethical judgment in particular would require a non-mental, non-psychologistic formulation for their normative properties to make any sense. So I would argue that the right way to interpret Moore's "analytical" method is to understand that putative objectivity of objects of thought (or will) was never abandoned in Moore's thinking. Moore took analysis to be, ultimately, a determination or even individuation of the properties we attribute to the analysandum in question—a consideration, that is, of what makes the analysandum *what it is* in itself. That an analysis tends to be expressed in words was something that Moore himself noted (664) but that he took to be more or less irrelevant to the process of *genuine* analysis.

## *A Defence of Common Sense*

An examination of Moore's 1925 paper "A Defence of Common Sense" (DCS) can make this line of thought clearer. DCS stands out as a cross-section of some of the key tradition-shaping construals of analytic philosophy linked to Moore and his method.[33] In explaining what he takes his philosophical views (and method) to be, Moore assembles nearly all of the elements that have come to represent a view about analytic philosophy itself: analysis, ordinary language, and common sense. I want to show that the right reading of Moore's claims in DCS highlights many of the ways in which Moore's views have played a role in

shaping a common view of analytic philosophy, and I will conclude this paper by proposing a few adjustments to the usual interpretation.

Moore's paper sets out three main points that he takes as representative of the way his thinking differs from that of some other philosophers. The first point (I) is a compound of a list of what he calls "truisms" and a meta-claim that "each of us has known to be true a proposition that corresponds to the propositions listed" (Baldwin 1993, 106). The list of truisms comprise statements concerning the existence of one's own body, that it has changed over time, that it occupies space and bears spatial relations to other bodies; and that one has had different mental states of different kinds like perceptions and beliefs, thoughts of imaginary things, dreams, and feelings. The second point (II) is that there is no good reason to suppose either that (i) physical facts are logically dependent on mental facts or (ii) that they are causally dependent on mental facts. And the third point (III) is that while he not skeptical as to the truth of any of these propositions, he is skeptical as to their correct analysis.

What Moore goes on to claim about (I) is that the principal way in which he differs from some philosophers is that they:

> seem to have thought it legitimate to use the word "true" in such a sense that a proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true; and some of these, therefore, would perhaps say that propositions like those enumerated in (1) are, in their view, true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false. I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I am not using "true" in any such sense … . I am maintaining, in short, that all the propositions in (1), and also many propositions corresponding to each of these, are *wholly* true … .
>
> *(Baldwin 1993, 110)*

The same holds for the propositions that make up (II). And (III), though it takes a slightly different angle from (I) and (II), is no less an opportunity for Moore to set out what distinguishes his views from others'. This is, I would argue, Moore's stress on an objective conception of truth and of reality. Bradley is clearly the object of his claims in (I), as Bradley took the view that no proposition could be wholly true, since it could express only a partial and contradictory aspect of the Absolute.[34] Berkeley's subjective idealism ("esse is percipi") is explicitly the object of Moore's claims in (II). And as for (III)—and in general, as it turns out—Moore is clear that there is a distinction between a proposition's *being true* and our being able to supply an analysis of *what it would be for it to be true*.

Moore explains this by claiming that propositions of the types in (I) and (II) can only be analyzed in terms of increasingly simpler propositions. The simplest, ultimately, would be propositions like "I am perceiving *this*" and "*this* is a human hand." But note what Moore says is focus is here: "it is the analysis of

propositions of the latter kind which seems to me to present such great difficulties, while nevertheless the whole question as to the *nature* of material things obviously depends upon their analysis." So we see him here explicitly tying the nature of analysis to *metaphysics*. He goes on:

> It seems to me a surprising thing that so few philosophers, while saying a great deal as to what material things *are* and as to what it is to perceive them, have attempted to give a clear account as to what precisely they suppose themselves to *know* (or to *judge*, in case they have held that we don't *know* any such propositions to be true, or even that no such propositions *are* true) when they know or judge such things as "This is a hand," "That is the sun," "This is a dog," etc. etc. etc.
>
> *(Baldwin 1993, 128)*

Moore here clearly places emphasis on the job of analysis to provide conditions for what it is for something to be what it is. This, of course, will be inevitably eventually linked to our states of judgment and knowledge. But Moore's essential claim here is that it is reckless (at best) to suppose that we can take ourselves to judge—let alone know—the truth of a proposition without an account of what it *is* that we take ourselves to judge or to know. Epistemological claims, that is, only make sense once we've sorted out the metaphysics of the objects of thought.

Moore approaches the formulation of "common sense" itself from a few different perspectives to tie in with his project in DCS. One is that "a commonsense view of the world is wholly true." Any feature of the world as specified in a commonsense view of that world is, moreover, true of that world, whether we know it or not. In addition, as Moore formulates it, the commonsense view of the world is expressed in propositions that are "ordinary" propositions and that mean "precisely what every reader, in reading them, will have understood me to mean" (Baldwin 1993, 110). Moore explicitly distinguishes his position here from that of philosophers who make a pretense of claiming or believing truisms like the ones he lists in (I), only to go on to contradict or dispute them. What lies behind this pretense, according to Moore, is that such philosophers would also dispute that there is an ordinary or "popular" meaning that such propositions possess (Baldwin 1993, 111). Moore in fact mocks such philosophers for being unwilling to give a "plain" answer to such plain questions while opting to create willful ambiguities (111). Moore asserts instead that there is no ambiguity to the meaning of (for instance) "The earth has existed for many years past." We plainly understand the proposition expressed by this sentence. Anyone who denies this, he argues, is conflating the question of "understanding the meaning of *p*" with being able to give a correct analysis of its meaning ("know what it means") (Baldwin 1993, 127). After all, in order to analyze it, we have to understand what it is that we want to analyze; although, as we have seen above, this is something

Moore takes to be "profoundly difficult" and even something that is it possible no one could provide.

What makes DCS practically a catalogue of key tradition-shaping elements in analytic philosophy from a Moorean perspective is of course his use of the notions of "analysis," "common sense," and "ordinary or popular meaning" in the explanation of how his views differ from those of other philosophers. But I think we can say that a kind of non-Moorean carelessness with regard to these notions developed, over time, into an understanding of analytic philosophy as a project of "analyzing" ordinary language; or (some understanding of) common-sense *meaning*. In DCS, however, Moore is quite clear that *bad* philosophy begins with denying such basic truths as the existence of material objects; the existence of my own and others' minds; and (I think most crucially) that what we think, judge, believe, and know are not mental entities. When Moore addresses the philosophers who have purported to deny his (I) and (II) he is addressing idealists—not for the first time, after all—as examples of bad philosophers: Bradley, who rejected any truth we possess as mere appearance and thus not wholly true; and Berkeley, who rejected material reality as absurd.[35] Moore is quite clear about this even in his remarks on sense-data, where he claims that though what we are immediately acquainted with is a sense-datum, sense-data are not the objects themselves that we do perceive and know. What I would argue this suggests is that the overarching position that Moore is emphasizing in DCS is in fact what we would call commonsense *realism*, which characterises his earliest views on the nature of judgment and the Good, all the way through to his later views on the nature of an external world.

We suggested above that a longstanding antipathy between analytic philosophy and examinations of its own history was instrumental in shaping interpretations of analytic philosophy. Some of that antipathy, I hope to have shown here, has been reflected in the understanding and interpretation of Moore's views. The usual understanding of Moore's views and philosophical method, I believe, has mis-characterised them, owing (in part) to a variety of equivocal conceptions of meaning, reference, and language that held sway in the analytic philosophy literature up to the latter part of the 20th century.[36] One of the greatest successes of late-20th-century analytic philosophy, however, was the amount of attention that began to be paid to these notions, starting with criticisms of Frege and Russell in the work of (for instance) Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980).[37] As a result, we have some critical distance now; and with it the opportunity to dis-entrench the usual interpretations of Moore's views and his method as (for instance) as concerning linguistic meaning and ordinary uses of language. A few welcome consequences, both historical and philosophical, could come of recalibrating Moore's views. Such readings would impart improved coherence to his philosophical development; address an important historical question as what he took himself to be arguing for by his own lights; and would ultimately provide a more faithful assessment of Moore's views as well as their role in the interpretation of analytic philosophy.

## Notes

1 My thanks to Gary Ostertag for discussion; and for the title.
2 Russell (1900) is a classic explicit example. See Ayers, Ree, and Westoby (1978) and Hunter (1993) for discussion. See also Strawson (1966) and Rorty (1984).
3 There is a very large literature on this; I can only gesture toward it here. Useful introductions into its central debates are Ayers (1978); Glock (2008); and the collection of papers in Sorrell and Rogers (2005), which includes Hatfield (2005). In the more recent literature, Beaney (2013) is a thorough and detailed source. Kremer (2013) discusses the merits of what he calls "philosophical history" in detail; Floyd (2009) identifies positive scholarly trends in the history of analytic philosophy since the 1980s.
4 See Sorrell and Rogers (2005, 43–4) on the story of the sign on Gilbert Harman's Princeton office door: "History of Philosophy: Just Say No!" This literature invariably contains references (most at second or third hand) to the quip attributed to Quine that there are two kinds of people interested in philosophy— those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy (Rorty 1984;). More recently, however, this debate flared up again with the publication and subsequent critical reviews and discussion of Soames (2003–05, 2 vols). *Philosophical Studies* (2006, 129(3): 605–65) includes a set of criticisms of Soames' work and his replies. See also the papers featured in the Author (Soames) Meets Critics session at the Pacific Division Meetings of APA, March 25, 2006. Front and center in these sets of papers is the question of the value of historical or contextual work in analytic philosophy.
5 See Kremer (2013) for more detailed discussion and criticism, particularly on the related issue of "presentism"; what Kuklick (2006, 551–2), in his review of Soames (2003–05), called "the enormous condescension of the present."
6 See Pigden (1999, 24) on what is sometimes referred to as 'text-fondling."
7 No characterization of analytic philosophy is without minefields. See Beaney (2013) for recent and thorough discussion. See Rorty (1984) for a capsule summary of the sort of view mentioned here.
8 Another vast literature; the key figures and texts are Frege (1884; 1893) and Russell (1903; 1905). The central idea is that revealing logical form is the only way to understand the meaning of our expressions; surface form is deceptive.
9 See Floyd (2009) on the role of formal methods in the interpretation of analytic philosophy.
10 See Urmson (1956); Langford (in Schilpp 1942).
11 *Anglophone* analytic philosophy, that is. Dummett's position (1993, 1), that the origin of analytic philosophy was a Germanophone phenomenon, is not entirely misconceived. Dummett was wrong, however, when he claimed that Russell and Moore sprang from "an entirely different *milieu*." See Preti (2008a); Baldwin and Preti (2011); Preti (forthcoming).
12 Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903a), Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922).
13 See Dummett (1975). The question "what is logical form" itself arises as a characteristic question of this interpretation of analytic philosophy. See the literature cited in Pietroski, P., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/logical-form/.
14 Russell's *Theory of Descriptions* (1903; 1905) is the *locus classicus* for this conception of analysis; an apex is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (1922). Russell develops it further in *Theory of Knowledge* (1913), *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), and *Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918); all in *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vols 7 and 8. See also Urmson (1956).
15 See Makin (2002) for a useful and thorough discussion.
16 These are discussed more fully in Preti (2008b); Baldwin and Preti (2011); Preti (forthcoming); and Morris and Preti (2015).

17 See Russell (1944, 1–20; 1959a, 54–64; 1959b). There is a certain amount of distortion, however, in what Russell and (even) Moore themselves say about their early philosophical development. See Griffin (1991; 1992); Hylton (1990); Preti (2008a; 2008b; forthcoming).
18 Both Moore and Russell studied philosophy with two notable mental scientists of the day at Cambridge: G. F. Stout and James Ward.
19 Ewing, 1934.
20 That is: the new psychology was developed in Germany and Austria, in the thinking of continental philosopher-psychologists like Herbart, Lotze, Brentano, and Twardowski. See Van der Schaar (2013); Nasim (2008); Preti (forthcoming).
21 Moore's PE was a version of his 1897/1898 Trinity Fellowship dissertations, both titled *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics*. See Baldwin and Preti (2011).
22 See most recently: Coliva (2004; 2010); Lycan (2001); Neta (2007); Pryor (2000, 2004), Soames (2003); Sosa (1999); Stroud (1984); Wright (2002). Past commentary includes Ambrose (1942); Malcolm (1942); Warnock (1958); and Wittgenstein (1969).
23 See Morris and Preti (forthcoming).
24 See Klemke (2000, 31); O'Connor (1982, 34); and Baldwin (1990, 295).
25 These are held in the Cambridge University Library (Add. 8875 15/3/1–6). Moore was given to multiple redraftings—so much so that some interesting material, like a draft review of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, remained unpublished. In the case of PEW we do not see what he was rejecting in his surviving materials, but what he was trying to clarify in the final published version.
26 See Schilpp (1942), especially the contributions of Langford (319–42) and Malcolm (343–68). But see White (1958) for criticism of the tendency to conflate Moore's appeal to common sense with ordinary language.
27 That Moore was not afraid to allow ambiguities to play out, however, is perhaps an important overlooked aspect of his method: that it be in service to what philosophy should be: it should be the right kind of "nonsense" (1942, 21); and it should avoid "woolliness" (1942, 19). For this, an issue might need to be conspicuously difficult to settle.
28 Semantic issues surrounding the question of identity statements between names became very significant in late-20th-century philosophy of language and mind. See Kripke (1980). See also Beaney (2007; 2016): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/analysis/.
29 See Wittgenstein (1953, Part II, sec. x). The issue is as follows: It can be raining, and I don't have to believe it. But to say "It is raining, but I don't believe it is" is odd at best (maybe paradoxical), since the sentences are not contradictions, and are not inconsistent. The issue highlights puzzles of self-ascription of belief, assertion, and entailment. See Wittgenstein (1953, Part II, sec. x); Baldwin (1990, 226); and Green and Williams (2007).
30 That is: there is one and only one $x$ such that $x$ is present King of France, and $x$ is bald. The sentence is false (no $x$ satisfies those properties).
31 See Ambrose and Lazerowitz (1970) and Ryle et al. (1957, 1–11). The early stage of this approach is often attributed to Wittgenstein's work after 1929. The post-war Oxford tributary is represented in the work of Austin, Ryle, and Strawson (among others).
32 See Preti (2008a).
33 DCS was Moore's response to an invitation to "give the contributors an opportunity of stating authentically what they regard as the main problem of philosophy and what they have endeavored to make central in their own speculation upon it" (Moore, 1925).
34 Bradley (1883; 1893).
35 See Moore (1899; 1903b).

36 See Dummett (1975) for a conception of the primacy of philosophy of language that held fast for some time.
37 See Soames (2003; 2005).

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