If *this* is the authors' strategy, it rests on a fallacy. Grant, for argument's sake, that, were there group agents, truths about their attitudes would not admit of easy paraphrase into truths about their members' attitudes. It does not follow that our *actual* everyday and social scientific attributions of attitudes to groups are not thus paraphrasable. Besides, as is shown by ordinary object eliminativists such as Peter van Inwagen (1990, *Material Beings*, Cornell University Press), Keith Hossack (2000, 'Plurals and Complexes', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 51: pp. 411–43), and Cian Dorr (2002, *The Simplicity of Everything*, Princeton University Ph.D. dissertation, accessible at: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0257/papers/SimplicityOfEverything.pdf>), paraphrases of sentences that apply predicates to singular terms for putative composite objects, into sentences committed only to the putative parts of those putative composites, can be a lot easier than one might have expected — one need only read them as applications of *collective* predicates to *plural* terms. So we should doubt that there are no easy individualist translations, even if there *are* autonomous groups.

All my criticisms notwithstanding, there is much to ponder, and much to learn from, in this lively work. The authors acknowledge their debts to writers who have reached similar conclusions, by comparable argumentative means, such as Carol Rovane. It's a shame that Susan Hurley's *Natural Reasons*, which in several ways anticipates elements of the authors' strategy, receives no mention.

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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic, by Michael Potter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xii + 310. H/b £45.00.

Michael Potter's absorbing book tackles the composition and the substance of what is known as Wittgenstein's *Notes on Logic*, and offers much to engross the scholar of early analytic philosophy. Part of the attraction of a sustained look at *Notes on Logic* is the problem of establishing just what the 'Notes' of the title are. Potter approaches the challenge in two parts. Most of the book consists of an analysis of the substance of the material, including discussion of (i) what it represents as an autonomous gauge of Wittgenstein's thinking at a significant interval in his philosophical evolution, and (ii) the influence of Frege and Russell on Wittgenstein's developing thought. One of Potter's

main contentions is that Wittgenstein's fundamental conception of logic was in place by mid-1912, emerging with conviction in *Notes*. The book also includes a detailed account of the provenance of *Notes*, rectifying some disputes and unravelling some tangles. I will begin with a brief word about *Notes* as historical material, before turning to the philosophical substance of the book (I note appreciatively that Potter argues that the historical and the philosophical are not independent here), and then I will return to the archival footage, so to speak.

Little survives of Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian thinking; less survives of his pre-War thinking; and still less survives of his pre-Norway thinking. What we have in Wittgenstein's own hand of his thoughts during his Cambridge period is a handful of letters to Russell. Moore visited Wittgenstein in Norway between March and April 1914 and came away with three notebooks, in Moore's hand, of what is published as *Notes Dictated to Moore*. Of Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian notebooks, most are lost. The few that survive were published as *Notebooks 1914–1916* (1st edition 1961). This included in an appendix what has become known as the Costello version of *Notes on Logic*, which the editors (Anscombe and von Wright) took as Wittgenstein's own work. The Costello version itself had been published in *Journal of Philosophy* in 1957; the material is there introduced by Harry T. Costello, and attributed to Wittgenstein. Costello (who assisted Russell during his visit to Harvard in spring 1914) claimed to have 'copied' the material from a source at that time in possession of Russell (Potter surmises this is also lost). In the second edition of *Notebooks 1914–1916* (1979), however, the editors jettisoned the Costello version, after McGuinness (1972) argued that it was most likely a construction of Russell's. They published instead another text, which McGuinness argued was also fashioned by Russell, but from material he got more directly from Wittgenstein. Potter here however makes the case that McGuinness still had not got it quite right, arguing that what we have of *Notes* is a compilation, translation, and arrangement, by Russell, of a multipart set of materials that Wittgenstein dictated or otherwise produced (some in German; some in English; and some in Russell's presence) between 7 and 9 October 1913.

There is no unequivocal evidence of what drew Wittgenstein to Cambridge to study with Russell, and Potter firmly disposes of the supposition that Wittgenstein was a gifted mathematician (still less a very good engineer) looking for a technical and talented mentor. We know that Wittgenstein somehow became interested in the nature of mathematics, and once he arrived at Cambridge his focus began to sharpen, which Potter claims (perhaps in overstatement) was the result of Wittgenstein searching for a way to make his own career. Potter argues that Wittgenstein settled on the philosophical foundations of logic, since (i) formal mathematics was not among his talents (and which in any case was a market cornered by Frege and by Russell), (ii) Frege and Russell had been arguing that that the foundations of

mathematics were logical, and (iii) the problems that plagued their logicism of this period were as yet unsolved. From here, Potter carefully adduces the evidence that by summer 1912 Wittgenstein had come to the view that the problems that undermined Frege and Russell's work could be construed as problems concerning the very nature of logic.

Though he gives a detailed account of the origin and development of themes familiar in *Tractatus* (analysis; complexes; simples; atomism; types; form; facts; unity), Potter resolutely defends the view that *Notes on Logic* is of philosophical and historical importance quite independent of how much it can serve to elucidate *Tractatus*. In September 1913, having decided to decamp to Norway, Wittgenstein wrote a feverish letter to Russell asking him to 'give me time enough to give you a survey of the whole field of what I have done up to now and if possible let me make notes for you *in your presence*'. The result of their meeting(s) was *Notes on Logic* — so, what *was* the 'whole field' of what Wittgenstein had done up to then? To answer this, Potter surveys in detail what Russell was at work on between 1911 and 1913, in order to isolate Russell's influence on Wittgenstein's work, and further argues that some of the most important elements in Wittgenstein's conception of logic can be traced to Frege — an emphasis on symbolism, for instance, and an adaptation of Frege's conception of an unsaturated expression. According to the case Potter presents, these drive Wittgenstein's conception of logic as grounded in the structural features of the proposition.

The discovery of the paradox — and attempts at its solution — plagued Russell from the publication of *Principles of Mathematics* and onward into the composition and publication of *Principia Mathematica*. Between 1903 and roughly 1913 he formulated and discarded a number of approaches to defang the paradox, if not dissolve it. What emerges from a close study of this period (as Potter emphasizes) is that an account of propositional constituency began to take on even more prominence in a variety of ways in Russell's work during this time. Some elements were discarded (the denoting concept) and some were refined, reformulated, and re-launched into the fray (the theory of types). The discovery of the theory of descriptions also introduced (among other things) a notion of analysis, which Potter argues had a significant impact on Wittgenstein's own developing view. On the one hand, Wittgenstein appears to defend a fairly literal understanding of analysis as the breakdown into parts. But on the other, he narrows down the issue onto what he began to call 'symbolism'.

Another strand to Wittgenstein's Cambridge-period developing views came from Russell's ambitious project to tackle the problem of propositional constituency from an epistemological angle. A number of complex issues characterize Russell's work at this stage. First and most familiar is the problem of the unity of a proposition. A proposition, as Potter puts it, is *articulate*; not just an aggregate of particulars (or universals) and a relation between them, since two different propositions can have the same

constituents. Further, in order to know or to judge that a proposition is true, we will need to understand what it expresses. And finally, we need an account not just of what makes it true but how we have access to it. Russell's work on the multiple relation theory of judgement in the period 1910–1913 is notable for its emphasis on the formulation of the principle of acquaintance and for underscoring his attempts to reconfigure the relation between the truth of a proposition and its components. Instead of the proposition being the thing that is true, it now corresponds to (stands for) what makes it true. As Potter makes the case, these are catalyst themes that begin to take recognizable root in Wittgenstein's thinking, making a substantive appearance in his letters to Russell, especially between June 1912 and September 1913.

Between March and May, 1914, Russell taught two courses at Harvard and delivered the Lowell lectures. The epistemology course at Harvard was the gloomy remainder of a projected ambitious work on the nature of knowledge which Russell had abandoned; in part, it is believed, because of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the multiple relation theory at the heart of it. It is in these criticisms that Potter traces the beginnings of Wittgenstein's substantive development of his own thinking on logic. Potter of course is not the first to bring attention to Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's epistemological views of this period — he remarks that it is a 'rite of passage' for scholars of the period to wrestle with them. But here Potter develops a position central to his book: that Wittgenstein was no technical mathematician, let alone a formal logician; but his not inconsiderable gift was the ability to reveal profound philosophical snags below the surface of both Russell and Frege's logical systems (and concomitant metaphysical views); and moreover, to exploit their own systems to do so.

Wittgenstein's criticisms appear to have played a role in Russell's abandonment of the *Theory of Knowledge* project, but there is scholarly dispute over exactly what those criticisms were, and exactly how and when the project ran aground for Russell on account of them. The most detailed exposition of this is in Nicholas Griffin's accounts (see his 'Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment', *Philosophical Studies*, 47, 1985, pp. 213–47, and 'Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment', *Russell*, 5, 1986, pp. 132–45), which Potter criticizes as attributing to Wittgenstein too technical an understanding of a contradiction entailed by Russell's defence of the multiple relation theory and the theory of types than Wittgenstein's talents in formal logic or mathematics would permit. Potter makes the case that Wittgenstein instead fused various strands of Russell's thinking from 1903 to 1913, especially on the subject of analysis. Complexes (like propositions) have constituents, so Wittgenstein now turned to the question of the nature of the simplest entities, the things putatively delivered by logical analysis — and he was not interested, argues Potter, in the Russellian goal of logical analysis as the account of proxies for what has been logically analyzed away. As to what the goal of analysis was meant to be, Potter notes that

Wittgenstein was not very interested in the formal details of (say) how reduction to simples was actually meant to work. All the same, Potter's defence of Wittgenstein's role as critic of Russell here may perhaps be too charitable. Potter makes the plausible case that Wittgenstein was not technically motivated, nor particularly well-versed in the available formalism, but he puts this down to Wittgenstein's ambition to make a unique mark for himself. One rejoinder (though perhaps too uncharitable) is that Wittgenstein's 'insouciance' about working out the formal details of his own views was that he was he could not get clear enough about what they were (and further lacked the competence of a trained mathematician), and so could not cultivate a path that involved grinding out the technical details.

Potter argues that the key to Wittgenstein's break with Russell — from 'our problems' in his letters to 'your problems' — is to be found in what he calls Wittgenstein's 'symbolic turn'. This, Potter argues, is Wittgenstein's insight that a simple is what is symbolized by a simple name. This leads, ultimately, to his 'fundamental thought' (the roots of which are the influence of Frege): that propositions are symbols whose constituents are symbols. In 1912 Wittgenstein was indeed concerned with Russell's questions — What are the components of the complex? How do they unite to form a proposition? After a visit to Frege at the end of 1912, Wittgenstein wrote to Russell that 'I had a long discussion with Frege about our Theory of Symbolism' (Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 21 — letter dated 26 December 1912). In a letter three weeks later (though the dating is Russell's), Wittgenstein appears to jettison the idea of the copula as itself a binding component of elements of the proposition. The theory of types had to claim that there are different copulae for different types of proposition. But this entailed that the universal quantifier cannot really range unrestrictedly; there is thus no genuine account of general propositions (like those of mathematics and logic) because there are propositions of different type and order. Wittgenstein's move was the attempt to formulate the view that unity of the expressive complex cannot be supplied by something distinct from the components of the proposition; whatever it is, it is part of the very structure of the expressive complex, which Wittgenstein starts to call 'Form'. The question for Wittgenstein now begins to centre on the conditions that permit a proposition to express. What Wittgenstein comes to reject in *Notes on Logic* is Frege's view that sentences are the names of truth-values, instead developing the view that what makes a proposition a proposition is different from what makes it true. The 'fundamental thought', at the heart of Wittgenstein's new stage of thinking, Potter argues, comes into focus by October 1913, and was shaped from a critical hybrid of Frege's and Russell's own views on propositional constituency. The insight of philosophical logic that emerges from his engagement with their views and which remains steadfast into *Tractatus,* Potter claims, is Wittgenstein's position that logic concerns structure.

The passages of *Tractatus* as published were not written in the sequence in which they appear, so scholars are left to piece together various accounts of what was written when. The surviving pre-Tractarian notebooks date from the War, and represent a very different intellectual period for Wittgenstein from his Cambridge era. *Notes Dictated to Moore* represent Wittgenstein's views after five or six months of Norwegian isolation. On Potter's view, *Notes on Logic* represents a break in proceedings in the account of the evolution of Wittgenstein's early views; importantly, showing what conclusions Wittgenstein had come to during his period in Cambridge, and demonstrating which elements of his Tractarian views were still to come (the picture theory, for instance). The concern, however, is that what survives as *Notes on Logic* is an edifice fashioned by Russell. What we have of *Notes on Logic* is a compound set of materials: some in Russell's hand; some in typescript; and none in Wittgenstein's hand (though some typescript material has corrections by Wittgenstein in his own hand). Potter mines the available archival evidence to make the case that what survives as *Notes* is a product of material now lost, and constructed from two different initial tributary sources.

Potter clearly sets out the evidence that Wittgenstein dictated a series of remarks to a German stenographer, in German, probably from some Cambridge-era notebooks, in Birmingham on 7 October, 1913. The prepared typescript was then dispatched to Russell. Wittgenstein then spent 8 and 9 October 1913 closeted with Russell; on the first day managing to get very little on paper; on the second, talking to Russell about his ideas in the presence of Jourdain's secretary. By the time Wittgenstein arrived in Norway, Russell had in his possession two typescripts — one from the Birmingham dictation session, and one from the Cambridge sessions. What survives is a set of four manuscripts (MSS 1–4), in Russell's hand, which Russell described to Ottoline Morrell in February 1914 as the product of 'translating, copying, and classifying the notes of Wittgenstein's work, as I shall want them for lecturing at Harvard', as well as a typescript labelled 'Summary'. Potter's challenge is thus to establish what part of the surviving material can be traced to what source session — Birmingham or Cambridge. He concludes that MSS 1, 3, and 4 are Russell's translation into English of the material dictated in German by Wittgenstein in Birmingham on 7 October; and that MS 2 is Russell's recasting of the result of their face-to-face sessions on 8 and 9 October (though why Russell should have transcribed, by hand, a typescript of those sessions supplied by Jourdain's secretary is something of a mystery, as Potter notes). The 'Summary' (titled in Russell's hand, with corrections by Russell and Wittgenstein) is, Potter ventures, a result of what was produced in the presence of Jourdain's secretary on 9 October. If this is correct, then *Notes on Logic*, such as we have it, is a blend of the Birmingham source material and the Cambridge source material. MS 2 and the Summary represent Wittgenstein's attempts on 8 and 9 October to expound his ideas to Russell; MSS 1, 3, and 4 are Russell's translation into English of remarks

dictated directly by Wittgenstein in Birmingham on 7 October. Potter supplies the texts in an appendix; the former as *Cambridge Notes* and the latter as *Birmingham Notes,* along with a concordance to the Costello version, and to each other, to track the divergences.

There is some dispute over the surviving material. McGuinness has argued that MS 2 was the product of Russell writing at Wittgenstein's dictation (in English). Potter's rejoinder is that the archival record does not establish when Wittgenstein would have done such dictating. Russell noted in a letter to Ottoline Morrell that Wittgenstein did the writing on 8 October (slowly and painfully, producing about 600 words in 6 hours); and on 9 October, what was said was taken down in shorthand by Jourdain's secretary. Potter does concede, however, that it is possible that what we have as MS 2 is Russell's transcription of a document, also now lost, written by Wittgenstein himself on October 8. On that day, Wittgenstein may have arrived to talk to Russell without any of his notebooks (Potter speculates that there were at least three Cambridge-era notebooks, all lost). Even had he been armed with his notebooks, however, their working arrangement has been described (by Russell) as Wittgenstein talking, and writing down whatever Russell thought 'worth it'. Since Russell also describes the session as one where 'we both got utterly exhausted', we can imagine a series of interruptions as Russell queried Wittgenstein, trying to get clear enough on the points he then had Wittgenstein write down (or which Wittgenstein wrote down as he himself desired). In addition — but I think less convincingly — Potter argues that Wittgenstein and Russell were discussing in *English*, not German. Russell's German was excellent, but Wittgenstein's English was not as good in 1913 as it became later, so it seems rather more likely that their session(s) were conducted in both languages (Russell's own recollection, years later, was that they conversed in German). Perhaps the end result of the session(s) came out in a form which no (English) stenographer would be able to make sense of. Russell may have had to tidy up the material — we do not know how substantively — before sending it off to be typed; and the result could be what we have as MS 2. In sum, Potter's conclusion is that MSS 1, 3, and 4 are Russell's English translations of Wittgenstein's own notebook entries, directly dictated in German on 7 October; MS 2 is Russell's record of what he could get out of Wittgenstein (in English, or both in English and German), when they met on 8 October; and the Summary is the typed-out version of the shorthand notes taken down by Jourdain's secretary of the session of 9 October, between Russell and Wittgenstein — which may have included Wittgenstein dictating or reading out from his notebooks, in German, with one or both of them discussing and/or translating those remarks into English on the fly.

Once Russell had finished editing the material he had from his two days with Wittgenstein, he had a typescript made up, which also included material from the Birmingham dictation TS. Potter speculates that this TS — or an iteration of it — was the basis of the Costello version, which more often than

not uses passages from the Birmingham notes (MSS 1, 3, and 4) and looks like a cut-and-paste transposition of passages from the source material along with additional editing. What survives is a TS of material with the headings 'Summary' and 'MSS 1, 2, 3, and 4', but we do not know whether or not this is what Russell brought with him to Harvard (and which would have been the basis of the Costello version). Thus, as Potter argues, what we know as the Costello version of the *Notes* is indeed most likely Russell's construction — a substantive *rearrangement* of the material that survives in Russell's hand (or some version of that, now lost). Although the evidence is equivocal, there are differences between *Notes* as we have it and the Costello version, ranging from unimportant minor mistakes to howlers on the logical notation and more. Potter argues that the editing hand behind the Costello version is unlikely to be that of a student, since the textual differences are substantive and seemingly expert. Since we know that Russell wanted it to lecture from, it is plausible, Potter claims, that the Costello version of *Notes on Logic* is in effect a(nother) Russell version of Wittgenstein's thinking at a pivotal moment in his philosophical evolution — and a substantive reconstruction of what we have of it. Ultimately, then, if Potter's analysis of the archival record is correct, what is published as *Notes on Logic* in the appendix to the second edition (1979) of *Notebooks 1914–1916*, is indeed more directly attributable to Wittgenstein than was the Costello version published with the first edition, though Russell's input is not far-off. One fifth is partially or wholly the result of discussion between Wittgenstein and Russell on 9 October (in English; or both in English and German; including dictation); one fifth is Russell's attempt to make something of the (to Wittgenstein, agonizing) 8 October session (which may have included dictation or even an actual document by Wittgenstein, now lost); and three fifths comprise Russell's translation of Wittgenstein's German dictation from his own notebooks on 7 October in Birmingham.

If the mark of first-rate scholarship is that it raises even more questions than it answers, then Potter's stimulating book is first rate indeed, as it raises many further questions of profound and novel interest. We are left to ponder afresh on several key issues: on *Tractatus* and its inclusion of themes from Wittgenstein's Cambridge era; on Russell's impresario-like role in coaxing what he could out of an idiosyncratic and novice philosopher in a critical formative period; on the genesis of *Notes Dictated to Moore;* and on the complete story of the development of early analytic philosophy, to which this book is a estimable addition.

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