



On the origins of the contemporary notion of propositional content: anti-psychologism in nineteenth-century psychology and G.E. Moore's early theory of judgment

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ABSTRACT

I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper 'The nature of judgment,' comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century neo-Hegelianism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore's paper (conventionally thought to have introduced what is now known as analytic philosophy) are more likely to have had their source in the work of two of Moore's teachers, G. F. Stout and James Ward. What may be called an anti-psychologism about psychology characterizes the work of these and other psychologists of the period. I argue that the anti-psychologism that is the main aim of Moore's early theory of judgment is an adaptation of this notion, which is significantly dissimilar from the notion defended by Bradley, traditionally thought to have been a key influence on Moore.

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1. Introduction

The story of the rise of analytic philosophy in the early writings of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) has long emphasized the dominance of neo-Hegelian metaphysics in late nineteenth-century philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford.¹ The conventional account of the shift in philosophical perspective and practice in the late 1890s often takes the form of Russell's own early description of a 'rebellion',² initiated by Moore and eagerly embraced by Russell himself. Both are held to have rejected the Idealist metaphysics they had absorbed from their teachers at Cambridge, and introduced con-

cerns and methods that generally characterize analytic philosophy to this day.³ Later reconstructions of this period in philosophy have, in their turn, included detailed discussion of the considerable influence of Frege's work in mathematical and philosophical logic.

In this paper, I will defend the position that the traditional picture of the rise of analytic philosophy is incomplete and, to some degree, erroneous. While Russell's idealist apprenticeship has been thoroughly and definitively examined by Griffin, and by Hylton,⁴ there is no similarly detailed analysis of the development of G. E. Moore's views between 1894–1904.⁵ A careful look at both published and unpublished material will show, I believe, that it is more

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¹ Key figures include F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), and F. C. S. Schiller (1864–1937) at Oxford, and J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925) and Edward Caird (1835–1908) at Cambridge.

² See Russell (1938), p. viii; (1944), p. 12; (1959), pp. 11–12; (1975), p. 61.

³ For example, Ayer (1971), p. 141.

⁴ See Griffin (1991) and Hylton (1990).

⁵ Moore's papers are preserved in Cambridge University Library; his 1897 and 1898 dissertation drafts (with examiner's comments and archival notes) are preserved in Trinity College Library. Material in the Cambridge University Library is cited as 'Add. 8330' or 'Add. 8875,' following library classmark convention. I am grateful to Jonathan Smith, senior archivist at Trinity College Library, for permission to consult Moore's dissertations (on permanent loan to Trinity College), and to the Syndics of the University Library at the University of Cambridge for permission to consult the Moore papers held there.

likely that a significant influence on Moore's early writings, specifically his 1899 paper *The nature of judgment* ('NJ'),⁶ comes from the literature in empirical psychology, and is less likely to have been derived from the idealist metaphysics of F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), as is widely believed.⁷

An exhaustive reconstruction of this period in Moore's philosophical evolution and its consequences for the history of philosophy goes beyond the scope of this paper, but a sketch of the broader picture will help to focus my discussion here. A complete analysis would require at least: (1) a critical analysis of Moore's unpublished manuscripts, letters and notebooks, of which the most important are the 1897 and 1898 versions of his dissertation, titled 'The metaphysical basis of ethics'; (2) a comparative account of the early work produced by both Russell and Moore, including unpublished student essays, notebooks, and papers read at meetings of the Apostles Society, the Sunday Essay Society, and the Moral Sciences Club, as well as published material; (3) a defense of the claim that Moore's early writings develop views that emerge more fully formed in his 1903 *Principia ethica*; and (4) an examination of the evidence, published and unpublished, for the intellectual influences on Moore during the period 1894–1904.

The discussion in this paper falls under (4). We know that Russell was a significant influence on Moore practically from Moore's arrival at Trinity but my focus here will be to reconstruct influences that have received scant attention. I will specifically center on the debate in the growing literature in late nineteenth century empirical psychology on the nature of judgment and the content of thought, discussed, in particular, by G. F. Stout (1860–1944) and James Ward (1843–1925), both of whom were Moore's teachers and with whom he worked closely. Stout and Ward were thoroughly familiar with the work of, among others, the psychologists Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), Franz Brentano (1838–1917), and Brentano's student Kasimierz Twardowski (1866–1938).⁸ I believe that the evidence strongly suggests that a central thesis that characterizes the work of these figures—what we will call an anti-psychologism about the new science of psychology—is (1) among the key influences on Moore, (2) provides the context for his early work, and (3) helps to explain why its consequences for twentieth-century philosophy were so acute.⁹

The role of NJ in the history of philosophy at this period cannot be underestimated. By 1903 Russell had credited Moore with having put an end to the fortunes of Absolute Idealism with its appearance, and subsequent historical accounts of this period do not hesitate to describe the publication of NJ as a watershed moment.¹⁰ But the archival evidence, in my view, provides evidence that a more nuanced understanding is needed, not only of the main line of argument in NJ but also of its impact on subsequent developments in philosophy. I have indicated above what I believe are the historical influences of the views Moore develops there. But I will also argue that the origin of the contemporary notion of propositional content is to be found in the distinction that Moore draws in NJ between the act of thought and the objects of thought and, in particular, the terms in which he draws it. The publication of NJ

is indeed a genuinely significant moment in the history of analytic philosophy, I will show, in that it represents the definitive break between nineteenth-century metaphysics and mental science, and twentieth-century philosophy of mind.

2. Reconstructing the composition of 'The nature of judgment'

I will begin with Moore's published autobiography, which contains a clue to the influences that shaped his early views. Moore was elected to a six year Fellowship at Trinity in 1898 that came to an end in 1904. From 1904–1911 Moore did not have a permanent university position, but in 1911 he was offered a university lectureship in moral sciences at Cambridge. Moore explains that this lectureship was meant to provide lectures for the students who were preparing for the Part I moral sciences Tripos exams, and that he would be expected to lecture on either logic or psychology. Moore opted for psychology:

The chief books that were recommended for the subject—such books as Ward's article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Stout's *Manual and Analytic Psychology*, and James' *Principles of Psychology*—seemed to me largely to consist of what was strictly philosophy; I had read all these books with a good deal of attention, and a good many of the subjects discussed in them were subjects on which I had thought a great deal and thought as hard as I could. It seemed to me, therefore, that I was already fairly competent to deal with a good part of the subject I should reasonably expect to cover . . . (Schilpp, 1942, pp. 27–32)

Not one of Moore's published writings from the period 1904–1911¹¹ deal directly with the works of Ward, Stout, and James that he describes above (published, respectively, in 1886, 1899 and 1896, and 1890). Yet he tells us that he was familiar with this material, and had devoted hard and protracted thought to the issues raised there. I will make the case below that there is direct evidence that the line of argument in these works (even Stout, 1899) will have featured as an influence on Moore during 1897 and 1898 as he was writing his Fellowship dissertation, although it might possibly have been an element of his preparation for the Part II moral sciences Tripos throughout 1894–1896.

However there is indirect but suggestive evidence for this dating as well. Moore was given to making copiously detailed lists; and indeed ten such lists in Moore's hand survive, noting, for instance, 'People I See' (Add. 83301/1/2) and 'Play, exercise, and health' (Add. 83301/1/5).¹² There are, in addition, lists entitled 'Books and music' (Add. 8330 1/1/3) and 'Work' (Add. 8330 1/1/4) which date from 1901 and cover the period 1901–1902. The most comprehensive of these, however, is a 'Chronological table of my life,' which describes events from November 1873 to July 1901 (Add. 8330/1/1/1).

Two small notebooks detailing 'work' also survive. Each one contains lists, starting from both ends, titled in Moore's hand,

⁶ Originally read at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society and subsequently published in *Mind*, 1899.

⁷ Bell (1999) confirms my general view here concerning the role of nineteenth-century empirical psychology on the development of early analytic philosophy, but is unconvincing on the specifics of the influences on Moore's early views. Bell cites no evidence in support of his attribution of a wholesale unreconstructed Brentanianism to Moore, and does not appear to have consulted the archival material. Bell also appears to overlook other crucial evidence of the influences on Moore at this period.

⁸ See Brentano (1995) and Twardowski (1997).

⁹ A corollary effect of my argument, moreover, is that it puts pressure on part of Dummett's account of the origins of analytic philosophy. Contrary to his assertion (1993), p. 1, Russell and Moore did not spring from an entirely different philosophical milieu from the German and Austrian thinkers Dummett credits with originating analytic philosophy—and, in fact, were directly influenced by those very thinkers, as the evidence will show.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Ryle (1970), who describes NJ as 'the *De Interpretatione* of early twentieth-century Cambridge logic' (Ambrose & Lazerowitz, 1970, p. 90). But it must be said that in the main, there has been little reconstructive explanation as to exactly how or why. This is likely due in part to the fact that Moore refused to reprint his early papers and dismissed them as the regrettable products of a philosophically unsophisticated mind. Moore's early papers did not appear in a collection until 1986, nearly thirty years after Moore's death. In his autobiography, however, though Moore brushes 'Freedom' (1898) aside as 'absolutely worthless', and does not even mention 'In what sense, if any, do past and future time exist?' (1897), he is far more forgiving about NJ (Schilpp, 1942, p. 21).

¹¹ Published volumes of work produced by Moore at this period are Moore (1922, 1953, 1986, 1993).

¹² The existing lists seem to have been compiled from memory at about 1901–1902, continuing for several years.

respectively, 'Work 28 Sep 1909–2 May 1914'; 'Books and music 27 Sep 1909–2 May 1914' (Add. 83301/4/1); and 'Work 3 May 1914–23 Oct 1917'; 'Books 2 May 1914–Aug 1926' (Add. 8330 1/4/2). In addition, some loose pages record 'Books Sep 1926–Oct 1928' (Add. 8330 1/4/3). Moore also kept diaries, although it is not known when he began this practice; his most complete extant diaries are contained in three notebooks dating 1909–1916.

The surviving lists and diaries reveal that Moore noted, meticulously, what he was reading and thinking about, along with how many hours he spent working. I would argue that if he had been devoting attention and hard thought to the works of Ward, Stout, James and Brentano and the issues raised in their work, between 1898 and 1904, the tenure of his fellowship, or later, between 1904–1911, he could not have failed to note it, given the thorough record these documents provide. Moore in fact does note in a diary entry for 13 September 1911, that he is reading Stout's *Groundwork*.¹³ Shortly after, in an entry for 24 September–30 September 1911, Moore notes: 'No work: move to Cambridge'.

It does not seem possible that Moore will have been working on Stout's views and reading him for the first time, a mere month before beginning his psychology lectures at Cambridge in 1911. The archives also contain 152 books from Moore's personal collection; but Dorothy Moore sold many of Moore's books after his death, so those that survive do not offer a complete picture. But in his 1911 lecture on psychology (Add. 8875 13/2/1) Moore quotes from what he refers to as 'Ward (9th ed),' which, he writes, he 'has by me'.¹⁴ And I would argue that it is difficult to credit that Moore did not have his own copies of the books he lectured on, given his thoroughness in preparation.

Moore lectured in psychology from 1911–1925, giving up his lecturing on psychology when he succeeded Ward as Professor.¹⁵ All the lectures for the fourteen years that Moore lectured on psychology appear to be preserved, along with many undated fragments.¹⁶ The 1911–1912 lectures are titled in Moore's hand, and from his first lecture, we find Moore expertly discussing Stout's *Manual of psychology* (1899) and *Analytic psychology* (1896); as well as Ward's 1886 'Psychology', and William James' 1890 *Principles of psychology* (Add. 8875 13/2/1). In Lecture I, for instance, Moore discusses in detail the question as to whether what he calls 'psychical objects' have (non-psychical) objects, and goes on to discuss Stout's view of this question, in comparison to Ward's (Add. 8875 13/2/1), and in Lecture VII (Add. 8875 13/2/7) Moore goes on to discuss what he calls the 'General Analysis of Mind = Classification of Mental Phenomena', citing Ward, Stout, and Brentano on the question as to whether mental facts (all or some) consist of being related to some (extra-mental) object.

I argued above for dating Moore's familiarity with this literature from before 1898.¹⁷ These lectures—the earliest in Moore's career as lecturer at Cambridge in psychology—show that he is thoroughly well versed in the leading mental science literature of the time, particularly on the subject of mental states and their identity and individuation conditions. The core metaphysical position that Moore adopts in NJ, as I noted above, is characterized by a distinction between

the mind and the objects of thought, with an uncompromising realism about the latter. Moore's theory of judgment proposes that the object of a judgment is a proposition, a structured, and non-mental, entity. As I will suggest, it is in Moore's anti-psychologistic construal of the objects of judgment that we can see the inception of a contemporary understanding of the nature of propositional content, one that takes a thought (or other mental state) as contentful in that it bears a relation to a mind-and-language-independent entity.

No manuscript draft of NJ has been discovered to date, making a completely definitive conclusion about its genesis more difficult. The evidence suggests, however, that NJ cannot be understood in isolation from the larger context of Moore's views in the 1897 and 1898 drafts of his Fellowship dissertation.¹⁸ A detailed examination of the 1897 and 1898 manuscripts goes beyond the scope of this paper, but I will briefly discuss some of the most suggestive indicators to the composition as well as to the conceptual influences of Moore's views in NJ found there.¹⁹

We must first settle the question of the composition of NJ. In his autobiography, Moore claims that he excised material he added to the end of the 1897 draft and resubmitted in 1898 to compose NJ. But Moore misstates the genesis of the 1898 manuscript, as the discussion of reason and ideas that he describes is not, in fact, a concluding chapter to the draft manuscript of 1898 as preserved. The material added in 1898 is the second chapter of five, and the chapter is missing pages 3, 4, 5 and 7–24;²⁰ in addition, none of what there is of Chapter II in the surviving 1898 manuscript is in Moore's own hand. But there is some independent evidence that settles the question as to whether the missing pages from Chapter II of 1898 constitute the basis of what was published as NJ.²¹

Moore begins Chapter II of the 1898 dissertation by stating that the chapter will proceed to discuss the proper meaning of 'rational' in Ethics, and goes on to defend his use of the expression 'proposition' instead of 'judgment':

This word, it may be admitted, does naturally imply a mental formulation, if not an actual expression in words. Both these implications were meant to be entirely excluded, and the word was nevertheless used, because there seems no better term to express the meaning intended. 'Judgment', which is also sometimes used, seems even worse, since it not only denotes a mental event, and hence implies activity still more openly, but is also commonly used as the name of a mental faculty. Our object will be now to show that, whatever name be given to it, that which we call a proposition is something independent of consciousness, and of some fundamental importance to philosophy. (Moore, 1898, Ch. II, p. 2)

Page two of 1898, Ch. II is missing about six lines at the bottom, but there is a six line fragment interleaved in the manuscript that fits exactly onto the bottom of page two. The fragment contains lines identical to those that form the opening of NJ (Moore, 1899, p. 176, shown in italics):

¹³ Add. 8330 1/3/2–4; this is the first mention of Stout in the material cited here.

¹⁴ Moore here refers to Ward (1886).

¹⁵ From 1925 until his retirement in 1939, Moore lectured on metaphysics. Moore did not lecture on ethics at Cambridge.

¹⁶ All of Moore's metaphysics lectures appear to be preserved as well. These lectures, along with the psychology lecture drafts and other material, were in the possession of Moore's student Casimir Lewy. When Lewy died in 1991, the material was added to the Moore papers archive.

¹⁷ In the case of Stout's *Manual*, as with his *Analytic psychology*, Stout published material first as articles (many in *Mind*). There is thus no reason to doubt that Stout's views will have been accessible to Moore prior to Stout's publishing them in book form.

¹⁸ This makes it difficult to discuss and evaluate the intricate arguments in NJ independently of an analysis of the dissertations. Here I confine myself to the main aim of NJ, and the evidence for it.

¹⁹ See also Baldwin (1990), Griffin (1991), and Hylton (1990) for their discussions of NJ.

²⁰ I retain Moore's own (erratic) recto page numbers.

²¹ The 1898 manuscript is unlikely, given its state, to be anything but a draft of what was sent to a typist for ultimate submission to the examiners. The university did not require Prize Fellowship dissertations to be deposited with the library until 1931, and no official copy of either 1897 or 1898 appears to survive. The preserved 1898 appears to be a mix of the typescript of parts of 1897, pages that are wholly in Moore's hand, pages of cut and pasted typescript conjoined with pages in Moore's hand; and pages not in Moore's hand. A comparison shows that the typescript pages conform to a number of the handwritten extant pages of 1897.

'Truth and falsehood,' says Mr. Bradley (*Logic*, p. 2), 'depend on the relation of our ideas to reality.' And he immediately goes on to explain that, in this statement, 'ideas' must not be understood to mean mere 'states of my mind'. The ideas, he says, on the relation of which to reality truth depends, are mere ideas, signs of an existence other than ourselves: and this aspect of them must not be confused with either their existence in my mind or with their particular character as so existent, which may be called their content. (Moore, 1898, Ch. II)

Pages three, four, and five of Chapter II are missing, and the next preserved page is numbered '6'. Some of this page turns up in the published NJ at the bottom of page 177, and through 178. There is a half-page fragment inserted in the manuscript after page 6 with 18 lines of text crossed through, which turns up in NJ at page 189. 1898 takes up again at page 25, some of which turns up at 190–191 of NJ. So there is textual evidence to show that the arguments in NJ formed part of this chapter of the dissertation.

A letter²² to Moore from his friend Theodore Llewellyn-Davies, in addition, seems to confirm the content of the missing pages:

My dear GE

I have not read all your dissertation, but read and reread that part of the chapter on Reason which deals with Concepts and Properties generally. I accept a great deal of it—... But here are criticisms—not final, perhaps mainly verbal—to help me to understand or you to re-state!

I. What is a Concept?

It is a possible object of thought—but 'that is no definition'. What then is the definition? You say at the start that Concept=Bradley's 'Universal Meaning'. But have you any right to this? Surely 'meaning' implies a mental operation, and is that which is signified or symbolized by an existent idea. Such an attempt 'to explain the concept in terms of some existent fact' is according to you vicious. Yet apart from this explanation you tell us nothing about the concept, except that it is immutable.

II. You say that a concept is not any part of an existent: yet all existents are composed of concepts. If 'compose' denotes the relation of part to whole, there is a contradiction here. If the contradiction is verbal only, kindly re-state avoiding it.

What is a (mental) idea? Have I an idea of You? If so, are the concepts of which that idea is composed at all the same as the concepts composing You (the true existential proposition You) [sic]

What is a judgment? I presume, from your point of view, it is the occurrence of a unique relation between a thinker (e.g. Me) and a proposition or complex concept. But is it not also a mental operation in which my ideas come in? If so, are the concepts which form the proposition at all the same as the concepts which compose the ideas? And does the truth or falsehood of the judgment at all depend on such an identity? (Add. 8330 8D/8/2)

None of the discussion about concepts and propositions that Davies refers to here survives in the 1898 manuscript, but it is one of the central themes of NJ. So we can now be confident, I think, in the absence of any manuscript or typescript copy of NJ, that the missing pages of 1898 came together to form a draft of that paper.²³

The conceptual influences on Moore at this period, however, are more contentious, in my view. It is by and large accepted that Moore's early substantial philosophical influence was Bradley's metaphysics.²⁴ Certainly Moore gives fulsome acknowledgment in his autobiography to J. M. E. McTaggart, who in 1896 was a young Fellow of Trinity, and who became a leading neo-Hegelian at Cambridge. McTaggart was a great admirer of Bradley and was the principal source of Moore's initial introduction to Bradley's views, which will have included lectures, tutorials, and discussions at meetings of the Apostles Society. More difficult to square with my position here, in addition, is Moore's acknowledgment to Bradley and Bradley's metaphysical views in the preface of his 1897 dissertation. Nevertheless, I believe there is essential evidence that supports the view that the principal sources of the main aim of Moore's position in NJ are not, or not principally, due to Bradley.

3. The conceptual influences of 'The nature of judgment'

Moore's key aim in NJ is to thwart any incipient mentalism or psychologism from encroaching on an account of judgment. But the discussion in 'The nature of judgment' is difficult and intricate, and a comprehensive analysis of its internal coherence must be deferred here.²⁵ The main thesis, however, is very clear, and my narrow focus here is to assess the evidence that supports a conceptual link between Moore's absorption of the lines of argument in the empirical psychology of his day and his main aim in NJ. Moore's anti-psychologism about judgment is carried through a series of complex arguments regarding the nature of concepts and Kant on the a priori, and re-emerges with gusto at the conclusion of the paper. Moore begins NJ by quoting Bradley on the nature of judgment, summarizing Bradley's own discussion, and then proceeds to an examination of what Bradley refers to as 'ideas'. Moore takes Bradley to task for eliding the difference between an idea as a mental fact and an idea as that which it signifies in judgment or predication (1899, p. 176), but commends him for having *prima facie* recognized, like Kant, that judgment will require components that can play the role of 'universal meaning' or a '*conceptus communis*'. Moore introduces the term 'concept' to replace Bradley's 'universal meaning', claiming that the expression 'idea', carries too much mentalistic stigma, and goes on to draw a parallel between Bradley's view of judgment and that of Kant's, both of which he rejects. Both Bradley and Kant, Moore claims, give what is in effect a too psychologistic account of judgment, by characterizing it as a mental act, the nature of which they fail to disambiguate at crucial junctures.

Having argued that Bradley's theory fails to avoid the pitfall of conflating a symbol with what it stands for, and that Bradley's account of the nature of judgment depends on an account of the nature of 'ideas' that is ultimately psychological, and not logical, Moore asserts that the problem is one that is common to any reductive theory of judgment or judgment-constituents. The correct view, according to Moore, is that neither a judgment nor its constituents are mental, nor reducible to any mental fact, and introduces 'proposition' and 'concept,' respectively, as new and better terms of art (*ibid.*, pp. 178–79). For Moore, a proposition is a complex, whose constituents are concepts. The proposition 'This rose is red' is a connection between concepts. Concepts are not mental—they are what they are independent of thought or thinkers. They are immutable

²² Moore dates the letter in his own hand '98 Since' Davies tells Moore his brother Crompton is proposing to 'bring a German to your lecture next Thursday', and tells him that he will be going to 'Verralls for Sunday the 4th. Shall I see you before?', I date this letter as most likely end of November 1898 (4 December 1898 fell on a Sunday). Moore gave a series of lectures on ethics at the short-lived London School of Ethics in 1898–1899. See Moore (1991).

²³ Both Chapter I and Chapter II of the 1898 manuscript are missing pages. Chapter I is missing pp. 4–11 and Chapter II is missing pp. 3, 4, 5 and 7–22, all handwritten. There are, in total, twenty-eight handwritten pages missing from Chapters I and II of 1898; as published, NJ is eighteen printed pages.

²⁴ See, for instance, Baldwin (1990), Griffin (1991), and Hylton (1990).

²⁵ Specifically, Moore's view that existence is a concept (1899), p. 181, and his complex discussion on Kant's notion of the contrast between a priori and the empirical judgments, which I would argue is siphoned wholly from his criticisms of Kant in the 1897 and 1898 dissertations.

and have no causal properties (ibid., p. 179). The difference between propositions and concepts, such that propositions can have truth conditions, cannot be a relation to a particular combination of 'existents'. What makes a proposition true is that there is a relation between its constituent concepts, and this relation can be 'immediately recognized', but cannot be further defined (ibid., p. 180). In Moore's view, the truth or falsity of any proposition depends on no other. Further, the necessity that we attribute to judgments—even judgments about experience—is not derivable from any act of mind or mental entity (like Kant's 'unity of apperception' or Bradley's Real). Nothing is more substantive or ultimate than a concept:

From our description of a judgment, there must, then, disappear all reference either to our mind or to the world. Neither of these can furnish 'ground' for anything, save in so far as they are complex judgments. The nature of judgment is more ultimate than either, and less ultimate only than the nature of its constituents—the nature of the concept or logical idea. (Ibid., p. 193)

It seems clear that the main difficulty in making sense of NJ almost certainly lies in the contingency of its publication as an autonomous paper, excised from the body of the 1898 dissertation. The 1898 draft is a complex discussion by Moore on the role of the notions of 'reason' and 'freedom' in Kant, and Moore's critical approach to the role of these notions in Kant turns on his analysis of mental states like knowledge and judgment. These latter are employed by Moore to defend a theory of judgment that takes the objects of judgment to be entirely mind-independent, which Moore ultimately takes to be a necessary condition on any theory of ethics, and, in particular, ethical judgment—the title of the dissertation is, in point of fact, 'The metaphysical basis of ethics'. I will conclude here by briefly sketching the main line of argument of the 1897 and 1898 manuscripts, to show that the wider context supports the main aim in NJ, as above. I believe that we can see where Moore's position takes a decisive turn toward the contemporary in his criticism of Kant on the nature of knowledge, which emerges in distilled form in NJ. It is in these discussions, I would argue, that Moore most clearly demonstrates an approach to the metaphysics of mind from a naturalistic perspective, one that can be traced to the conception of mind and the nature of knowledge he absorbed from the standpoint of empirical psychology.²⁶

4. The context of 'The nature of judgment': Moore's fellowship dissertation draft manuscripts of 1897 and 1898

Moore's main criticism of Kant does not change from the 1897 manuscript to the 1898 manuscript—but his acknowledgment to Bradley does:

The greater part of the dissertation, which I submitted for examination last year, has been included in the present work. Some omissions, involving an important change of view, have been made ... For my own metaphysical views I am no doubt chiefly indebted to Bradley. But I have come to disagree with him on so many points, and those points of importance, that I doubt if I can name any special obligations ...

Both the 1897 and 1898 versions of Moore's dissertation are, in the main, a criticism of key features of Kant's ethics: Moore takes Kant to have failed to give a coherent defense of Practical Reason, as distinct from Pure Reason, because, Moore argues, Kant cannot in effect give a solid defense of the autonomy from the mental of the objects of Pure Reason. This is in part because:

Kant does not seem to have recognized that his statement that what we know is merely given or appearance is itself synthetic and therefore required justification... these defects may be traced from the fundamental form in which Kant puts the problem of the Critique. He does not sufficiently distinguish it from Locke's psychological problem. When he sets out to examine the limits of our Reason, he presupposes that the distinction between subject and object is fundamental for epistemology, that we have knowing faculties (Vermogen) which we can examine by themselves, and that on the other hand there is also a world, which is what it is, whether we know it or not. The investigation of knowledge, upon such a presupposition of its opposition to reality, can obviously lead to nothing but its confinement to Appearance. When our knowledge is from the beginning [taken] as belonging to us as opposed to the world, it can never be brought into relation with the world... indeed, it seems absurd, on reflection, to call that knowledge which is merely of phenomena, since knowledge is not knowledge unless it is true and so in some way must be information concerning how things really are ... (Moore, 1897, Ch. I, pp. 11–13)

Moore argues that Kant's ethics is modeled on his epistemology, and the errors in his account of knowledge—particularly those that commit him, intentionally or not, to a form of psychologism—infect his account of ethics.²⁷ As Moore reads him, Kant's view is that our knowledge is confined to appearance, which is (questionably) linked to the *Ding an Sich* by way of the assumption Kant makes that what is 'given' to experience must have *been* given by something that is supersensible, and a further assumption about the *nature* of the relation between giver and given. The attempt to give an account of the Will modeled on that of reason has Kant defending a distinction between Practical Reason and Pure Reason. But, as Moore sees it, Kant's conception of Practical Reason and his concomitant account of freedom is confused. The objects of Reason are those of mere appearance, and as such, cannot play the normative role required of objects of Will. Kant's notion of Practical Reason, according to Moore, ends up as a free or uncaused cause, and 'embraces accordingly not only all the confusions to be found in his conceptions of Reason in general but also new ones peculiar to itself' (Moore, 1898, Ch. I, p. 42).

The key defect in Kant's conception of reason, Moore argues, is that reason is construed both as if it were the source of *a priori* propositions and also as if it explains their validity; construed as if it is both their cause and their justification. Only a proposition, however, can be valid, as Moore argues (particularly in Chapter II of 1898); and validity is a logical relation, not a causal relation (which can only occur between substances). Practical Reason, thus:

combines the following discordant functions: (1) some necessary *a priori* propositions about what is good is necessary as a fundamental principle of Ethics. Practical Reason, according to Kant, is what gives this. It must, then, be a source of a proposition and at the same time (2) the condition of its validity. (3) it not only thus furnishes a reason, why a thing should be done, but is also itself the reason, or cause, why a thing is done. (4) Being necessary [obscured] cause not only of a principle, but also of action in accordance with a principle, it is also in its widest sense cause of action contrary to such a principle—Against this monstrous conception we have to urge (1) that there is no reason for ascribing the fundamental principles of Ethics, to any entity whatever. (Ibid., pp. 43–44)

²⁶ Thus we could say that Moore's non-naturalism about ethics is a (perhaps ironic) consequence of his naturalism about the objects of thought and judgment.

²⁷ Griffin (1991, p. 132), claims that Russell's own psychologistic interpretation of Kant was probably influenced in some degree by Ward, but had its major source in Vaihinger (1881). Moore himself cites Vaihinger as a principal source in the preface to 1897 his dissertation. Ward published a study of Kant in 1922.

The crucial question, Moore claims:

appears to be this. Why is our knowledge to be condemned as merely knowledge of Appearance? Why are we to be merely Transcendental Idealists and merely Empirical Realists? ... by this too psychological statement of the nature of knowledge, Kant did in reality lay himself open to Berkeleian Idealism, which it so indignantly repudiates by asserting the existence of the Ding an Sich. For he has no answer to the question: How do we *know* that these conditions imposed by our knowing faculty are universal? (Moore, 1897, Ch. I, p. 9)

The implicit question Moore seems to be asking here—‘Why can’t we be Transcendental Realists?’—is something the answer to which I would argue characterizes his criticism of Kant’s conception of ethics,²⁸ and helps to demonstrate that he is taking the psychologism he attributes to Kant as undermining not only Kant’s epistemology but, more gravely, his ethics. Moore will argue throughout the 1897 and 1898 drafts that the only metaphysical basis for knowledge—and, *a fortiori*, ethics—is a mind-independent conception of the objects of judgment. Idealism (neither Kant’s nor Bradley’s) will not do.

A number of passages throughout both the 1897 and 1898 dissertations show Moore continually emphasizing a distinction between truth and belief—one that we take for granted today, but which apparently perplexed some of his examiners, drawing hostile fire from Bosanquet:

the intellectual motive of the Dissertation, as I read it, is to dissociate Truth from the nature of Knowledge, and Good from the nature of the Will, so as to free Metaphysic from all risk of confusion with Psychology ... I confess that I feel a difficulty in regarding it as serious. (Cambridge, Trinity College, Add. Ms. a. 247 (4), pp. 1–7)

Bosanquet, in spite of his criticism, betrays that he has fully appreciated the centrality of this distinction in the anti-psychologism that Moore is urging against Kant. Over and over, Moore underscores the importance of distinguishing belief from knowledge, and his formulation of the distinction is remarkably contemporary:²⁹ knowledge is a composite state, on the one hand psychical and involving a distinction between subject and object, and on the other, involving the nature of the object, characterized as a mind-independent entity, a proposition.

In the introduction to the 1897 dissertation Moore gives an account of the difference between what he calls Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, with a view to defending Ethics as a science, and not as, in classical philosophy, an Art:

But though Art, as the actual doing of things in which sense alone the moulding of things can be its direct aim, may really be treated as so coordinate with knowing—the distinction being that between volition and cognition in psychology; when Art is treated as a ‘scientific discipline’ its direct object becomes ‘knowing’ just as much as that of science. The object of Ethics, ‘what ought to be’, is certainly different from that of any science, but in as much as the direct aim of Ethics is to know this and not to do it, it becomes pure theory and is subordinate to the general conditions of knowledge.

The non-naturalism that is a well known characteristic of Moore’s later ethical views is evident in nascent form here—but there is

something else evident as well. Moore confidently formulates his view in the language of empirical psychology (note for instance the distinction between ‘volition and cognition’); and this language appears throughout the manuscripts. That Moore’s critical assessment of Kant is informed by the psychology literature of the day cannot be better illustrated, I think, than in this passage:

there is, in short, no reason for supposing that such a science as has been called ‘Transcendental Psychology’ in distinction from empirical psychology does exist; or for regarding ‘Reason’ as other than an object of empirical psychology. It is attempted to base the distinction by asserting that Transcendental Reason is a condition for the possibility of knowledge ... by ‘knowledge’ what is meant? If ‘truth’ then it is difficult to see that there can be any other true proposition than some other true proposition. If the mere process of cognition, then does not empirical psychology investigate the conditions for the possibility of this? A similar ambiguity is involved in the word ‘condition’. In what sense a ‘condition’? If an existent be meant ... then condition is equivalent to ‘cause’, and both reason and knowledge must be conceived under the category of substance, as in empirical psychology. But if a logical condition be meant, then it must be some true proposition from the truth of which another proposition can be inferred. (Moore, 1898, Ch. I, pp. 36–37)

This examination of some of the archival evidence shows, I believe, that there is some intriguing evidence for the supposition that Moore’s views at this period were influenced by views in the developing discipline of empirical psychology. There is in fact some direct evidence of Moore’s exposure, as we will see below. I will thus conclude here by suggesting that if all this is right, it is possible that a misunderstanding about Moore’s specific employment of an anti-psychologistic act/object distinction in NJ has obscured some salient facts about the influences on his early work.

As I remarked above, it is traditionally supposed that Moore adopts the distinction directly from Bradley, whose own position on the nature of judgment turned partly on an attack on the classical empiricists’ notion of ‘idea’ as too psychologistic (as Moore notes in the first few pages of NJ). But this criticism of the classical empiricists was not unique to Bradley.³⁰ James Ward, for instance took the very same critical approach in his work, and his 1886 was considered for decades the *locus classicus* of criticism of the associationist view bequeathed by classical empiricism to the new discipline of psychology. This issue turns, I would argue, on what ‘psychologism’ or ‘anti-psychologism’ means in the literature of this period. This needs more attention than I can give it here, but what we can say is that for Bradley, anti-psychologism about the contents of mind is employed in defense of an Absolute or monist Idealist metaphysics, which specifically opposed an individual or subjective phenomenalism.³¹ But for the early psychologists, anti-psychologism meant something else entirely. The nascent discipline of psychology construed its study of the mind and of the mind’s relation to reality as legitimately scientific. Phenomenal consciousness was itself a legitimate area of study, but there was no question that consciousness states had non-mentalistically construed *objects*, of which a proper scientific analysis could be given.³² I think the evidence discussed here supports the contention that Moore’s formulation of an act/object distinction for judgment and its components bears only a superficial similarity to Bradley’s, and is far more consistent

²⁸ ‘Transcendental Realism’ might even be said characterize Moore’s own conception of ethics in PE.

²⁹ A sampling of explicit passages, some of which also turn up in Moore 1898, can be found at MSS. 1897/I/13; 1897/I/22; 1897/I/22v; and 1898/I/22.

³⁰ See, for instance, Mace (1954).

³¹ Consider, in this context, that Bradley and Ward differed quite pointedly on their conception of a self as distinct from its objects, Bradley denying a relation between an individual self and its objects (denying relations altogether), and Ward defending it (so much so that an incensed Bradley died estranged from Ward). See Griffin (1991), p. 131.

³² See, for instance, Hodgson (1876, p. 228), who takes it that the difference between psychology and philosophy is that the psychologist is ‘guided by facts to the objective aspect of states of consciousness’.

with the psychologist's understanding and formulation of anti-psychologism.³³

The middle to late nineteenth century saw the steady development of a highly professional debate on the nature of psychology, including the distinguishing and justification of the psychologist's specifically scientific interest in mind from that of the metaphysician's. Rival conceptions of psychology (experimental vs. descriptive) developed rapidly through the work of Wundt and Brentano.³⁴ Articles, reviews, critical commentaries and books of the period further include discussion, formulation, and criticism of the entities squarely in the purview of psychology: the nature of mental states or acts. The attempt to wrest psychology away from metaphysics—particularly a neo-Hegelian metaphysics—was the attempt to establish a science of mind that neither collapsed into philosophy (metaphysics or epistemology) nor collapsed into physicalism (leaving psychology no purchase within the empirical sciences).³⁵ Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the properties of mental states was a lively topic of discussion in the literature, a discussion characterized by the kinds of issues that persist in philosophy of mind today: the nature of representation; the kinds of mental states that are representational; the tenability of claims to genuine knowledge of the extra-mental; the nature of the extra-mental as distinct from its representation in the mind; the connection between a presentation and what is presented; the nature of judgment, thought, and its components, and so on. I turn below to the direct archival evidence to support the view that these discussions were key elements of the views to which Moore as a student was introduced, and which form the conceptual precursors for his position as we see it in NJ.³⁶

5. Moore's undergraduate notebook: Stout's lectures in the history of philosophy

Substantiating this is partly assisted by the fact that some of Moore's undergraduate work survives, among which is a notebook of notes Moore took at lectures of Stout's, and a notebook that records notes Moore took at the lectures that McTaggart gave on Lotze in 1898, along with essays written for Ward.³⁷ In a letter of 4 February 1895, Moore writes to his parents:

Dr Ward thought my work in moral science last term had not been sufficiently looked after; so this term he has set me Lotze's Metaphysic to read (which I do aloud with Sanger), and I give him a paper of points, which I find difficult, every week, which he looks over and discusses with me at his house on Saturday afternoons.

On 23 April 1895, Moore writes to his parents: 'I have seen Dr. Ward, who will continue to look over my abstracts of Lotze; and I have the same lectures on History of Philosophy with Dr. Stout' (Add. 8330 2/1/40–58). Moore's History of Philosophy notebook (Add. 8875 10/1/1), in addition, contains the most direct evidence

of the influence that Stout had on his philosophical development, particularly in Stout's lectures on Kant.³⁸ The notebook is inscribed, in Moore's hand, 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Mr. Stout of St. John's, October, 1894'. The course of lectures covered Descartes, Bacon, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Leibniz; in a section Moore titles 'English line', Stout lectured on Locke, 'Berkeleyan idealism', and then Hume. The rest of the notebook's recto pages are blank, and Moore begins his notes on Kant by turning the notebook over and using the verso pages for the lecture entitled 'History of Philosophy preceding Kant as it appeared to Kant'.

Moore's notes are meticulous, and throughout these there appear to be formulations and analyses of Kant's position, by way of Stout, that emerge in Moore's 1897 and 1898 dissertations and published papers. Moore's notes record Stout as claiming that 'Kant seems to confuse logical a priori with psychological subjective [sic]', but that 'Validity of a priori knowledge may be established, without handling question of its subjectivity'. A few lines later, in his notes on Kant's Analytic, Moore writes that '... A[nalytic] asks what is the nature of object as such=what is nature of concept as such=what is nature of judgment as such?'

The psychologism with which Kant is indicted by Moore might also have originated in his absorption of Stout's view:

space and time not being things in themselves, and not being particular sensations, they must be psychological forms. Appearance implies for Kant something which appears ... Thus K thinks we cannot know the thing in itself, and yet can know nothing but the thing-in-itself—phenomenally. The noumen[.] is the phenomenon; the trans. Object is the thing in itself, which cannot be properly known but is barely thought of Nowhere ... complete relativity of space-relations (as urged by Lotze) is mentioned by K[ant] as an argument for subjectivity of space and time. So Bradley. (Add. 8875 10/1)

Moore's notebook next records Stout's lectures on Fichte, and a few remarks on Schelling, going on to six pages on Herbart.³⁹ Stout's introductory lecture on Herbart also includes what might easily pass for a summary of Moore's later view of Kant's ethics: 'Kant was wrong in making transcendental freedom of will basis of morality ... such a timeless self-determination is utterly useless for ethics.'

Stout also lectured extensively on Lotze: Moore's notebook devotes 11 pages, recto and verso, to notes on Lotze.⁴⁰ Moore notes Stout's claims that

So far since Kant we have had phils.[sic] who having seized some central principle have developed into a system to cover all reality [sic]. On the other hand K[ant]'s method is of enquiry and analyzing presuppositions of human knowledge. K too was educated in science and philosophy. Lotze refuses to consider problems of philosophy as conceived by idealists. He is not at the center of universe; he can only feel his way towards truth. (Ibid.)

³³ Note that this interpretation might explain why Bradley appears to believe that his own view is not that under fire in NJ. See Bradley to Moore (10 October 1899), Add. 8330 8B/21/1.

³⁴ Critical discussions of both Wundt's and Brentano's contrasting approaches in psychology were featured in the first issue of *Mind*, founded in 1872 as the first English language journal devoted to psychology and philosophy. *Mind* is an unparalleled record of the development of both disciplines at this period.

³⁵ See, for instance, Sully (1876, 1878a, 1878b), Ward (1876), and Hodgson (1885).

³⁶ Griffin (1991), p. 40, gives the most comprehensive account of Russell's undergraduate immersion in the work of these figures, thankfully noting that Russell may have helped to encourage a misinterpretation of the tenor of his early influences by referring, in reminiscences, to Stout as an Idealist (a characterization Russell inferred, it seems, from Stout's professed admiration of Bradley) and to Ward as a Kantian. There is, in fact, little evidence for either of these characterizations; with interesting consequences, in my view, for the interpretation of Moore's early writings.

³⁷ Add. 8875 10/1; 10/2; 10/3.

³⁸ Stout was not a member of the Apostles' Society, but both Stout and Moore regularly attended meetings of the Moral Sciences Club, and we have it from Moore himself that Stout encouraged him—sometimes as the only student present—to participate in every discussion, supporting him when he spoke up (Moore, letter to parents, 18 February 1896; Add. 8330 2/1/59–66).

³⁹ Stout himself was responsible for bringing detailed analyses and criticisms of J. F. Herbart's (1776–1841) views to late nineteenth-century British philosophy, publishing extensively on the Herbartian psychology, and acknowledging the influence of Herbart in the preface to his 1896. The transition to psychology as an empirical science is widely traced to the work of Herbart and Lotze.

⁴⁰ Passmore (1966), p. 21, claims of Lotze that 'Few philosophers have been so pillaged'—that is, rarely credited in the works of others.

Stout covers, in detail, the analysis of thought in Lotze's *Logik*. Stout includes a discussion of the distinction between impression and idea, and Moore notes that 'when an impression becomes an idea, it is not the idea of the impression ... [Lotze] places doctrine of concept before that of judgment: because we must shape ideas before we can combine them in judgment'. Lotze's *Logik* was the source of his concept of 'validity', an early formulation of a non-mental element in thought that was later taken up by thinkers as philosophically divided as Frege and Bradley. Moore notes that for Lotze,

every content of thought, has by the nature of thought, this abiding self-identity ... not particular existence, nor merely psychical existence, but only validity ... this ... shewed how thought depends on matter thought of, it is not shewn that the content of thought is not the matter thought of, but only dependent on it. It is the problem of metaphysics to explain how this is possible. (Ibid.)

Moore's notes next record Stout's lectures on Lotze's *Metaphysics*, in which Lotze argues that Kant's attempt to postulate the conditions for the 'real', which makes knowledge possible, was not as satisfactory as that of Herbart. The most significant element of Lotze's metaphysics with respect to the picture of Moore's influences that we are reconstructing here is that he is no monist, preferring instead to defend a view that the connection between the 'objective world' and the 'world of mind' is a *relation*, in sharp contrast to Bradley's Absolutist metaphysics. Moore notes, 'For [Lotze] ... the system of phenomenal relations corresponds to a system of real relations. He is thus a realist, as opposed to the special Idealism, which holds that the phenomenon of the material world is directly produced in us by the Universal Mind'. And, 'In our apprehension of Time there is much obviously subjective ... our notion of time ... as pre-conditioning events is an inevitable trick of the imagination.' According to Stout, Lotze at first advocated the subjectivity of time, but did eventually give it up, 'Hence he is aware of all that ingenuity could do to maintain the opposite view'; ultimately, Moore notes, Lotze 'very properly destroyed the Hegelianism of his time'. It is an appealing historical parallel that the very same, not too long after this, was said of Moore.

6. Late nineteenth-century empirical psychology at Cambridge: Stout and Ward

James Ward and G. F. Stout were, at Cambridge in the late nineteenth century, highly influential in the development of British psychology. The evolution of psychology into an experimental and laboratory science, and the rise of psychoanalysis after the turn of the century, however, has all but erased traces of the influential role they played. Stout and Ward were principally responsible for bringing detailed accounts of the work of, among others, Herbart, Brentano, and Lotze to British philosophy and psychology, and their own work was central in the field. As noted above, Ward's 1886 article 'Psychology' was long considered the definitive criticism of associationism, and his (1893) was a graceful précis—and withering attack—on what he calls the 'modern' (genetic) psychology of the time. Both Stout's 1896 and his 1899 were standard works for decades; and, as we noted above, they featured in Moore's psychology lectures for years.

It is true that Ward was no avowed realist (preferring to leave metaphysics to one side), but his Idealism, such as it was, was far less conspicuous than Bradley's and in fact closer to Lotze's, with whom Ward had studied at Göttingen and who was a great influence on his own work. What we do see in Ward, however, are a number of perfectly clear statements as to the nature of psy-

chology which emphasize that while the province of the psychologist concerns the mental states of an individual,

nor are we bound, because we take the individualistic standpoint as psychologists, to accept the philosophical conclusions that have been reached from it ... a psychologist *may* be an idealist in Berkeley's sense, or in Fichte's, but he need not. He is just as free, if he see reason, to call himself ... a natural realist. (Ward, 1886, p. 164)

In this, of course, Ward means to deploy a criticism of the classical empiricists on the nature of psychology as epistemology. Given their starting principles, he claims, the classical empiricists were doomed to fail to establish that we can have genuine knowledge of a world independent of our ideas; but as to the ideas themselves, the classical empiricist 'is able to give a very good account' (ibid., p. 162). In short, the error that the empiricists made in by equating epistemology and psychology might have wrecked their epistemology but did not necessarily harm their psychology.⁴¹

Stout himself was a prolific writer, whose familiarity with the work of Continental and American psychologists not only was integrated into his own work, but incorporated into British intellectual life through his editorship of the journal *Mind*.⁴² Stout's major work, the two volume *Analytic psychology* (1896), is principally a defense of a version of act-psychology and a discussion of the nature of what he calls 'attitudes of consciousness'. Stout is interested in preserving in an account of 'psychical states', and wishes to resist a reduction of the psychical to the physical, while nevertheless avoiding the fallacy of confusing ideas with the things of which they are ideas. By the same token Stout wishes to resist also the collapse of the thing of which a psychical state is an idea to mere idea. According to a review by Angell (1897, pp. 532–537), Stout aligns himself against the purely 'physiological psychology' of the day, and undertakes to provide an 'analytic investigation of the fully developed mind ... following the lead of Brentano'. Although Stout does not agree entirely with Brentano on the classification of mental states, what we see here is that 'his principle of division [is] the mode in which consciousness refers to its object ... what we obtain by our analysis cannot be considered as identical with the presentation analyzed, but simply as an adequate symbol of this'. Stout's (1896, Vol. 2), which begins with a chapter (which Angell calls 'exceedingly able and luminous') on what he calls Noetic Synthesis, is an attack on an associationist account of judgment and its constituents, concepts.

A similar line of argument had emerged earlier in Stout's exhaustive discussion of Herbart's psychology. Stout tells us (1888a) that Herbart's two major works of psychology set out both a psychological theory on the basis of abstract principles and a description and analysis of the 'concrete phenomena of mind (22)'. Consider Stout's summary of Herbart's account of the process of abstracting a presented content from the causal conditions under which a presentation appears:

Logic treats not of the process of thinking, but of relations in the object thought of. The logical concept is the presented content considered apart from the psychological conditions and circumstances of its presentations at this or that time to this or that individual mind. Concepts in this sense, as the common property of all men and all times, are in no way psychological facts ... (Stout, 1888b, p. 477)

This account seems to interestingly anticipate both Frege's notion of sense as well as the notion of 'concept' in Moore's NJ as a non-psychological entity. One of Herbart's lasting legacies is his conception

⁴¹ Moore, as we saw above, applies just this point in his criticism of Kant.

⁴² Stout was editor of *Mind* between 1892 and 1920.

of the modes of consciousness as thinking, feeling, and willing. What is given in consciousness—a presentation—is the possible object of one of three attitudes. Contemporary philosophers of mind will recognize here an early formulation of certain states of mind as attitudes, although it is not until Moore's NJ that we get the view that the object of an attitude takes the form of a (mind-independent) proposition.

Thus both Ward and Stout shared the view that psychology as a discipline that concerned itself with the 'inner' or 'mental', but from which no particular metaphysics—let alone a form of idealism—need follow.⁴³ I have been arguing that the significance of this new approach for a reconstruction and understanding of Moore's early influences cannot be understated. The evidence I have examined above seems to show that part of the context into which his early views seem to fit is precisely the new approach that a scientific psychology was beginning to bring to classical philosophical problems like the nature of knowledge. The *a priori* Hegelian construct, with its derivation of the real from the rational, was seen by mid nineteenth-century mental scientists as hopelessly out of step with the empirical and scientific realism that emerged in the progress of disciplines like biology and physiology, and which had inevitable consequences for a science of mind. The new psychology of the nineteenth century took (among other things) the representational character of mental states as a proper object of scientific investigation; and interpreted it as an important element in the construction of our scientific knowledge. Mental states were presumed to be directed onto the non-mental world, a world about which we could have genuine knowledge. Thus the aim of late nineteenth century mental science in the burgeoning discipline of empirical psychology is the attempt to formulate identity and determination conditions for the mind and its contents in a legitimately scientific way. The thinkers of this period, as we have noted, were united in guiding their subject away from its history of scientifically suspect metaphysics (shades of idealism) or non-scientific theology (shades of the soul).⁴⁴ A distinction between acts of mind and their objects that took seriously the thesis that objects of thought were extra-mental promised not only a properly scientific psychology (linked to the extra-mental world and grounded in experience) but a chance, as they saw it, to draw credible scientific conclusions about knowledge and about philosophical worries like skepticism—a sticking point, as Ward and others often pointed out, in the epistemology of the classical empiricists. As I suggested above, the new psychology was characterized by a form of scientific realism about mental states that we can take for granted today but which had to contend then with joint opposition from neo-Hegelianism in philosophy and a wholly material conception of mind from the physiologists. What I believe has been overlooked as an element in the development of Moore's early thought is the way that this anti-psychologism about psychology helped to introduce the contemporary understanding of mental states as propositional—complex logical, not psychological, entities—that we see articulated explicitly for the first time in the realism of Moore's NJ.

7. Conclusion

Moore's undergraduate apprenticeship in philosophy was spent without question in the long—but waning—shadow of the neo-Hegelian metaphysics of the late nineteenth century. But I have argued here that there is credible evidence that Moore's early work

exhibits to an appreciable degree the influence of the work of Stout, Ward and the German-language developments in empirical psychology that were their influences, especially in the formulations of mind and mental content, formulations that have become mainstream today. As a result, I think it is clear that the expressions 'idealism' and 'realism' must be carefully interpreted in the context of comparative examinations of the mid nineteenth-century psychologists' view of the mind and the neo-Hegelian views of that period. This is particularly relevant with respect to the reconstruction of the views of Moore (and Russell) at the early part of the century. For instance, as we saw above, Bradley—the governing representative of British nineteenth century neo-Hegelian Absolutism—was a stringent critic of the classical empiricists; but he had this in common with nearly all the mid to late nineteenth-century psychologists who were united against the associationism it represented, and who were anxious to move the investigation of mind onto firmer scientific footing. Furthermore, Bradley's criticism of the empiricists was directed onto their *subjective* phenomenalism; against which he argued for what we might call an objective Idealism. For Bradley, the distinction between appearance and reality was the distinction between a rational reality over and above subjective appearances. For the early psychologists, including Lotze and Herbart, and certainly Ward and Stout, the distinction between appearance and reality was that between the representations that were the object of psychological investigation and the extra-mental reality those representations were representations of.

The account of Moore's influences that I have argued for here supports the view that what Dummett has called the 'extrusion of thought from the mind'—has a complex history. I think it is true that the extrusion of thought from the mind is deeply influential on the development of early analytic philosophy, and that Frege's discoveries in logic and philosophical logic have ultimately played no small role in its development. But the anti-psychologism characteristic of Frege's logic was not known by Ward or by Russell in 1896, when Moore began his moral sciences Tripos preparation; and not known at all by Moore between 1896–1898.⁴⁵ It is to do both Stout and Ward a historical and conceptual disservice not to emphasize that they themselves made prolific and substantive contributions to the issue of the extrusion of thought from the mind as scientifically minded psychologists—contributions that were far more accessible to Moore, and for which there is direct evidence of his exposure. In Moore's hands, I have argued, the extrusion of thought from the mind as represented in NJ rang the curtain down on nineteenth-century philosophy; and also on nineteenth-century mental science. NJ represents not only the inception of an entirely contemporary metaphysics of mind but also of an entirely different method in philosophy, whose transit through the first half of the twentieth century was further influenced in no small part by Moore's mature views.

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⁴³ Ward (1883a,b, 1887, 1899).

⁴⁴ See, for example, Ward (1893), and Mace (1954), p. 69.

⁴⁵ According to Griffin (1991), p. 42, Ward gave Russell Frege's Begriffsschrift (Frege, 1967 [1879]) when Russell was a Fellow (thus as early as 1895 or 1896). According to Griffin, Ward had read neither, and Russell does not appear to have read Frege independently as early as this (see Russell, 1903, p. xviii). There is no evidence, moreover, that Moore was at all familiar with Frege at this period.

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